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ABSTRACT
At the time of independence, in 1947 the state of economy 
of Pakistan was very poor. During the past four decades, as 
a result of conscious efforts from different governments, a 
sustained growth of gross national product (GNP) of more 
than 5 percent per annum in real terms has been achieved. 
During this time the economy has also gone through basic 
structural transformation with a significant rise of the 
share of industrial output in gross domestic product (GDP).
During the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) a record level 
of investment (as percent of GNP) was achieved with the help 
of foreign capital. The success of the Second Five Year Plan 
encouraged the Planners in Pakistan to push further forward 
a strategy of high growth rate with the help of foreign 
capital. The long term objective, in a frame work of "two 
gap model", was to terminate the dependence on foreign 
capital over a period of twenty years (i.e. 1965 to 1985). 
However, this objective could not be achieved. Instead 
Pakistan has been facing a problem of persistent current 
account deficit despite a dramatic increase in the private 
transfers from abroad in the 1970's and 1980's. As a result 
of external deficit for a very long period, Pakistan 
accumulated a massive foreign debt; the pace of which 
particularly accelerated in the aftermath of two oil price 
shocks. However, there is no clear evidence of a coherent 
fiscal and/or monetary policy which could restore the
(vii)
external balance. The measures taken by various governments 
have been mostly of administrative kind and a few ad-hoc 
export promotion schemes. The only important development in 
second half of 1980s was the introduction of a flexible 
exchange rate.
Failure of the structural approach to balance of payments 
(as advocated by "two gap" models) coupled with a fall in 
grants and grants like foreign capital from developed 
countries to the developing countries have shifted the 
argument in favour of macroeconomic policies. Now imports 
and exports gap is most often seen as a consequence of ill 
conceived economic policies rather than a simple structural 
problem.
Macroeconomic policies are basically guided by the 
traditional "expenditure changing" and expenditure 
switching" policies. These tend to pay more emphasis on 
demand side of economy and ignore changes in financial 
assets, physical capital and the aggregate prices. 
Monetarists, on the other hand, have associated a central 
role with money to play in balance of payments adjustment.
Keeping in view the difficulties associated with building 
a macroeconomic model for a developing country like 
Pakistan, we have built an open economy model where 
aggregate demand, prices, financial and capital assets, 
balance of payments, and foreign debt have all been
(viii)
combined.
The simulation results of our model clearly demonstrate 
that exports and imports do respond to an appropriate policy 
instrument. Adjustment is particularly found to be strong 
with government consumption cuts. The exchange rate 
depreciation, however, has not been found to be an adequate 
policy measurer to improve balance of payments deficit. Any 
nominal exchange rate depreciation is ultimately transformed 
in to an equal domestic price rise and as a result the 
initial gains in terms of improvement in balance of payments 
are completely off set by the subsequent price rise. It is 
only the real exchange rate depreciation which could 
possibly bring a permanent "expenditure switching".
In an event of a shortfall of foreign resources, 
introduction of a cut in investment has not been found to be 
an appropriate solution because of its consequences for 
exports and home product inflation. But, if it is considered 
difficult to cut government consumption then desirable 
adjustment results could be achieved with a smaller cut in 
government investment rather than private investment, though 
in case of Pakistan reality is the other way round.
(ix)
CHAPTER 1
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH STRATEGIES OF PAKISTAN
1.1 Introduction
Pakistan emerged as an independent state on 14th August, 
1947. At the time of independence state of the economy was 
very poor(l). Per capita gross national product (GNP) was 
only RS.222 (1949-50 prices) and level of savings and
investment was below 5 percent of the GNP. More than fifty 
percent of the GNP was coming from agricultural sector. The 
manufacturing sector was confined to small scale cottage 
industry and its contribution to the GNP was about 8 
percent. According to census, conducted in 1952, 75 percent 
of labour force was employed in the agricultural sector and 
22 percent in the manufacturing sector.
During the past four decades different governments have 
pursued various economic policies and the economy has gone 
through basic economic transformation. Figure 1.1 indicates 
the long range pattern of economy in terms of GNP (1975-76 
prices). The trend growth rate of GNP during 1959 to 1987 
has been more than 5 percent per annum. The yearly growth 
rate of GNP is shown in Figure 1.2. (Figure 1.2, besides the 
annual actual values of growth rates, also shows the growth 
rates smoothed by a five years moving average). Most 
obvious, perhaps, is the significant dislocation caused by
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the political events and war during 1970-72. The prewar peak 
of growth rate ( 11.4 percent ) is unprecedented and doubts 
must exist concerning the accuracy of estimates. Similarly 
the growth rate for the year 1977-78 is very high (2). 
During this period the economy has also gone through 
significant internal structural change. The share of 
industry value added has increased and that of the
agricultural sector has fallen in gross domestic product 
(GDP). Table 1.1 provides the changing pattern of sectoral 
shares in GDP for the years indicated.
Table 1.1 
Share of Gross Domestic Product 
1949 1965 1975 1985 1987
GDP 100 100 100 100 100
Agr. 53 37 33 26 24
Industry 8 15 16 19 20
Other 39 48 51 55 56
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88
Economic growth of Pakistan is quite impressive and among 
the low income countries Pakistan is listed in "three top 
growth performers ( i.e.Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan)" {see 
for example Yousuf and Peters (1985, p9) and Stern (1989, 
p4^. In the following section we will briefly review the 
economic growth strategies adopted by Pakistan over the past 
four decades.
3
I1.2 Strategies of Economic Growth
Literature in the field of economic growth and development 
is voluminous and enormous. Our objective is not to provide 
a full review of theories developed in this field (3). We 
will only look at the important developments on the subject 
and see how these theories have influenced the economic 
policies in Pakistan which made foreign capital to assume an 
important position in the efforts towards economic 
development of Pakistan.
It was Harrod (1939, 1949) who made first important
contribution to aggregate growth theory. The extension of 
Keynesian short run employment theory into long run growth 
theory in the form of Harrod-Domar equation 'g = s/k1 (where 
*gr' is growth rate, 's' is savings rate and 'k' is the 
capital output ratio) is the natural point of departure in 
the history of economic growth. The Harrod-Domar analysis 
gives emphasis on savings and capital output ratio as 
determinants of growth rate. Logic and idea behind the 
equation are so powerful that these are still the first 
aspects that are examined in any proposed or actual growth 
path. It implies that growth process could be accelerated by 
increasing savings or minimizing the capital output ratio. 
Historically development economics which is mainly concerned 
with growth theories in the context of developing countries, 
was emerging as a new subject at the time when Harrod and
4
Domar were dynamising Keynesian percepts in order to avoid 
secular stagnation, (see Arndt (1978,p33).
In the context of developing countries Nurkse1s (1953) 
work ( "Problems of Capital Formation in the Underdeveloped 
Countries") is a starting and probably the most influential 
line of thoughts in the field of development economics. 
According to his thesis capital formation is a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for economic growth. More 
or less same view was confirmed by other economists. Kuznets 
(1966) provided a statistical creditabi1ity to the view that 
economic growth is associated with a steady growth of 
capital. The discussion of economic growth has also been 
much influenced by the articles of Rosenstein Rodan and 
Hirschman. Rosenstein Rodan (1943) who put forward the idea 
of a "big push" with an element of "balance growth" seems to 
be a combination of Keynesian notion of effective demand and 
Simithian idea of the size of market. His basic thesis is 
that small investment in isolation could not be economically 
feasible because of inadequate demand for output. But if 
many investments, principally in the industrial sector, took 
place simultaneously they could all be profitable because 
the increase in income could be sufficient to provide 
large enough market for all the outputs. This appears to be 
an implicit closed economy model because no role is given to 
international market. Hirschman's (1958) analysis, in 
contrast to Rosenstein Rodan's "balance approach", argues
5
for a large investment from government (particularly in 
basic infrastructure) to create "imbalance" so that an 
entrepreneurial decision making class could emerge with the 
process of "backward linkages" to fill shortages in other 
sectors.
Lewis (1954 and 1955) raised a number of crucial issues in 
a clear and systematic way. Many of these have been central 
to subsequent discussion of development of an underdeveloped 
economy. These include:
(i) the determinants of savings and its influence on 
economic growth;
(ii) the appropriate choice of capital intensity in 
investment and
(iii) the interrelationship between income and growth 
in the process of change.
In analyzing the process of growth Lewis has made classical 
assumptions of unlimited supply of labour at fixed wages, 
the accumulation of capital only in the advanced industrial 
sector and savings only out of profits. In his model, 
process of economic growth may be seen simply as an 
absorption of labour by the advanced sector with the savings 
rate for the whole economy increasing over time as the
6
profits rise along the increasing share of the advanced 
sector. According to Lewis, theory of economic growth is an 
understanding of process by which savings as percentage of 
GNP increase from five percent to twelve percent (4) For 
Rostow (1960) a ten percent savings and investment is a 
precondition for "take off" (5).
1.2.1 Foreign capital and economic growth
Extending the line of argument of Harrod-Domar model to 
the developing countries, receiving aid from U.S.A, Fei and 
Paaw (1965) developed a macro model with emphasis on the 
role of foreign capital in the development of underdeveloped 
countries.
According to Fei and Paaw model, a required level of 
investment 'I/Y'(investment as ratio of GNP) is a function 
of capital output ratio (k), target rate of growth of GNP
(h) and population growth rate (r) i.e.
I/Y = k (h + r ) [1.1]
Substituting this into
I = S + A [1.2]
(where 'S' and 'A' stand for domestic savings and foreign
7
capital inflow respectively) gives growth rate
h = (s-rk)/k + a/k [1.3]
('s' and 'a' are for 'S' and 'A' as fraction of 'Y' (GNP) 
(6). From this Fei and Paaw derived the conclusion that 
domestic per capita income will increase only if population 
pressure is so low that 's/k* is greater than population 
growth rate 'r'. If the 's/k' is less than 'r' the per 
capita GNP will fall unless foreign savings are available to 
make '(s+a)/k greater than 'r'. In view of non availability 
of foreign capital for indefinite period, Fei and Paaw 
introduced the concept of Per Capita Marginal Savings 
(PCMS)- a function 'u' which takes incremental per capita 
savings as constant fraction of incremental per capita 
income. On the basis of this new function 'u' they 
identified following different cases
(i) There are favourable cases where no foreign 
capital is required because !k(h+r)' is less than the 
initial savings rate (’s') and investment target of 
'I/Y' can be achieved from these savings.
(ii) There are cases where in the initial stage 
'k(h+r)' is greater than 's' but less than long run 
capital growth rate ('u'). In this case the gap of 
domestic savings and investment is filled by the
8
foreign capital and terminates by a finite date. 
According to Fei, Pakistan was in this category.
(iii) There are unfavourable cases where 'k(h+r)' 
exceeds the long run growth of the capital. The gap 
between domestic savings and investment would 
continue unless GNP growth rate • h' or population 
growth rate 'r' is reduced by a significant margin.
1.2.1.1 Dual Gap Hypothesis
Fei and Paaw model, discussed above, makes no distinction 
in domestic and foreign savings. In other words domestic 
savings are perfect substitutes of foreign savings. Several 
articles have appeared in which the assumption of complete 
substitution between domestic and foreign resources has been 
dropped and saving-investment gap and imports-exports gap 
have been combined. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these 
theories is " Foreign Assistance and Economic Development" 
put forward by Chenery and Strout (1966) . Chenery and Bruno 
in 1962 started criticizing what they called "the formal 
growth theories " which failed "to clarify the relation 
among several instruments of development policy" (7). They
emphasized: (i) the separate role of ' foreign resource
(excess of imports over exports); (ii) the present and 
future composition of demand; and (iii) the ability to plan 
and implement development activities. According to Chenery
9
and Bruno (1962) these considerations- are not much 
important for developed countries, but are most often the 
principal limits to growth of developing countries (8).
The two gaps are associated with demand and supply
of foreign exchange where import demand may exceed exports 
plus net foreign transfers. An important point of departure 
is the role of foreign capital which it can play in terms of 
"contribution to mobilization and allocation of all 
productive resources" (9).
Initially in 1962 a case study was done by Chenery and 
Bruno for Israel which was subsequently developed into a 
full Chenery-Strout (1966) Model. The full Chenery-Strout 
model consists three distinct phases. Phase I and II make up 
investment limited growth. Phase I terminates when 
investment reaches a level to sustain the target growth rate 
of GNP (r). In order to achieve this target the rate of 
investment growth has to be maintained above 'r' with the 
help of foreign capital inflow. In Phase II GNP and
investment rise at a constant rate with continuous inflow of 
foreign capital, the level of which is determined by the
marginal propensity to save, the target growth rate and
capital output ratio. Phase III which is a "trade limited 
growth" phase reflects country's inability to change its 
productive structure in a manner to meet the changing
pattern of internal and external demand. The central problem
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in Phase III is two fold. On the one hand the economy starts 
to develop an inelastic demand for imports to sustain the 
production in the economy and on the other hand, because of 
the institutional and organizational factors, exports can­
not finance the required level of imports. Now it is the 
imports-exports gap which dominates and puts a limit on 
growth. Key elements of the two gap hypothesis can be 
presented algebraically as following:-
where
Yt = Yo(l+r)1 [1.4]
It = kr Yt [1.5]
St = So + s (Yt-Yo) [1.6]
Mt = Mo + m(Y -Yo) [1.7]
Xt * Xo + (1 + x)1 [1.8]
Y = GNP
I = desired level of investment 
S = Domestic savings 
M = total imports 
X = total exports 
r = target rate of growth of GNP 
k = capital out put ratio 
m = marginal propensity to import and 
x = exogenously determined rate of growth of 
exports
By definition imports-exports gap 'Ft'is
Ft = Mt - Xt [1.9]
Putting [1.7] and [1.8] in [1.9]
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Ft = Mo + m(Yt-Yo) - Xo + (1 + x)1 [1.10]
shows that in order to eliminate the trade gap either the 
export growth rate 'x1 must exceed the target growth rate of 
GNP 'r' or the marginal import ratio ' m' must be 
substantially below the initial average import ratio. This 
condition establishes the trade criterion for progress 
towards self sustaining growth. An important feature of 
Phase III, different from Fei and Paaw model, is level of 
domestic savings which are now enough to meet investment 
requirements but these could not be fully transformed into 
foreign exchange to fill the exports-imports gap.
In the dual gap hypothesis following assumptions must hold 
simultaneously for a country to be in foreign exchange 
bottleneck:-
(i) There must be no further possibilities of import 
substitution.
(ii) Export earnings must be completely inelastic.
(iii) The import content of current production must 
be unalterable.
If any of these assumption is relaxed the country canr\_ot be
12
in a foreign exchange bottleneck.
The whole model and approach came under fire for its 
stringent assumptions of fixed and inelastic coefficients 
with regard to import and exports (see for example Lai (1972 
and 1988), Cline (1984) Stern (1989)^. In particular if it 
is assumed that there is an excess of demand for foreign 
exchange, then one could counter argue that the relative 
price of foreign exchange can change (and will change if 
permitted to do so) exports potential and import demand will 
respond to price changes. The two-gap approach has also been 
heavily criticized because of its failure to take into 
account the debt servicing which is most often the prime 
cause of excess of demand over supply of foreign exchange. 
These are certainly important questions which must be 
properly addressed. We understand that an appropriate
answer to these fundamental questions lies in dropping the 
unrealistic assumptions of "two-gap" model and then
examining the issue in a consistent macroeconomic 
framework.
1.2.2 Impact of Foreign Capital
Almost all foreign aid theories and models agree that
foreign capital plays a critical role in achieving the
objectives of sustained economic growth and some target rate 
of increase in the output per capita of a recipient country.
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The theories and models (discussed above) have provided an 
analytical framework to determine the amount and timing for 
foreign capital inflow. The central and crucial question is 
however/ that whether foreign capital has been effective and 
beneficial in terms of achieving its objective.
The opinion with regard to role of foreign capital in the 
economic development of underdeveloped countries differs 
significantly {see Riddell (1987) for a comprehensive 
survey of opinion about impact of foreign capital both from 
marxist and capitalist economists}. The argument in favour 
of foreign capital, as potential source of growth, is based 
on standard result that investment is profitable as long as 
the rate of return exceeds the rate of interest {see
Thirlwall (1983, pp296-297) for mathematical proof}. While 
for the critics from the left, foreign capital plays 
imperialistic role ^e.g.Hayter (1971), Santos (1972j} the 
criticism from less left and right position is in terms of 
its negative impact on domestic savings (or increase in
private and/or government consumption) (see for example 
Bauer (1981), Griffin (1970) Griffin and Enos (1970), 
Weisskopf (1972) Mosley (1980 and 1986) and Mosley et al« 
(1987^.
The rationale of this negative impact of foreign capital 
on domestic savings stems from conventional text book
question of whether countries require foreign capital
14
because they need foreign exchange to acquire capital goods 
from abroad or whether foreign capital should be considered 
more broadly as supplement to resources employed by the
economy for consumption (C), investment (I), and government 
services (G) which make the total absorption (A) as 
following:-
A = C + I + G = Y + M - X  [1.11]
where 'Y', 'M' and 'X' stand for domestic output, imports
and exports. From [1.11] above it is evident that an
increase in capital imports may not constitute a net
supplement to domestic investment, but may also be used in 
part to increase the consumption level and will therefore 
not help to achieve the objective of economic growth.
However, all these attacks have been equally countered by 
others (see Papaneck (1972, 1973), Levy (1987^. Papaneck
(1973) in his major study "Aid, Foreign Private investment, 
Savings and Growth in Less Developed Countries" related 
domestic growth to three types of foreign capital inflow:
(i) aid (a); (ii) private investment (f) and (iii) other 
foreign flows(o). With domestic savings ratio (sd) as 
additional explanatory variable, for eighty-five countries 
he found strong positive influence of foreign capital on GDP 
growth rate (y). Following is his estimated equation :
y = 1.5 +0.2 sd + 0.39 a + 0.17 f + 0.19 o [1.12]
(6.0) (5.8) (2.5) (2.1)
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Levy (1987) in a cross country empirical study observed that 
only that part of foreign transfers add to consumption which 
are in fact meant for consumption. Similarly Pack and Pack 
(1990) in a case study for Indonesia found no evidence that 
aid has caused any increase in government consumption. The 
key argument of Papaneck (1972), which was subsequently 
accepted by Mosley et a l . (1987), was about the simultaneous 
causation ( i.e. aid may go to those countries with the 
weakest growth performance). Mosley et a l ., therefore, made 
another attempt in 1987 by employing standard simultaneous 
equation techniques of econometrics (two and three stage 
least square). Their ultimate result, however, could not 
comprehensively establish the negative impact of foreign 
capital on growth or savings {see Stern (1989, p635)>. The
analysis of Riddell (1987), based on historical evidence of 
particular countries, is direct and has found that foreign 
capital is often beneficial.
1.2.3 Concluding remarks
In the 1950’s and 1960's the flow of foreign capital to 
developing countries occupied the central position in the 
literature of economic development and in the politics of 
relation between rich and poor countries. The Pearson (1969) 
report on aid was, particularly, a major event at that time. 
The quantity of aid from developed countries to developing
16
countries, however, has remained small in total as against 
the UN criteria of 0.7 percent of developed countries GNP 
(emphasized in the Brandt report). At the moment the 
conditions of any major transfer of resource from rich 
countries to poor countries in terms of non repayable grants 
and soft loans and credits are very slim. Compared with 
1950s and 1960s, the 1970s witnessed a significant change in 
the composition of capital inflow to developing countries. 
In the mid 1960's grants and grant like flow plus foreign 
direct investment occupied for more than half (58 percent in 
1966) of the net flow of the financial resources of 
developing countries (10). The commercial lending along with 
official lending grew very rapidly during last decade and as 
a result the total external debt of developing countries 
also started to rise sharply.
In view of these new developments the argument with regard 
to excess of demand over supply for foreign exchange has 
changed and assumed new dimension. It is now seen as a 
macroeconomic imbalance where excess of imports over exports 
is considered to be the consequence of ill conceived 
economic policies. For example "Large budget deficits, 
overvalued exchange rate, and measures that discourage 
domestic savings all bias an economy toward relying on 
foreign capital" (11). The balance of argument has now 
strongly shifted towards stabilization policies and 
structural adjustment which attempt to correct the balance
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of payments deficit and excess demand by changing the real 
exchange rate, liberalizing trade and tightening fiscal 
policy {see for example Balssa (1981) and Killick (1982 and 
1985)}. These are particularly associated with the IMF and 
its task is to help to resolve short run balance of payments 
problem. The World Bank with its longer term perspective has 
been increasingly involved in structural adjustment 
policies. Most often these two agencies co-ordinate their 
programmes and move together.^see Khan et al* (1986) for a 
synthesis of IMF and World Bank approaches^ .
1.3 Economic Growth Strategies of Pakistan
In order to solve its basic economic problems, economic 
policies in pakistan have been often prepared under an 
influence of popular ideas and economic growth theories of 
that time.
After independence in 1947 the first three years were 
primarily devoted to rehabilitation and overcoming the 
basic distortions of the economy caused by the partition. A 
six year Development programme was hurriedly prepared for 
1951-1957. This was subsequently replaced by the First Five 
Year Plan (1955-1960). The first decade (1950-1960) of 
economic policy making in Pakistan was characterized by 
heavy emphasis on the establishment of import substituting 
industry (ISI) in the consumer goods sector while machinery
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was mostly imported from abroad {see Power (1963)}* The
basic strategy was "to restrain the growth of agricultural 
incomes and facilitate investment in industry by private 
entrepreneur"(12) The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) of 
Planning Commission Government of Pakistan states that"there 
was a considerable transfer of income from agricultural to 
the industrial sector as terms of trade were deliberately 
turned against agriculture through such policies as 
1icensing of scarce foreign exchange earned primarily by 
agriculture to the industrial sector, compulsory government 
procurement of food grains at low prices to subsidize the 
cost of living of the urban industrial workers, generous tax 
concessions to industry and lack of similar incentives for 
commercial agricultural investment"(13). By these means up 
to the first half of of the sixties, on the average 3600 
million rupees annually were being transferred from 
agriculture to urban industrial sector(14). This according 
to one study was about 15 percent of the gross agricultural 
output(15).
The ISI policy initially appeared to be quite successful 
which resulted in expansion of the industry by 43 percent 
till 1955. The successful import substitution, strict 
control on imports, Korean Boom and the low propensity to 
import (which is quite usual with the low level of GNP in 
any economy) led to a surplus in balance of payments of 
about $338.7 million (1117.7 million rupees) between 1950 to
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1955. The average annual investment during this period was 
slightly above 5 percent of GNP of which 82 percent was 
financed by domestic resources and only 18 percent was from 
foreign resources. The rate of domestic savings also went up 
to 8 percent of GNP as compared to 5 percent at the beginning
The policy in terms of expansion of industrial sector was 
to some extent successful. But the squeeze of the
agricultural sector resulted in a significant fall in its 
production. The rate of growth of agricultural output was
barely half the rate of growth of population. The supply of
foreign exchange was also affected because of low increase 
in agricultural production. This was a quite logical 
reaction of agricultural sector to its continual 
exploitation "The strategy of indirect transfers [of 
resources from agricultural to industrial sector] had
reached a dead end "(16)
1.3.1 Foreign capital and domestic investment
During 1960-1965 two major shifts in economic policy could 
be clearly identified. Firstly, the policy of transfers of 
resources from agricultural sector was now precisely 
channeled to those groups of the community whose marginal 
savings rates were thought to be relatively higher. Haq 
(1963), the Chief Economist of Planning Commission 
Government of Pakistan, forcefully presented the idea that
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"there exist a functional justification for inequality of 
income if it raises production for all and not consumption
for a few.......  The road to eventual equal ities may
invariably be through initial inequalities." (17).The
combination of policies of transfers of resources from
agricultural sector to entrepreneurial class of modern 
industrial sector appear quite close to Lewis model where 
savings are assumed to be only from profits earned by the 
advanced industrial sector. According to Papaneck (1967, 
chapter 2) this was a typical Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
creation in Pakistan.
The second major shift was the emphasis accorded to high 
level investment supported by external resources. "A big push 
concentrated in a period of ten to fifteen years" was now 
considered to "do the trick" of attaining self sustained
growth (18). As a result of this new strategy a major share 
of total investment was now financed by the foreign capital. 
The share of foreign capital in domestic investment, which 
was only 13.6 percent during 1954-55 reached to 40 percent 
in the year 1964-65 (19). The total investment also
increased to 21.5 percent of GNP which is the highest rate 
achieved in Pakistan. The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) is 
one of the most successful plan during which most of the 
economic objectives were achieved. Foreign capital played a 
major role in this success by filling the foreign exchange 
and saving investment gaps, {see Griffin (1965), Nurul Islam
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(1972), Brecher and Abbas (1972) Baqai and Brecher (1973), 
and Awan (1978)}.
Success of the Second Five Year plan encouraged planners 
to push forward this strategy further into a long term 
perspective in an analytical framework of the two-gap 
model.The "Optimal Pattern of Growth and Aid- The Case of
Pakistan" by Chenery and MacEwan (published in 1966) was at
the root of first Perspective Plan (1965-85). The explicit 
aims of the Perspective included (i) quadrupling of the GNP 
during twenty years and (ii) elimination of dependence on
foreign aid (20). A basic framework and key assumptions of
the model are summarized in Table 1.2.
The objective of the Perspective Plan was to eliminate
dependence on foreign capital. However, this overoptimistic
assessment of the plan was not supported by independent
studies {see Rahman (1967) and Kemal (1975)}. The objective
of elimination of dependence on foreign capital could not be
achieved though some success has been made by reducing it in
relative terms. The foreign capital is now financing about
30 percent of the total investment which was above 50
percent till 1975. Table 1.3 provides yearly details of
investment (with segregation for government and private
investment) and foreign capital inflow in terms of
percentage of GNP and the share of domestic investment
! financed by foreign capital.
\i
i
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Table 1.2
Basic FrameiWork and Key Assumptions of 
Pakistan's Long-Term Growth (1965-85)
compound
growth
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 rate(Sfc)
(A) As % of GNP
(1)Gross Investment
(2)Gross Domestic
18.4 20.2 21.4 22.1 22 .9 8.5
Savings 10.3 13.6 16.9 20.2 21.8 11.4
(3)External Resources 8.1 6.6 4.5 1.9 1.1 -3.0
(4)Exports 6.7 7.6 8.1 8.5 7.5 7.9
(5)Imports 15.3 14.2 12.6 10.4 8.6 4.2
(B) Key Assumptions
(l)GNP growth rate (Sis) 5.2 6.5 7.3 7.5 7.5
(2)Marginal savings(Sls) 22 22 25 28 25
(3)Capital-output Ratio 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 3
(4)Marginal propensity
to import 12 9 6 4
Source The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70 Table 1
During 1950 to 1955 foreign capital financed only about 18 
percent of the total investment. From Second Five Year Plan 
(1960-65) onward foreign capital has always been a 
significant component of investment financing. The reliance 
on foreign capital was accorded so high priority that 
according to Griffin (1965, p621) "the entire social and
economic system and the planning exercise which is its 
manifestation, is supported and sustained by foreign
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Table 1.3
Foreign Capital Inflow and Investment(21) 
, PERCENT OF GNP ,
INVESTMENT
FOREIGN
YEAR TOTAL PRIVATE GOVT CAPITAL
FOREIGN CAPITAL 
AS % OF TOTAL 
INVESTMENT
1959 10.54 3.08 7.46 3.87 36.72
1960 13.10 8.51 4.59 8.77 66.95
1961 14.47 6.52 7.95 7.50 51.83
1962 17.29 6.02 11.27 11.21 64.84
1963 20.42 11.95 8.48 10.86 53.18
1964 21.52 11.32 10.20 12.28 57.06
1965 17.65 9.45 8.21 8.76 49.63
1966 16.59 8.13 8.47 8 .66 52.20
1967 15.06 8.03 7.03 9.28 61.62
1968 13.72 7.15 6.57 6.82 49.71
1969 14.31 6.82 7.50 6.38 44.58
1970 13.89 6.28 7.61 6.61 47.59
1971 12.44 6.33 6.11 4.39 35.29
1972 11.25 5 .72 5.54 5 .69 50.58
1973 11.96 4.48 7.49 6.20 51.84
1974 14.44 4.89 9.54 9.45 65.44
1975 18.04 5.83 12.21 9.34 51.77
1976 17.95 4.95 13.00 7.38 41.11
1977 16.19 4.59 11 .60 5 .37 33. 17
1978 15.82 3 .98 11.83 5.44 34.39
1979 16.36 4.58 11.79 6.59 40.28
1980 14.32 3.91 10.41 4.07 28.42
1981 14.17 3.00 11.17 5.52 38.96
1982 14.07 4.29 9.78 6.26 44.49
1983 13.78 4.83 8.95 4.22 30.62
1984 13.80 5.14 8.66 4.00 28.99
1985 13.75 5.12 8.63 4.50 32.73
1986 14.56 5.93 8.63 4.58 31.46
1987 14.20 6.05 8.15 4.42 31.13
Source: Economic Survey of pakistan 1987-88
assistance". It is quite interesting to note that for the 
Third Five Year Plan, which included the long term strategy 
to eliminate dependence on foreign capital, the request 
for external assistance was 300 percent more than that 
obtained during 1955 to 1960.(22).
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In general there appears association between foreign 
capital inflow and investment in Pakistan. Figure 1.3 shows 
the movements in the ratio of foreign capital and investment 
as percent of GNP. The precise regression coefficient and 
R-Square are as following:
IY = 9.8 + 0.75 FKY [1.12]
(5.6) (5.3)
R Squr: 0.51
IY and FKY stand for investment and foreign capital as 
percent of GNP. Figures in parenthesis are for t-ratios.
An important feature of investment in Pakistan is a 
substantial large share of investment from the public sector* 
Figure 1.4 compares the public and private investment over 
past three decades. After a rapid expansion during seventies 
and first half of eighties the gap between private and 
public sector investment is now closing. Political factors 
have played an important role in distribution of investment 
between the public and private sectors. Nationalization of 
a number of industries and financial institutions in the 
early seventy's substantially increased the share of public 
sector investment (23). The relationship of foreign capital 
with public and private investment is quite interesting. 
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 compare the ratios of private and public 
investment to GNP with the ratio of foreign capital to GNP. 
A separate regression for the private and the public
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investment shows that private investment is more associated 
with the foreign capital inflow. However, the public 
investment has not shown such relationship with foreign 
capital inflow. The estimated coefficients with respect to 
private and public investments are as follow
PIY = 1.7 + 0.65 FKY [1.13]
(1.1) (5.2)
R Squr: 0.52
GIY = 8.2 + 0.0.01 FKY [1.14]
(3.8) (0.06)
R Squr: 0.10
(PIY and GIY stand for private investment and government
investment as percent of GNP). These results implicitly 
suggest that the brunt of a shock of fall in foreign
resources is born by the private sector while the public
sector investment stands protected.
1.4 Changing attitude
At the end of Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) it was
recognized that foreign debt and debt service liability were 
increasing rapidly. (This issue will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3). The total foreign debt outstanding which was 
only 462 million rupees in 1959 climbed to 3146 million by 
the end of Second Five Year Plan (1960-65). Since then there 
has been no pause in this rising trend and the debt is 
increasing almost exponentially. Between 1959 and 1987 it
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has increased annually at compound rate of about 21 percent. 
The increase in debt liability also increased the debt 
service payments which has substantially reduced the net 
inflow of capital to Pakistan as given in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4
Net Foreign Capital Inflow as Percent 
of Gross Capital Inflow
Net as percent of 
Years Gross capital inflow
1951-60 100
1960-65 91
1965-70 80
1970-78 68
1978-83 52
1983-88 32
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88
The accumulation of debt and the changed international 
environment with regard to availability of grants and grants 
like loans/credits forced planners to change their attitude 
towards foreign capital as easy option for financing 
domestic investment. The Second Perspective Plan (1988-2003) 
just like the First Perspective Plan (1965-85) envisages to 
reduce dependence on external resources to the level of 0.9 
percent of GNP (24).The important departure in policy is the 
absence of dogmas and phrases of fifty's and sixty's. 
Instead, in line with IMF and World Bank the emphasis is now 
more on adjustment policies. World Bank during 1988 
recommended, among other things, the following major areas of
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policy action (25):
(a) public resource mobilization, principally from a 
major tax effort.. . . ;
(b) reduction of the current fiscal deficit....; and
(c) introduction of a phased programme of trade 
liberalization consisting both of export promotion 
and import liberalization.
One can clearly see the reflection of these recommendations 
in the objectives of 7th Five Year Plan (1988-93) which 
include: (26)
(a) to increase the tax/GDP ratio from 13.1 percent 
to 16.1 percent;
(b) to control the growth of government expenditure;
(c) to reduce dependence on external borrowing by 
creating surpluses in the balance of payments; and
(d) to convert the fiscal current account revenue 
deficits into surpluses.
30
1.5 Scope and plan of the study
The discussion of the preceding sections clearly suggests 
that it would be quite inappropriate to pursue further the 
policy of economic growth based on the conventional "two 
gap" model. In order to address the problem properly the 
relationships between broad economic aggregates have to be 
taken into account. We have, therefore, envisaged for our 
study to build a macroeconomic model for Pakistan where 
relationships between macroeconomic variables are defined 
and estimated rigorously. The plan of our study is as 
following.
Next chapter outlines how the balance of payments in 
Pakistan has changed over the past three decades and 
examines its main components. It also includes a broad 
review of balance of payment policies together with the 
review of policies pursued by Pakistan.
Chapter 3 is the natural extension of Chapter 2 and is 
exclusively devoted to the debt and debt service problems 
created by foreign borrowing. Other relevant issues 
associated with the debt problem are also discussed in this 
chapter.
Chapter 4, 5, and 6 constitute the major empirical work of 
this study.
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In chapter 4 a macroeconomic model for Pakistan is defined 
and econometric equations are estimated. The model combines 
aggregate demand, prices, balance of payment and assets 
(financial, capital and foreign debt) accumulation. The 
model has a full dynamic structure which is quite useful to 
see the path of regaining an equilibrium state in response 
to changes in various factors. We believe that a model of 
this kind is a significant improvement over the conventional 
"two gap" model which heavily depends upon so many stringent 
assumptions. However,it is important to mention that 
developing a macroeconomic model for a developing country 
like Pakistan is not an easy task. We have, therefore, 
given a detailed account of difficulties and limitations 
before we entered into the model building processes and 
estimation of equations.
The model described in Chapter 4 has a dynamic structure 
and equations are estimated in log linear form. We, 
therefore, consider simulation as a powerful analytical tool 
for evaluating properties of the model. This not only helps 
to analyse the long run impact of an exogenous change but it 
also shows the path through which the final state is arrived 
and that is what we intend to do. Chapter 5 is fully devoted 
for simulation exercise where the impact of internal and 
external exogenous changes have been evaluated.
Chapter 6, which is the final part of our empirical work.
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particularly describes the simulation results of an external 
shock which reduces the availability of foreign exchange 
resources, and the policy responses in order to regain the 
pre-shock state of the economy. One could see a clear point 
of departure from a simple "two gap " model which does not 
handle policy options in the event of any such shock. It is 
rather interesting to note that according to Fei (1962) such 
a cut in foreign assistance might cause a " sudden death" of 
the economy. We, however, do not agree with such an extreme 
assessment. Instead, we intend to examine a negative impact 
of a shock on the private and public investment and the 
possible policy response to overcome the problem.
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Notes
(1) Political events of 1970 led to separation of eastern 
wing of the country. As a result now Pakistan constitute the 
western wing. Rest of the discussion is only relevant to
present day Pakistan unless otherwise mentioned.
(2) Both peaks have occurred, interestingly, in the years 
following the take over by a military government. These high 
growth rates could either be interpreted as a result of 
restoration of peace and order forcefully brought by the 
military or it could be a malicious attempt to show a bright 
economic picture to justify the change in government.
(3) See Stern (1989) which provides a good survey of 
theories of economic development.
(4) Lewis (1955) (p208).
(5) Rostow (1960) (p37).
(6) Derivation of the equation [1.3] is as following
I = S + A
substituting in equation [1.1] gives
(S + A)/Y = k ( h + r) or
(S/Y) + (A/Y) = k ( h + r ) or
s + a = k ( h + r )  or
h + r = s/k + a/k or
h = (s-rk)/k + ak
(7) Chenery Bruno (1962, p309)
34
(8) ibid (pp309-311)
(9) Chenery (1966, P385)
(10) Nicholas 1981, p^l)
(11) World Development Report (1985, p45)
(12) Griffin (1965, p610)
(13) The Third Five Year Plan Planning Commission Government 
Pakistan, 1965-70 (p7).
(14) Griffin (1965, p612)
(15) Griffin and Khan (1973, p44)
(16) Baqai (1973, p33)
(17) Haq (1963, p21)
(18) ibid (p22)
(19) The Third Five Year Plan, Planning Commission 
Government Pakistan 1965-70 (p8).
(20) ibid (pl7)
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(21) Flow of foreign capital has been further discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3.
( 2 2 ) As 20 (p9 and pl9)
( 2 3 ) For a comprehensive political interpretation of 
economic development of Pakistan see Noman (1988).
( 2 4 ) 7th Five Year Plan 1 9 8 8 - 9 3  and Perspective Plan 
1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 3  Planning Commission Government of Pakistan vol-I 
( P 48 )
( 2 5 ) World Bank (1988, pllO)
( 2 6 ) As 24 (p52)
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CHAPTER 2
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICIES
Some of the aspects of balance of payments (BOP), in terms 
of flow of foreign capital inflow to Pakistan have already 
been touched in Chapter 1. Having discussed the "two gap" 
model, in Chapter 2 now we need to go into details of the 
BOP as a preparation for our full macro study. In 
particular, in this chapter we are going to study the 
various components of BOP accounts and BOP policies with 
special reference to Pakistan.
2.1 The Balance of Payments Accounts
Balance of payment may be defined as a systematic record 
of all transactions between the residents of one country and 
rest of the world over a specified period, usually a year. 
The way in which these accounts are compiled and presented 
differ from country to country. But according to standard 
practice a BOP sheet is always divided into two broad parts 
i.e current account transactions and capital account 
transactions. In this standard form Table 2.1 shows the BOP 
record for the years indicated. (For the period 1951-1987 
the BOP accounts for Pakistan have been appended at the 
end of the chapter).
The current account, represented in rows A-C of Table 2.1,
37
Table 2.1
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN
(MILLION RS)
1959 1972 1979 1986 1987
ITEM/YEAR 1960 1973 1980 1987 1988
(A)TRADE BALANCE 1043 153 -23519 -29076 -32937
(1) Exports 763 8551 23410 63355 78445
(2) Imports -1806 -8398 -46929 -92431 -111382
(B)INVISIBLE(NET) -24 -73 13622 27074 17515
(l)Non Factor Service 0 -701 -2356 -4934 -7968
(2)Investment Income 0 -890 -2782 -11947 -14040
2.1-Income 0 178 515 1581 2387
2.2-Payments 0 -1068 -3297 -13529 -16427
(of which intr.is) 24 900 2891 6498 7529
(3)Private Transfer 0 1518 18761 43955 39523
(of which rem.are) 0 0 13830 39159 35767
(C)CURRENT ACC. BAL. -1067 80 -9897 -2002 -15422
(D)PRIVATE CAPITAL(N) 19 147 1723 5501 4107
(l)Direct Investment 0 0 673 2218 2141
(2)Other long term 0 136 703 1599 1966
(3)Short Term 0 10 347 1685 0
(E)PUBLIC CAPITAL(lO 643 2597 11088 11620 14865
(l)Gross Disb. 671 3717 14553 24049 27589
1.1-Project Aid 267 1047 7999 17293 18147
1.2-Non Food Aid 290 1686 1594 3541 3001
1.3-Food Aid 114 984 208 980 3106
1.4-BOP Support 0 0 4148 0 0
1.5-Relief Ass. 0 0 604 2235 3335
(2)Amortization -29 -1120 -3465 -12428 -12724
(F )ALLOCATION OF SDR 0 0 366 0 0
(G)CHANGES IN RESERVES 162
i
2189» -1047 8564 3454
(H )ERRORS/OMIS SIONS -567 634 4327 6555 95
Source: Appendix Table 2.1
provides details of all those items which relate to 
currently produced goods and services. The capital account 
transactions, on the other hand are concerned with the 
changes in country's stocks of assets which have financial
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claims and therefore affect future income of the country.
The current account (row C in Table 2.1) is the total sum 
of visible and invisible. The visible consists of 
merchandise exports and imports and the balance of these two 
referred to as balance of trade (row A Table 2.1). The 
invisible on the other hand (rows B.l to B.3 of Table 2.1) 
includes non-factors services ( such as freight and 
insurance cost and tourism) factor payments which are net 
inflows of interest, profits, dividends from abroad and 
private transfers which cover things like remittances by 
migrant workers (1).
The capital account , after taking into account the 
changes in the foreign exchange reserves, is the mirror 
image of the current account balance. The capital account 
transactions are generally much more heterogeneous as 
compared to current account balance and, therefore, can be 
presented in many different ways. Generally a distinction is 
made between private and public capital and between 
portfolio and direct investment. The other important items, 
at the bottom of the sheet are about changes in the level 
of foreign exchange reserves. This item in this case is a 
change in holdings of gold and convertible currency with 
State Bank of Pakistan on 30th of June of each year.
The balancing item (row H) records any errors and
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omissions arising from the statistical compilation of the 
statistics.
Having looked at the current account and capital account 
in isolation we could now identify following two important 
relationships between these two:-
(i) Import of capital which is recorded as an inflow 
on capital account in the short run, the cost of this 
has to be paid (excluding grants) in the future in 
terms of factor payments besides amortization of the 
principal.
(ii) Although there will always be either a surplus 
or a deficit on the current account when the two 
accounts are added together they must be in balance 
(after taking into account the changes in reserves 
and statistical errors) by definition. In other words 
a deficit on current account, if not financed from 
the reserves, must be accompanied by an equal 
transfer of capital from abroad. Thus current account 
transactions have a kind of binding implication for a 
capital account so that in an ex-post accounting 
sense BOP always balances.
The illustration so far about current account and capital
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account was in a very broad terms. In the following sections 
we will now discuss various components of current and 
capital account in a more intensive fashion before we 
proceed to the BOP policies.
2.1.1 Current Account Balance
The important components of a current account balance are 
exports, imports and invisible payments . We will discuss 
exports, imports and foreign private transfers from abroad 
in this section but leave returns on private investment and 
interest payments on foreign loans for the next chapter 
which has been primarily devoted for such items. These 
details will provide a basis for our econometric work 
described in Chapter 4.
2.1.1.1 Exports
Exports is one of the most important and the principal 
source of payment for imports and to a large extent the over 
all picture of BOP is determined by the volume of exports.
Exports from Pakistan ,except for the year 1972-73, have 
been less than imports despite a regular upward trend in 
real terms. Estimated, using a semi-log method, exports have 
grown in real terms at a compound rate of 8 percent per
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annum between 1959 and 1987. The estimated equation is as 
follows:-
x = 7.95 + 0.08 Trend [2.1]
(where x is natural log of exports.)
The growth of exports from 1959 to 1973 was quite 
significant and was about 13 percent which subsequently came 
down to 6 percent in the later period. The rate of growth of 
exports has remained faster than the growth of GDP. As a 
result the share of exports in GDP has been regularly 
increasing*Table 2.2 provides yearly details of the share of 
exports in GDP. Figure 2.1 clearly shows a regular upward 
trend of share of exports in GDP.
According to economic classification exports are divided 
into three categories: (i) primary commodities ; (ii)
semi-manufactures and (iii) manufactures. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 
illustrate the economic composition and structure of 
exports.
Primary commodities referred to here are all land 
produced products (2) and Pakistan dose not exports any 
mineral products in raw form. The composition of exports is 
dominated by four items i.e rice, raw cotton, cotton yarn 
and cotton cloth which constitute about 50 percent of the 
total exports. Rice exports has risen sharply and has been 
Pakistan's leading export item from 1973-74 onwards. The 
share of raw cotton has been unstable and significant
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Table 2.2 Share of exports in GDP
YEAR PERCENT
1959 4.5
1960 2.9
1961 2.8
1962 4.9
1963 4.7
1964 4.4
1965 4.2
1966 4.0
1967 4.6
1968 4.5
1969 3.7
1970 4.3
1971 6.8
1972 13.9
1973 12.4
1974 9.9
1975 9.4
1976 8.3
1977 8.1
1978 9.5
1979 11.1
1980 11.9
1981 9.1
1982 10.5
1983 9.9
1984 8.7
1985 10.1
1986 11.6
1987 12.7
Sorce: Econmic Survey of Pakistan, 1987-88
variations occurred over a number of years. The cotton share 
in exports has been dependent upon many factors like demand 
for raw cotton by domestic textiles and cotton yarn 
manufacturers and production of cotton itself which is 
significantly affected by weather conditions. The cotton 
group (cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloth and cotton fabrics) 
constitutes more than 50 percent of the total exports.
Table 2.5 outlines, broadly, the variations in relative 
shares of exports going to different markets. The direction
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Table 2.3 Economic Classification of Exports
[Percent]
Primary Semi- Manufactured
Year Commodities Manufacture GOODS Total
1969 33 23 44 100
1970 33 23 44 100
1971 45 27 28 100
1972 39 31 30 100
1973 39 23 38 100
1974 48 13 39 100
1975 44 18 38 100
1976 41 17 42 100
1977 36 15 49 100
1978 32 21 47 100
1979 42 15 43 100
1980 44 11 45 100
1981 35 13 52 100
1982 30 13 57 100
1983 29 14 57 100
1984 29 17 54 100
1985 35 16 49 100
1986 26 21 53 100
1987 28 20 52 100
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1988-89 Table 10.4
of export has been changing over the past three decades. In 
1959-60 share of the developed economies was 49 percent 
which came down to about 36 percent during 1982-83. After 
1982-83 there has been a kind of recovery in the share of 
developed countries and it has reached to the highest level 
of 61 percent during 1986-87. This clearly shows the 
importance of economic activities of developed economies for 
the exports from Pakistan. The share of other countries 
(excluding CMEA countries) is almost moving in the opposite 
direction of developed countries. The share of exports to 
CMEA countries has been continuously declining after 
reaching to the highest level of about 18 percent during 
1970-71. This than stabilized around 4 percent.
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Table 2.4 Structure of Exports 
[Percent]
Fish &
Carpets Raw Cotton Fish & Synth.
Year Cotton Manu Rice Prep. Leather Rugs Text. Others Total
1969 13.9 31.8 5.8 3.9 6.8 3.4 1.1 33.3 100
1970 14.3 32.8 8.7 3.1 5.4 3.3 0.8 34.9 100
1971 29.1 29.4 8.1 3.3 5.2 3.2 0.4 21.3 100
1972 14.0 37.4 13.3 2.7 6.4 3.3 0.7 22.2 100
1973 4.0 32.3 20.6 2.7 4.1 4.5 0.6 31.1 100
1974 15.2 21.6 22.4 1.5 3.6 4.4 0.2 31.1 100
1975 8.8 25. 1 22.0 2.5 5.3 6.4 0.3 29.6 100
1976 2.8 25.0 21.9 3.4 5.7 8.1 0.3 32.8 100
1977 8.6 22.1 18.6 2.6 4.9 9.0 1.2 33.0 100
1978 4.0 24.5 20.0 2.7 7.4 10.4 0.4 30.6 100
1979 14.3 19.3 17.9 2.3 5.4 9.4 0.2 31.3 100
1980 17.8 15.5 19.1 1.9 3.0 7.7 4.3 30.6 100
1981 11.2 19.4 15.7 3.0 4.4 6.4 0.9 38.9 100
1982 11.6 20.0 10.7 2.6 3.5 5.6 8.1 38.0 100
1983 5.3 21.2 15.2 2.7 5.3 6.2 3.9 40.2 100
1984 11.9 22.9 8.8 3.2 6.1 5.3 1.7 40.1 100
1985 16.9 19.5 11.1 2.7 5.8 5.4 1.6 36.9 100
1986 12.3 23.2 8.1 3.0 6.4 5.4 4.3 37.2 100
1987 13.9 23.1 8.2 2.8 6.4 5.7 4.4 35.5 100
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1988-89 Tablel0.5
Pakistan has been quite successful to maintain an access 
to its traditional markets. In addition it has been 
particularly able to take advantage of the expanding market 
of oil exporting countries.
2.1.1.2 Foreign private transfers
One of the most significant event of the second half of 
seventies and early eighties has been the dramatic 
increase in migration of Pakistani workers mainly towards 
Middle East and the increase in the share of private 
transfers (because of workers remittances) in the total
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Table 2.5 Destination of Exports [percent share]
Year Developed
Countries
CMEA Developing
Countries
196o 49.1 5.8 41.6 “ )
1965 46.2 12.2 41.5 0.5)
1970 43.1 17.5 39.4 6.5)
1972 44.9 12.0 43.1 10.9)
1975 41.0 4.4 54.6 28.0)
1976 43.5 4.0 52.5 33.3)
1977 39.3 4.3 56.4 28.9)
1978 47.6 3.7 48.7 25.3)
1979 39.7 3.9 56.4 28.3)
1980 32.9 3.9 63.2 30.7)
1981 38.6 4.1 57.4 31.9)
1982 35.5 4.2 60.3 40. 3)
1983 40.3 4.5 55.2 41.7)
1984 52.2 5.5 42.3 22.5)
1985 51 .7 5.9 42.4 20.2)
1986 57.5 3.6 38.9 17.1)
1987 60.7 4.0 35.3 14.0)
© F i g u r e s  in p a r e n t h e s i s  are for the s h a r e  of oil 
e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
Source:Economic Surveys of Pakistan,(1971-72,1988-89) 
_______ and Table 6.3 Adam and Iqbal (1983)____________
foreign exchange earnings. During the years 1982 to 1984 the 
share of private transfers was more than 50 percent of the 
total foreign exchange earnings, (see Table 2.6 for further 
details).
The private transfers played a major part in cushioning 
the adverse balance of trade position. However, a decline 
in these transfers have already started. The declining 
trend has begun in the mid 1980's and in the fiscal year 
1987-88 dropped to rupees 39523 millions from the highest 
level of rupees 45575 millions (in nominal terms) achieved 
during 1985-86. In real terms (3) the decline has started
Table 2.6 Share of private transfer and workers
remittances in total foreign exchange earnings
Private Remittances
Transfers as percent of
Year [percent] Private
1969 23 NA
1972 15 NA
1975 23 NA
1976 34 57
1977 48 47
1978 47 77
1979 44 74
1980 43 78
1981 49 87
1982 53 72
1983 53 95
1984 53 97
1985 48 87
1986 41 89
1987 34 90
Source: Appendix Table 2.1
even earlier (see Figure 2.2).
2.1.1.3 Imports
Pakistan's Commercial Policy (discussed in section 2.3.1) 
has significant influence over volume and composition of 
imports. Total imports in real terms have been growing 
without any pause. The over all growth rate with semi-log 
method is as following
m = 8.91 + 0.06 Trend [2.2]
(where m is log of real imports)
The growth rate of imports is less than exports but higher
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than GDP. Imports as percent of GDP have ,therefore, 
increased over the years. The rising trend of imports as 
percent of GDP is quite visible in Figure 2.3 though the 
variation around the trend are greater compared to the share 
of exports in GDP (Figure 2.1). An important point is that 
in contrast to exports the growth of imports in the early 
years (1959-73) was only 3 percent per annum and has 
increased subsequently.
The composition of imports has also gone through 
significant change. The share of capital goods has gradually 
declined from about 50 percent to 36 percent and the share 
of raw material has gone up to about 50 percent of total 
imports. Raw materials for consumer goods are now the major 
import items which fetch about 40 percent of total import 
bill. This is a clear reflection of import substitution in 
the consumer goods industry which has increased demand for 
the raw materials to produce consumer goods. The over all 
share of consumer goods in the total imports is fairly 
stable and it appears that early import substitution of the 
consumer goods is more or less equated by new products. 
Table 2.7 provides the details of composition of imports.
2.1.2 Capital Account
The principal items of capital account are private 
capital, public capital and changes in foreign exchange
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Table 2.7 Economic classification of imports
Percent Share in Total Imports
Year
Capita
Goods
Raw Materials For
Consumer
Goods
TotalCapital
Goods
Consumer
Goods
1969 50.0 11.0 29 .0 10.0 100
1970 52.0 11.0 26 .0 11.0 100
1971 42.0 11.0 24 .0 23.0 100
1972 30.0 10.0 31 .0 29.0 100
1973 30.0 7.0 39 .0 24.0 100
1974 29.0 9.0 40 .0 22.0 100
1975 35.0 6.0 38 .0 21.0 100
1976 38.0 6.0 40 .0 16.0 100
1977 34.0 7.0 40 .0 19.0 100
1978 30.0 6.0 42 .0 22.0 100
1979 36.0 6.0 42 .0 16.0 100
1980 28.0 8.0 49 .0 15.0 100
1981 30.0 8.0 48 .0 14.0 100
1982 31.0 6.0 49 .0 14.0 100
1983 32.0 6.0 48 .0 14.0 100
1984 32.0 6.0 46 .0 16.0 100
1985 37.0 5.0 40 .0 18.0 100
1986 37.0 7.0 39 .0 17.0 100
1987 36.0 7.0 42 .0 15.0 100
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1988-89
Reserves held by State bank of Pakistan.
2.1.2.1 Private capital
Private capital account is not published officially in any 
consolidated form. The data presented in Table 2.1 is from 
different balance of payments statistics reported in 
Economic Surveys of Pakistan and is in net form. The private 
capital remained insignificant till mid seventies and 
particularly the short term borrowing has been almost zero. 
In the subsequent period both direct private investment and 
other long term transfers have gradually increased. I.nspite
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of small share of the total capital inflow, private capital 
has implications for the current account balance in terms of 
repatriation of profits on investment and interest on loans 
(which we will discuss in some detail in Chapter 3).
For short term capital the data is available only in net 
terms and it is difficult to make any judgment of size of 
total short term borrowing. However, the data available 
indicates that short term borrowing has never assumed a long 
term status by repaying the past loans through new 
borrowing. In the situations where short term loans are 
repeatedly renewed for repayments of previous credits, then 
a separation of short term from long term capital is of 
limited analytical significance. Pakistan has successfully 
avoided aiiy such renewals.
2.1.2.2 Public capital
Public capital inflow to Pakistan is primarily in terms 
of: (i) project assistance; (ii) commodities assistance; 
(iii) food assistance; (iv) BOP support and (v) relief 
assistance(4). Table 2.8 provides the details about percent 
share of different kinds of assistance from 1959 to 1987.
(i) Project assistance
The large bulk of foreign capital received by Pakistan has
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Table 2.8 Composition of Foreign Public Capital
As percent of gross disbursement
Project Comm. Food BOP Rel ie
Year Aid Aid Aid Supp. Ass
1959 39.7 43.3 17.0 0.0 0.0
1960 46.8 3.2 50.0 0.0 0.0
1961 66.4 2.6 30.9 0.0 0.0
1962 48.7 19.6 31.7 0.0 0.0
1963 48.9 23.8 27.3 0.0 0.0
1964 47.6 24.5 27.9 0.0 0.0
1965 68.9 20.5 10.7 0.0 0.0
1966 53.1 28.7 18.1 0.0 0.0
1967 55.0 20.0 25.0 0.0 0.0
1968 68.4 30. 1 1.6 0.0 0.0
1969 57.3 28.0 14.7 0.0 0.0
1970 59.6 30.4 10.0 0.0 0.0
1971 68.7 19.3 12.0 0.0 0.0
1972 28.2 45.4 26.5 0.0 0.0
1973 34.1 36. 3 23.5 6.0 0.0
1974 29.3 18.6 9.9 42.0 0.0
1975 36.6 14.6 15 .0 33.8 0.0
1976 46.8 22.0 11.7 19.6 0.0
1977 60.3 16.7 11.1 11.9 0.0
1978 63.2 22.5 5.3 9.1 0.0
1979 55.0 11.0 1.4 28.5 4.1
1980 69.5 10.6 6.8 1.6 11.4
1981 48.6 15.8 8.1 0.9 26.6
1982 57.2 23.0 6.1 0.0 13.7
1983 59.1 12.7 15.1 0.0 13.2
1984 71.8 9.9 6.3 0.0 11.9
1985 69.0 6.1 16.0 0.0 8.8
1986 71.9 14.7 4.1 0.0 9.3
1987 65.8 10.9 11.3 0.0 12.1
Source :Economic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88
been specific to certain projects and most often strictly
tied to the source and utilization. Most loans/grants
received from donor countries, in form of project
assistance, are allocated to the public sector projects.
The mechanism of project assistance includes, besides
foreign component, a counterpart local finance component
which has to be met by raising the necessary resources
t
l
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domestically. The donor countries enjoy a significant 
control over project preparation, appraisal and execution. 
In order to have more flexibility government of Pakistan 
have always pleaded for commodity assistance (see for 
example Government of Pakistan Consortium Memorandum for the 
Pakistan Consortium 1970-71).
(ii) Commodity assistance
Commodity assistance in the form of industrial materials 
can be viewed as an inflow of foreign economic resource 
particularly designed to remove some of the obstacles to 
self-sustaining growth. It allows some degree of flexibility 
to the recipient country by not being tied to at least its 
utilization. Although in most cases it is tied to the 
source. Ratio of commodity assistance to the total capital 
inflow to Pakistan has decreased over the years.
(iii) Food assistance
Food assistance is also a part of commodity assistance and 
is mostly received from United States of America (USA) under 
Pl-480 through sale of surplus agricultural commodities. 
These commodities, ranging from wheat to edible oil,have 
been purchased by the Government of Pakistan from USA and 
were paid for in domestic currency till 1967 and in domestic 
currency and dollars after 1967. The funds generated by the
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sale of these commodities are deposited in a special 
"counter part" fund controlled by the US government through 
its mission in Pakistan.
(iv) Balance of payments support
The capital inflow received for temporary BOP support can 
be, strictly speaking, termed as untied and most flexible 
kind of loan. Such loans were provided to Pakistan by Saudi 
Arabia and Iran during the seventies (5). These are the best 
type of loans provided these are not for a too short period. 
The balance of payments support have been a significant 
proportion of total capital inflow during 1974-75 (42 Sfc)
1975-76 (33.8 %) and 1979-80 (28.4 %). The bulk of this has 
come from IMF. IMF through these loans exert significant 
influence over government policies towards subsidies, 
pricing of government sector utilities, liberalization of 
imports and reducing the share of public sector investment 
(6).
(v) Relief assistance
Relief assistance to Pakistan on a massive scale has 
started in the year 1979 when Afghan refugees started coming 
to Pakistan. In the year 1981-82 relief assistance was about 
27 percent of total resource inflow from abroad. Such 
assistance is quite important in relieving the economic
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burden of about three million refugees. Besides direct help 
to refugees, the relief assistance is being used in 
implementing a number of small projects in the areas where 
refugees are camped.
2.1.2.3 Principal sources of foreign capital
The relative importance of different countries/agencies as 
donor in different periods of time tells us some thing about 
the structure of a country's dependence on different sources 
of capital. Moreover, as we noted that most assistance is 
tied to source, the source structure of capital points 
towards the recipient's assistance determined import 
structure. The more diverse the source of capital from 
abroad is the lesser the influence of the donor on the 
recipient.
Pakistan's sources of foreign capital are conventionally 
divided into following four major groups
1. Consortium
2. Non Consortium
3. Islamic countries
4. IMF Trust Fund
The Aid to Pakistan Consortium has provided assistance to 
Pakistan both through bilateral (country to country) and
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Table 2.9 Total Loans and Credits Contracted 
[Percent Share]
Source/Years 1951
1955
1955
1960
1960
1965
1965
1970
1970
1978
1978
1983
1983
1988
[A] Consortium 100 100 95 94 66 78 91
A.l Bilateral 52 81 73 78 44 39 36
A.1.1 USA 29 56 49 39 17 12 13
A.1.2 Others 23 25 24 39 27 27 23
A.2 Multi 1. 48 19 22 16 22 39 55
[B] Non 0 0 5 6 13 6 7
Consortium
[C] Islamic 0 0 0 0 21 12 2
Countries
[D] IMF Trust 0 0 0 0 1 4 0
Fund
Total: 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88
multilateral (financial institutions to country) 
arrangements. The Consortium comprises Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K. and 
U.S.A. Table 2.9 provides the percent share of loans and 
credits contracted by Pakistan from different sources. The 
assistance under consortium arrangements has always assumed 
the largest share. During the first ten years, after 
independence, all the public sector capital inflow was from 
the Consortium countries. An important change with in 
Consortium over the years is the shift from bilateral to 
multilateral arrangements and a significant fall in the 
contribution from U .S .A .towards the total capital inflow to
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Pakistan.
The multilateral arrangements of assistance are made 
through International Bank of Reconstruction (IBRD), 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), International 
Development Association (IDA), Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and Food Aid Consortium (FAC). An increase in the share of 
Consortium multilateral assistance points towards a decline 
in the share of concessionery transfers. This is because 
Consortium multilateral financial institution have 
historically transferred a large amount of resources to 
Pakistan in form of loans whose financial terms and 
conditions, in some cases, have been equivalent to 
commercial loans.
The decline in the relative share of Consortium towards 
total capital inflow to Pakistan during seventies was 
principally caused by the emergence of the Islamic
countries as a new important source of foreign capital. 
During the non plan period of 1970-78 the Islamic countries 
provided about 21 percent of total foreign capital. (In the 
year 1973-74 this share was as high as 45.6 percent). It 
declined in the subsequent period to 12 percent during the 
Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83) and merely to 2 percent 
during 1983-88. The major donors were the oil exporting 
countries who have generated large current account surpluses 
because of rise in oil price. Similarly the share of Non 
Consortium countries increased from 6 percent during Second
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Five Year Plan (1960-65) to 13 percent during the non plan 
period of 1970-78. The share of Non Consortium countries 
slided back to 6-7 percent when inflow from Consortium 
countries increased from 66 percent during 1978-83 to 91 
percent during 1987-88.
2.1.2.4 Change in foreign exchange reserves
Foreign exchange reserves held by the State Bank of 
Pakistan change due to regular transactions. The strength 
and weakness of the capital account is reflected in the 
level of gross foreign exchange reserves. Table 2.10 shows 
the total foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of 
Pakistan as percent of imports during that year and the 
extent to which it could have financed the import bill in 
terms of weeks requirement (see also Figure 2.4). Imports 
here are referred to physical imports and exclude all 
invisible payments. The lowest level of reserves in terms of 
meeting the import requirements of the country was in the 
year 1977-78 when these were barely sufficient to pay for 
eight weeks worth of imports. A very low level of reserves 
pushes a country to resort on short term borrowing if the 
current account balance deteriorates by a significant margin. 
This increases the debt service liability and also endanger 
credit worthiness. As an alternative to short term 
borrowing a government is likely to take administrative 
steps to restrict imports to arrest further depletion of
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Table 2.10 Ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves and Imports
Foreign Exchange Reserves as
YEAR
Weeks Eq. 
of Imports
Percent of 
Imports
1959 30. 58
1960 28 55
1961 28 55
1962 21 40
1963 25 48
1964 17 34
1965 17 33
1966 18 35
1967 12 24
1968 15 28
1969 22 43
1970 20 38
1971 14 27
1972 18 36
1973 18 34
1974 10 19
1975 12 24
1976 14 26
1977 8 15
1978 14 27
1979 10 19
1980 19 37
1981 17 33
1982 14 27
1983 25 48
1984 22 42
1985 11 21
1986 16 30
1987 15 28
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88
foreign exchange reserves. Effects of any such measure is 
most likely to reduce the imports in the coming year. In 
order to see such an effect on imports we have used the 
level of past year's reserves as one of the explanatory 
variables for imports with expecting a positive sign .
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2.1.3 Export and import prices and terms of trade
The effect of import price rising faster than exports 
prices, other things remaining the same, is to worsen the 
current account balance. This relationship of exports and 
imports prices is known as the terms of trade. More 
precisely the terms of trade are defined as the exchange 
ratio between foreign and domestic goods and services. There 
are several alternative measures of this concept, but the 
one which we are using here is the net barter terms of trade 
and is defined as the ratio of the prices of exports to the 
prices of imports, i.e Px/Pm (7)
In order to see whether the terms of trade have moved 
systematically against or in favour of Pakistan we have to 
rely on aggregate weighted average indices of exports and 
imports prices reported in the Economic Surveys of Pakistan.
An index number is designed to reduce a large set of data 
into a single number. Certainly, if the goods included in 
index number are not homogeneous in quality over the years, 
for which the index number is being developed, than to that 
extent the index numbers will be less representative (8 ). 
Since countries import and export typically thousands of 
different types of goods it is necessary to develop some 
kind of index numbers which could be used to see the average 
terms of trade and also to see changes in exports and
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imports in real terms.
One of the concerns of many developing countries, 
particularly after the work of Prebisch (1950) and
Emmanuel (1972) is the unfavourable impact of unrestricted 
trade on terms of trade and therefore on BOP of developing 
countries. However, in case of Pakistan there is no evidence 
of any systematic deterioration of terms of trade despite 
the fact that a major share of exports from Pakistan 
consists of primary or primary based commodities. Figures 
2.5 and 2.6 show the historical values of price index of 
exports and imports and the average terms of trade. It is 
rather interesting that during the period 1959 to 1987 the 
trend growth rates of weighted average exports and imports 
price indices are the same (i.e 11 percent per annum). As a 
whole during past three decades, with the exception of some 
fluctuations on either side, we can safely conclude that 
Pakistan is neither a major beneficiary nor a looser in 
context of commodity terms of trade. However, because of a 
larger volume of imports as compared to the exports even an 
equal price rise in imports and exports would cause further 
increase in the current account BOP deficit in absolute 
terms. This inturn increases demand for foreign capital with 
associated consequences for foreign debt and debt service 
payments.
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2.2 The Balance of Payments as a Policy Problem
We have so far considered the BOP in an accounting 
framework. The importance of BOP is in fact far more than a 
simple double entry book keeping. An achievement of BOP 
equilibrium is often an important economic objective.
Since the independence, Pakistan's economy has been living 
with deficit at current account. pn ^he whole BOP of 
Pakistan have remained structurally fragile. Pakistan's 
export growth has come primarily from primary or primary 
commodity based. For quite a long time there has been no 
significant change in the composition of exports which still 
heavily depends upon rice, cotton and cotton manufacture. 
The overall performance of exports remains hostage to 
variation in domestic output and international prices of 
only two commodities (rice and cotton) and in the case of 
cotton manufactures to rising protectionism in the importing 
countries. A large imbalance between exports and imports 
(see Trade Balance in Table 2.1), the latter being almost 
twice the former (with few exceptional years), also 
highlights Pakistan's BOP vulnerability. The pace of export 
growth which was quite impressive during 1960's was not 
maintained. The workers remittances which are helping to 
offset the negative trade balance and thereby improving the 
overall current account balance are also in decline.
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Table 2.11 Trade and Current Account Balance
As Percent Of GDP
Year Trade Current Account
1959 -6-2 -6-3
1960 -8.7 -9.6
1961 -8 .8 -10.0
1962 -8 . 8 -10.0
1963 -8.2 -9.0
1964 -9.7 -10.8
1965 -5 . 8 -7.9
1966 -7.1 -9.2
1967 -4.7 -6.4
1968 -3.5 -4.7
1969 -3.9 -5.1
1970 -3.5 -5.4
1971 -0.2 -1.4
1972 0.2 -0.1
1973 -4.1 -5.0
1974 -10.3 -10.6
1975 -7.7 -7.6
1976 -8.6 -6 . 9
1977 -9.3 -3 . 9
1978 -10.9 -5 . 1
1979 -11.2 -4.7
1980 -9.8 -2.9
1981 -11.5 -4.4
1982 -10.3 -0.6
1983 -10.5 -2.1
1984 -11.9 -5.3
1985 -8 . 5 -2.5
1986 -5.3 -0.4
1987 -5.3 -2.5
Source; Economic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88
Apparently there appears no signs of improvement in the 
international environment which could possibly help to 
overcome the BOP problem in an easy fashion. According to 
World Bank appraisal report (1988) " Pakistan no longer can
sustain current account deficit of over 3 percent of GDP" 
(1988, p24). According to the same report the progressive 
reduction in the deficit to well below 3 percent of GDP is 
needed to maintain the credit worthiness of Pakistan. Table
66
2.11 and Figure 2.7 show the ratio of current account 
balance (which includes private transfers from abroad) and 
trade balance (only difference of exports and imports) to 
GDP. The trade deficit as percent of GDP remained above 5 
percent most part of the period. The current account 
balance, as percent of GDP, because of large private 
transfers from abroad is, however, relatively low and 
according to World Bank criteria is in safe limits. The year 
1986 is an exception when cotton and rice exports were 
highest because of record rise in output of these crops. The 
significant variation of these ratios in different years 
also highlights the vulnerability of trade and current 
account ba1ance.
2.2.1 Temporary versus fundamental disequilibrium
It is very important to make a judgment to assess whether 
the BOP problem is of temporary nature or is it merely a 
reflection of fundamental disequilibrium in the economy. In 
principle, a temporary disequilibrium (TDE), deficit or 
surplus, should be for a very short period of time. For 
example a crop failure could cause a temporary current 
account deficit or because of seasonal or cyclical effects a 
deficit may emerge which would be automatically reversed 
subsequently. On the other hand fundamental disequilibrium 
(FDE) poses real problem which tends to persist. It is 
however sometimes difficult to understand that whether a
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deficit/surplus is of temporary nature or is likely to 
persist for a long period. The solution to TDE is simple. It 
requires a financing support when there is deficit and to 
accumulate reserves when it run surpluses - the arrangements 
which were agreed in 1944 under Bretton Wood System.
As we have seen in Chapter 1 that in the case of Pakistan, 
foreign capital has been used to bring fundamental changes 
in the economy rather than solving any short term current 
account deficit. Although Pakistan has availed the facility 
of BOP support at a number of times to finance its most 
immediate imports or to enhance the depleted foreign 
exchange reserves, the overall BOP situation clearly 
suggests that the problem is still of a fundamental nature 
and it demands appropriate policy measures.
2.3 The Balance of Payments Policies
Along with other economic issues, the BOP problem has 
caused a controversy among different school of thoughts# The 
BOP Policies can be classified as follows:-(9)
1. Traditional BOP policies.
2. Monetarist approach to BOP.
3. Structuralist approach to BOP
Out of these three kinds of policies, we have already
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discussed the structural approach under the "two gap 
hypothesis" (see chapter 1 of this thesis). Here we will, 
therefore, confine our discussion to the other two 
approaches.
2.3.1 Traditional balance of payments policies
Traditionally there are a number of policy options 
available to a government wishing to improve its BOP. These 
could be divided in to:
(i) expenditure changing;
(ii) expenditure switching and
(iii) direct controls.
We will first discuss the "expenditure changing" and 
expenditure switching" policies (besides direct control 
methods) and then show how they can be suitably deployed in 
pursuit of internal and external balance.
2.3.1.1 Expenditure changing policies (10)
"Expenditure changing" policies are designed to alter the 
level of spending. This approach is based upon a Keynesian 
income adjustment mechanism of an open economy first 
introduced by Machlup (1943). The extent of leakage effect 
depends upon the marginal propensity to import which
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measures the change in imports resulting from a given change 
in income. It is, therefore, realistic to expect a direct 
relationship between imports and income or expenditure. In 
other words any contraction in domestic economic activity 
would reduce the current account deficit. This could be done 
by lowering the government spending, raising taxes, 
curtailing investment or any combination of these. AS a 
result of these national income will fall through Keynesian 
multiplier process and the trade balance should improve, 
depending upon strength of the marginal propensity to 
import. It is quite obvious that the higher the marginal 
propensity to import the more effective the "expenditure 
changing" policy will be.
Another concept close to conventional "expenditure 
changing" policies is the "absorption approach", which also 
emphasizes the importance of reducing domestic expenditure. 
This was invented by Alexander (1952)(11) who based his
approach on the national income identity i.e., output (Y) is 
equal to private consumption (C) plus domestic investment 
(I) plus government consumption (G) and plus the difference 
between exports(X) and imports (M):
Y = C + I +  G + ( X - M ) [2.3]
If we write balance of trade (B) as
B = X - M [2.4]
and define domestic absorption A
A = C + I + G [2.5]
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then
B = Y - A [2.6]
That is to say, the trade balance is a difference between 
domestic income or production and the domestic spending or 
absorption. So, if total domestic absorption exceeds total 
domestic output, by definition, the country must be running 
a current account deficit. Hence, to cure deficit requires 
either an increase in output or a reduction in absorption. 
An important feature of the absorption approach is its 
ability to relate the balance of payments to the overall 
operation of the economy.
2.3.1.2 Expenditure switching policies
"Expenditure switching" policies are intended to switch 
the spending away from .imports to import substitutes 
produced locally and to switch spending by foreigners 
towards the deficit country's exports. This can be achieved 
by different means such as tariffs, fixing imports quotas or 
subsidizing exports to improve their competitiveness in the 
international markets (12) in addition w a n  appropriate 
exchange rate policy (which we will here confine to 
devaluation only) (13).
The analytical tool which explains the questions that 
whether or not the devaluation will bring the desired 
results is known as the "elasticities approach". An extreme
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simplified version of "expenditure switching " or 
Marshal1-Lerner condition is based on following restricted 
assumptions:-
(i) Domestic prices (P) are unaffected by the 
exchange rate*
(ii) Domestic output (Y) is held constant.
(iii) Exports (X) and imports (M) volumes are 
determined by real competitiveness (with imports 
also affected by domestic output which is assumed 
to be constant).
(iv) Domestic economy is small and hence it could 
not influence world income and prices.
(v) There is no independent supply function and 
supply reacts passively to demand at a fixed 
price level.
The balance of trade (B) in domestic currency may be 
written as
B = Pd X - Pf ME [2.7]
where X and M are defined as'
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[2.8]
M [2.9]
X measures the quantity of exports and Pd is the average 
price of exports, so that PdX is the value of exports in 
domestic currency and T)i is the price elasticity of demand 
for exports (<0). M is the quantity of imports; Pf is the 
average foreign price of imports; E is the nominal exchange 
rate; 172 is the price elasticity of demand for imports (<0 ) 
and it is income elasticity for imports (>0). Taking log of 
[ 2] and [3]
Equation [2.10] suggests that exports depend on how fast 
domestic prices are changing relative to foreign prices, 
taking into account the exchange rate e, multiplied by the 
price elasticity of demand for exports. Import growth 
likewise depends firstly, on how fast import prices are 
changing relative to domestic substitutes (taking into 
account the exchange rate e) multiplied by the price
x = 171 ( pd - pr - e) and £2.10]
[2 .11]m = i72 (pr + e - pd) + it (y)
l e t t e r s  in s m a l l  c a s e s  are t h e  logs of v a r i a b l e s  of
e q u a t i o n s  12] a n d  [3]).
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elasticity of demand for imports*, and secondly, how fast 
domestic income (or absorption) is changing together with 
the income elasticity of imports. Under the restrictive 
assumption of Marshal1-Lerner condition, however, it is only 
the exchange rate which is allowed to change and influence 
the volume of exports and imports.The ultimate effect of 
devaluation, in this case, will depend upon the absolute sum 
of the elasticities of demand for exports (171) plus the 
elasticity of demand for imports (172) . If " [rji + ?72]>1" the
effect on balance of trade ( in foreign currency) will be
positive and vice versa (14). If the terms of trade effects 
of devaluation are ignored then in domestic currency the 
effect on balance of trade will always be positive as long
171 and 172 have the correct signs.
Marshal1-Lerner elasticity approach is only a rough guide 
to the likely effects of a devaluation because of its very 
restrictive assumptions.
Combining elasticity approach with the absorption approach 
(discussed with "expenditure changing approach"), one can
easily deduce that devaluation could only improve the trade 
balance where real output increases or the real expenditure 
(absorption) is brought down. The conventional view of 
elasticity approach that devaluation will always bring an 
improvement in the balance of trade is not true if the 
economy is operating at a full employment. In other words
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devaluation must be accompanied by other policies to reduce 
absorption in order to leave room for the necessary 
re-allocation of resources to increase exports and to 
substitute imports.(15)
2.3.1.3 Direct control
Many governments, particularly in developing countries, 
find it difficult to go for a price or income adjustment 
because of their political repercussions and ,hence, prefer 
of use direct control methods to solve the BOP problems. 
These methods include tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, and 
foreign exchange control.
Tariff is most popular instrument which provides an 
advantage to domestic producers in competition with imports 
in a home market. A tariff is essentially a tax on commodity 
imports designed principally to change the relative prices 
of commodities and thereby alter the pattern of 
international trade (though it could also be levied on 
revenue raising excuses)(16). As far the effects of a tariff 
are concerned, it is, in general, designed to shift the 
demand away from foreign goods, thereby lowering the 
imports, and attracting resources to the protected sector.
Export subsidy is frequently used for promoting exports 
of a particular commodity. An export subsidy represents a
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reward to exports implicitly or explicitly by the
government. The production and consumption effects are 
similar to those of an import tariff in that it changes the 
output and price of the subsidized good. An important 
difference is that where a tariff increases government 
revenue a subsidy increases government spending which have
different effects on domestic effective demand. An export 
tax is sometimes also imposed to discourage export of 
certain commodities and divert them to the local market. It 
happens particularly in case of those primary and
unprocessed goods which are used as inputs in import 
substitutes or goods meant for export.
Imposing quota is another way to limit the import of a 
certain commodity whilst providing protection and
encouragement in its production locally. The appeal of the 
quota lies in its flexibility and its ability to substitute 
for a tariff. It is especially popular in developing 
countries where it provides the quick and selective way of 
curbing unwanted imports.
Exchange control is a direct and legal restrictions 
imposed by the government to exchange one currency into 
another currency regardless of the motive. Most developing 
countries have some form of exchange control systems. Such a 
control enables a government to exercise maximum control 
over international trade particularly the import trade.
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2.3.1.4 Internal and external balance
The BOP policies so far discussed, despite their 
popularity, are a kind of "laundry list" from where a 
government can "pick and choose" to solve the problem. Mead 
(1951) was amongst the first to consider the problem of 
attaining simultaneous internal and external balance (in 
terms of unemployment and BOP respectively) which in the 
absence of international capital mobility comes down to a 
current account balance. As in many areas of economics, 
simultaneous achievement of internal and external balance is 
likely to involve a trade off between the two. Salter (1959) 
and Swan (1963) essentially described Mead's ideas now most 
often referred to as the famous Swan's diagram.(produced as 
Figure 2.8). On vertical axis of the diagram F  represents an 
index of international competitiveness (such as rise in F 
equates to devaluation and a fall in F  to revaluation of a 
currency). On x-axis A represents the level of absorption or 
domestic demand. IB represents combinations of F and A that 
will yield internal balance. Above the line IB there is a 
problem of general price rise (inflation) and below the line 
economy is in recession. Similarly EB line represents the 
combinations of F and A which ensures external balance. 
Above the line there is a BOP surplus and below it is 
deficit. The policy combination which could be used to move 
the economy towards E in Figure 2.8 are summarized in Table 
2 . 12 .
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Table 2.12 Expenditure changing and switching policies
Case
Internal
Balance
External
Balance
A. Recession/Deficit
B. Recession/Surplus
C. Inflation/Surplus
D Inflation/Deficit
Increase A Devalue F 
Increase A Revalue F 
Reduce A Revalue F
Reduce A Devalue F
The Swan diagram shows how a mixture of "expenditure 
changing" and "expenditure switching" policies could, in 
theory, move an economy towards its internal and external 
goals. But if devaluation is ruled out then Mundell (1962, 
1968) provided a novel idea of achieving an external balance 
and for the first time introduced an international capital 
mobility into the model and demonstrated that an
equilibrium (such as point E in Figure 2.8) could be 
achieved by combination of monetary (to achieve external 
balance)and fiscal policy (to achieve internal balance).
In a typical Mundellian model BOP deficit could be taken 
care of by raising domestic interest rates in order to 
attract foreign capital and balancing current account 
deficit. The likely policy options to achieve internal and 
external balance are summarized in Table 2.13. A major 
drawback of Mundell model is its assumption of fixed 
prices.
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Table 2.13 Fiscal and monetary policies for 
Internal and external balance
Case
Fiscal 
Policy for 
Internal Balance
Monetry 
Policy for 
External Balance
A. Recession/Deficit expand tight
B. Recession/Surplus expand easy
C. Inflation/Surplus contract easy
D. Inflation/Deficit contract tight
2.3.1.5 Limitations of traditional approach
The traditional approach to BOP as a whole is a kind of 
synthesis between a number of alternative policy options for 
achieving internal and external balance with in a 
macroeconomic framework of the economy. The full model of 
traditional approach is the familiar ISLM model of macro 
economics. The open economy ISLM model includes all the 
essentials of Keynesian income adjustment approach, the 
absorption approach and elasticities approach. The ISLM 
model is probably the most widely used in discussing policy 
options and developing empirically relevant hypothesis. In 
spite of this widespread application it has several 
limitations which helped the revival of monetarist approach 
to the BOP. The principle limitations of these policies are 
as following:-
(i) This whole approach is essentially a short run
and based upon with given money stock, financial
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assets and physical capital.
(ii) It assumes the aggregate price level as given 
and makes no attempt to provide adequate explanation 
of inflation.
(iii) It is basically Keynesian biased and,
therefore, tends to give more attention to the demand 
side and neglect the supply side of economy.
(iv) Despite Mundell's contribution, its treatment of 
international capital movement is very limited which 
is not very realistic in the present days
circumstances particularly in case of developed 
economies.
(v) The traditional approach is quite relevant only 
under fixed exchange rates where monetary authorities 
protect domestic money supply from the effects of
deficits and surpluses of BOP which is no more a
realistic assumption in the post 1970 era.
All of these issues are of fundamental importance and we 
will address them appropriately in our empirical model. A change
in financial assets, which is ignored in the traditional
approach, brings a change in the private consumption and,
therefore, in aggregate demand. The change in aggregate
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demand affects the demand for imports directly as well as by 
its effect on domestic price level which changes the 
relative competitiveness of exports and imports. Similarly, 
besides demand side, supply side of an economy has equal 
important role. Capital stock which is assumed as given in 
the traditional approach, has a very significant part to 
play in our model by changing capacity of the economy to 
produce more.
2.3.2 The monetary approach to balance of payments
The limitations of traditional approach helped the revival 
of monetarists. The monetary approach to the BOP began to 
take shape in 1970's although it has its origin in Hume 
(1752).(17)
Contrary to the traditional approach monetarists have been 
paying more attention to the long run problems with
particular emphasis on:
(i) the built in tendency of an economy to move towards 
full employment;
(ii) price flexibility (including in some cases 
flexible exchange rate) and
(iii) importance of short term international capital
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movements.
Although the traditional approach did not ignore the role of 
money (since it is represented by LM side of ISLM model) 
monetarists associate with money to play a central role in 
the theory of BOP. Instead of looking narrowly at the 
current account the monetarists see the BOP in terms of 
inflow and outflow of money as a whole. The demand and 
supply of money is, therefore, in the heart of their 
analysis of BOP.
The way Hume presented specie-flow mechanism which 
corrects the balance of trade surplus or deficit, has more 
or less re-appeared in the monetarists explanation. 
According to most simple form the total money supply (M) 
consists of foreign exchange reserves (P) and domestic bank 
deposits (D) so that
M  = R + D [2.12]
The implications of such an equation are obvious. A 
persistent current account deficit is monetary phenomenon 
which can only occur if a deficit in the trade balance 
(which will reduce R ) is not allowed to feed through to a 
contraction of M  , either because government would not allow 
to contract output and sterilize it by raising D to 
compensate or the banking system is unable to control its
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lending. Although this is highly simplified model but it 
does point towards an important fact that trade balance may 
spill over into the domestic money supply which was 
something completely ignored in the traditional approach by 
assuming perfect sterilization. In other words a deficit in 
BOP can only persist if it is accompanied by domestic 
increase in money supply. The fact that governments cannot 
continue indefinitely by running down their foreign exchange 
reserves and have to ultimately restrict the domestic money 
supply has been central in the philosophy of IMF in dealing 
with BOP problem.
In order to complete the model monetarists have provided 
an alternative explanation for the relationship between 
money, income, prices and the trade balance in an economy. 
According to the traditional ISLM model an increase in money 
supply brings down the interest rate which encourages 
investment and ultimately through a Keynesian multiplier 
process increases imports and thus indirectly creating 
current account deficit. The monetarists mechanism, on the 
other hand, operates, through cash balance effect on 
consumption. When money supply is increased, people 
temporarily increase their spending rather than holding 
extra cash balances. On the aggregate money supply is 
translated into an increased demand and prices are pushed 
up. As a result of this increase in prices, in an open 
economy, the exports are diverted to the domestic market and
85
more demand is created for imports leading to trade deficit. 
This whole phenomenon is only transitory and once a trade 
deficit reduces the money supply, domestic and international 
prices converge back into the equation. One can see the 
likely implication of a devaluation from this analysis. Any 
improvement in the balance of payment will be temporary and 
transitory until a rise in import prices brought by 
devaluation feed into the domestic price level. In other 
words, for a small country devaluation will only raise the 
domestic price level equal to the devaluation. Thus the real 
solution will lie in the control of money supply. One can 
see the similarity in the final outcome of traditional 
approach and monetarists approach where there is no 
international capital mobility and exchange rate/ prices are 
constant. The explanation, however, differs in two
approaches.
2.2.3 Concluding remarks on balance of payments policies
In terms of BOP, the traditional approach is based upon a 
macroeconomic framework which focuses primarily on the short 
run, with no need for automatically moving back towards full 
employment, fixed exchange rates and prices, with little 
international capital movement (except in the Mundell case). 
BOP is brought back to equilibrium through a combination of 
adjustment policies based upon a synthesis of elasticities 
approach and absorption approach by selecting appropriate
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demand management policies. The monetarists revival has 
undoubtedly enriched our understanding of the BOP problem 
and has highlighted some of the weaknesses of the 
traditional approach. Its focus on cash balance and 
imbalances in the money market adds an extra dimension to 
the BOP and reemphasises the monetary implications of BOP 
adjustment and its repercussions in the money market. In 
terms of ultimate result, however, both approaches would 
come closer to one another if under monetarists approach 
exchange rates are assumed fixed with no international 
capital mobility which is most often the case of developing 
countries. The real difference then revolves around 
differences in emphasis over the relative contribution of 
price adjustment, income adjustment etc. {For a full 
synthesis of these approaches see Cuthbertson (1979, Ch. 5) 
and Stein (1982, Ch. 6 )>
In summary, we conclude that while the structural approach 
under the "two gap" hypothesis has failed both at 
theoretical and practical grounds, the traditional approach 
of only demand side management of the economy is equally not 
so satisfactory. Similarly, inspite of the new insight which 
monetary approach has given in understanding of BOP, yet its 
very strong reliance on financial sector of an economy in 
restoring the external equilibrium makes its application 
particularly difficult for developing countries where an LM 
curve for their economies is most often missing. It is these
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sorts of difficulties that make the macroeconomic behaviour 
some what different for developing countries than those from 
the developed countries. Taking full advantage of all these 
theories^but keeping in view the peculiar conditions of a 
developing country (like Pakistan)^ we have developed a 
macroeconomic model for Pakistan.
2.4 Balance of payments policies of Pakistan
As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, BOP in Pakistan
has been basically considered to be a structural problem 
with a long run strategy to achieve external balance. For a 
short term control of the BOP, Government of Pakistan has 
traditionally relied on administrative measures. In the 
following section we will briefly describe the commercial 
and trade policies, exchange rate policy adopted by Pakistan 
and a broad view of the fiscal and monetary position.
2.4.1 Commercial policies and management of foreign trade
Pakistan's commercial policy is a combination^ of sub 
policies administered by different government agencies. 
These include: (a) the Exchange Control Policy administered 
by the Foreign Committee of Ministry of Finance which 
regulates the inflow and outflow of foreign exchange and 
allocates foreign exchange between the public and private
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sector; (b) the import licensing policy dealing with the 
disbursement of foreign exchange allocated to private sector 
between various uses and users and which is supervised by 
the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports; (c) the export 
promotion policy devised by the Ministry of Commerce most 
often concentrated on providing the incentives needed to 
maximize exports and (d) the tariff policy enforced by the 
Ministry of Finance mainly as a revenue raising device. 
These policies have altogether assumed the shape of 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), tariff barriers and export 
incentive schemes (18)
2.4.1.1 Non tariff and tariff barriers
The NTBs in Pakistan are in terms of explicit import 
quotas and list of commodities which could be imported. Till 
1983 there was a positive list of imports which were allowed 
to be freely imported. All other items needed explicit 
approval from the government in terms of an import license 
for the import of a commodity. In July 1983, the government 
switched from positive to a negative list system which 
explicitly listed banned and restricted imports. This list 
has been revised many times downwards in order to liberalize 
imports. However, Pakistan continues to depend on import 
bans and restrictions for protection of import substitute 
industry. According to World Bank estimates (1988, p64) when 
Pakistan's import regime reached its most restrictive stage
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in 1980 , about 41 percent of the domestic industrial value 
added was protected by import bans and another 22 percent by 
various form of import restrictions. With the introduction 
of a negative list system and some other import 
liberalizing measures, the equivalent percentages were 29 
percent and 3.7 percent in 1986. The official position on 
import bans and restrictions, as expressed in Import Policy 
Orders, states that Pakistan's non-tariff barriers serves 
two purposes: to provide assured protection to import 
competing industries, and to restrict imports of luxury 
consumer goods.(19).
Pakistan's tariff structure is quite complicated and is a 
kind of mixture of number of tariff/taxes. The average 
tariff rate is now about 30 percent. The highest average 
import taxes were levied after the 1965 war with India when 
these taxes on average were above 50 percent for three 
consecutive years. Even today Pakistan's average (nominal) 
tariff rank at the top, along with India's amongst 
developing countries (World Bank 1988, p68). Individually
for different kinds of items these rates vary from zero 
percent to above 200 percent.
2.4.1.2 Export incentives
In 1954 for the first time an Export Incentive Scheme was 
introduced but it was not very successful in promoting
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exports. Export Bonus Scheme introduced in 1959, which 
provided price incentives for exports of selected goods, is 
considered to be one of the most successful export promotion 
schemes in Pakistan. Under this scheme exporters of selected 
commodities were given import license equivalent to 20 to 40 
percent of the value of their exports. Since the licenses 
commanded a high premium in the open market, this served as 
a strong incentive to export activity. In effect the scheme 
mounted to a selective devaluation of rupee or 
(alternatively) to a system of selective export subsidies 
and therefore, had the implicit effects of a multiple 
exchange rate (20). In 1972 after the devaluation of rupee 
the scheme was abolished.
Currently exports from Pakistan are subject to a number of 
incentives particularly rebates of sales,excise tax, custom 
duties and corporate income tax (21).
2.4.1.3 Exchange rate policy
At the time of independence Pakistani rupee was linked 
with pound sterling. The first major crises in the foreign 
exchange policy came in 1949 when pound sterling was 
devalued by 31 percent. While other members of the sterling 
areas followed the suit, Pakistan decided not to devalue its 
currency. This decision particularly disrupted the trade 
with India who refused to recognize the exchange rate of its
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currency in terms of Pakistani rupee. As a result Pakistan's 
exports substantially declined because India was a major 
trade partner of Pakistan. In 1955, as a late response to 
pound's devaluation, Pakistani rupee was also devalued. The 
new exchange rate in terms per US dollar was rupees 4.76.
The exchange rate of rupees 4.76 per US dollar was 
maintained for a quite a long time. The rupee was devalued 
second time in 1972 by about 56 percent. The new exchange 
rate in the beginning was rupees 10.47 per US dollar which 
was subsequently brought down to to rupees 9.90. This new 
exchange rate was kept fixed for another eight years. In the 
1980's, the adoption of a flexible exchange rate system was 
by far the most important decision in the history of 
exchange rate of Pakistan. Since then rupee has 
substantially depreciated in real terms. (For definition of 
real versus nominal depreciation see Chapter 4 
sections 4.5.1.2 and 4.5.1.3)
The exchange rate devaluation/depreciation, however, has 
not proved to be a successful tool for achieving an external 
balance. After the 1972 devaluation, particularly, the 
economy witnessed a rapid increase in general price level 
which clearly suggests that exchange rate policy is not 
going to solve the BOP problem unless it is accompanied by 
some other suitable policy measures to arrest the rising 
prices.
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2.4.1.4 Fiscal and monetary policy
It is very difficult to identify any visible relationship 
between fiscal/monetary policy and the BOP problem of
Pakistan. One reason, probably, is that Pakistan has always 
viewed BOP as an structural problem rather than a 
macroeconomic imbalance where, as we have already concluded, 
there is little room for fiscal and monetary policy. 
However, as we have noted in Chapter 1 that because of
changing international environment with regard to 
availability of concessional and grant like capital from 
abroad the government is forced to change its attitude.
It is quite interesting to note that Pakistan has never 
achieved a budget surplus. The government expenditures have 
been growing, in real terms, at a compound rate of 7 percent 
per annum between 1959-60 and 1987-88. This rate is 
significantly higher than the rate of growth of GDP and as a 
result the government expenditures are now above 25 percent 
of GDP which were about 20 percent in the year 1959-60. 
Regarding revenue, government still heavily relies on 
indirect taxes (to the extent of 85 percent) and there is 
hardly any change in the overall structure of taxes over
past three decades. The rate of growth of revenue is
slightly higher than expenditure (8 percent per annum) which 
has gradually reduced the over all government budget 
deficit. However, the government budget deficit is still
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around 6 percent of GDP and is the major source of creation 
of financial assets. Table 2.14 and Figure 2.9 provide the 
yearly details of government revenue, government expenditure 
and government budget deficit as percent of GDP.
In context of the monetary policy during 1955, for the 
first time? guidelines were prepared in order to determine a 
kind of safe limits for monetary expansion. A formula 
governing the safe limit of monetary expansion, during 
1955-65 laid down a monetary expansion equivalent to the 
target of real growth in GNP plus 2 percentage points to 
allow for the economy's progressive monetization at the 
appropriate level. Subsequently,in 1968 an annual increase 
of 2.5 percent above GNP growth was considered as the safe 
limit.(22).
In principle State Bank of Pakistan has all the 
instruments of monetary controls, but the monetary policy 
has most often played a passive role to accommodate 
government budget deficit. The seventies fully exposed the 
limitations of monetary policy when the government was 
rigorously following its social programmes and the State 
Bank of Pakistan found it difficult to control increasing 
government borrowing.
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Table 2.14 Government Revenue, government expenditure and
budget deficit as percent of GDP
Year Revenue Expen. Deficit
1959 11 .76 19.74 -7.98
1960 11 . 56 16. 83 -5.26
1961 12 .11 19 . 70 -7 . 59
1962 9.99 23 .73 -13.74
1963 12 . 33 21 .93 -9.60
1964 12 .60 23 . 19 -10.59
1965 13.11 25.01 -11.90
1966 13.72 21 .93 -8.21
1967 13.24 19.25 -6.01
1968 15.20 19. 87 -4.67
1969 15 . 38 19.69 -4.31
1970 13 .09 20.01 -6.93
1971 12. 18 20. 39 -8.21
1972 12 . 26 19.79 -7. 53
1973 13 . 52 19. 53 -6.01
1974 12 . 53 23 .48 -10.95
1975 12 .70 26. 27 -13.57
1976 13 . 15 26.49 -13.34
1977 15 .42 25 . 04 -9.63
1978 14.47 24. 38 -9.91
1979 19.01 24. 37 -5 . 36
1980 19 . 84 23.41 -3 . 57
1981 18 . 58 24. 36 -5.78
1982 18.75 24.90 -6 . 15
1983 19. 89 24. 93 -5.03
1984 18 .40 24. 18 -5.78
1985 18.97 24.45 -5 .48
1986 19.36 25.55 -6 . 19
1987 19.62 25 . 20 -5.58
Source: Econmic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
We have discussed in great detail the BOP accounts of 
Pakistan and have observed that the nature of the problem is 
not temporary. When we combine it with our discussions of 
Chapter 1 we conclude that it is no more feasible to see the 
BOP only as a structural problem in the framework of " two 
gap" hypothesis. There is, however,very little evidence that
Pakistan has tried the traditional or monetary tools in 
order to achieve external and internal balance in a coherent 
way. We therefore argue that once it is established that the 
BOP problem of Pakistan is of fundamental nature then it 
should be properly addressed.
According to Khan et a l . (1986, p8 ) "When balance of
payments deficits are not inherently temporary they must be 
rendered so by corrective policy measures. The formulation 
of such measures requires the possessions of an implicit 
model that links policy instruments control led by the 
authorities to the balance of payments".This what in fact we 
precisely intend to do with the help of a macroeconomic 
model which we have developed for Pakistan.In our model, 
with in the limits posed by the peculiar conditions of 
Pakistan, we have made an effort to combine both demand and 
supply sides of the economy. In particular we have clearly 
defined role for financial and capital assets which are 
missing in the traditional Keynesian type approach.
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Appendix
Table 2.1BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN 
(MILLION RS)
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
ITEM/YE AR 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
(A)TRADE BALANCE -1043 -1597 -1693 -1802 -1887
(1) Exports 763 540 543 998 1075
(2) Imports -1806 -2137 -2236 -2800 -2962
(B)INVISIBLE(NET)* -24 -162 -214 -238 -176
(l)Non Factor Servi 0 0 0 0 0
(2)Investment Incom 0 0 0 0 0
2.1-Income 0 0 0 0 0
2.2-Payments 0 0 0 0 0
(of which intrest 24 29 52 62 86
(3)Private Transfer 0 0 0 0 0
(of which remitten 0 0 0 0 0
(C)BALANCE ON CURRE -1067 -1759 -1907 -2040 -2063
(D)PRIVATE CAPITAL(N) 19 90 90 81 90
(l)Direct Investmen 0 0 0 0 0
(2 )0ther long term 0 0 0 0 0
(3)Short Term 0 0 0 0 0
(E)PUBLIC CAPITAL(N) 643 1576 1352 2223 2390
(l)Gross Disbursem 671 1628 1447 2385 2599
1.1-Project Aid 267 762 962 1161 1271
1.2-Non Food Aid 290 52 38 466 619
1.3-Food Aid 114 814 447 757 709
1.4-BOP Support 0 0 0 0 0
1.5-Relief Ass. 0 0 0 0 0
(2)Amorti zation -29 -52 -95 -162 -209
(F)ALLOCATION OF SDR 0 0 0 0 0
(G)CHANGES IN RESERV 162 127 55 -97 308
(H )ERRORS/OMMIS SIONS -567 -220 -520 361 109
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Table 2.1 cont.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
ITEM/YEAR 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
(A)TRADE BALANCE -2532 -1676 -2329 -1682 -1347
(1) Exports 1140 1204 1297 1645 1700
(2) Imports -3672 -2880 -3626 -3327 -3047
(B)INVISIBLE(NET)* -300 -619 -666 -590 -424
(l)Non Factor Servi 0 0 0 0 0
(2)Investment Incom 0 0 0 0 0
2.1-Income 0 0 0 0 0
2.2-Payments 0 0 0 0 0
(of which intrest 119 157 209 219 309
(3)Private Transfer 0 0 0 0 0
(of which remitten 0 0 0 0 0
(C)BALANCE ON CURRE -2832 -2295 -2995 -2272 -1771
(D)PRIVATE CAPITAL(N) 100 195 109 114 109
(l)Direct Investmen 0 176 0 0 0
(2)Other long term 0 19 0 0 0
(3)Short Term 0 19 0 0 0
(E)PUBLIC CAPITAL(N) 3184 2342 2242 3175 2266
(l)Gross Disbursem 3361 2537 2965 3470 2708
1.1-Project Aid 1599 1747 1576 1909 1852
1.2-Non Food Aid 823 519 852 695 814
1.3-Food Aid 938 271 538 866 43
1.4-BOP Support 0 0 0 0 0
1.5-Relief Ass. 0 0 0 0 0
(2)Amortization -176 -195 -724 -295 -443
(F )ALLOCATION OF SDR 0 0 0 0 0
(G)CHANGES IN RESERV -201 -283 311 -470 71
(H )ERRORS/OMMIS SIONS 654 525 -955 1487 534
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Table 2.1 cont.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN
ITEM/YEAR
1969
1970
1970
1971
1971
1972
1972
1973
1973
1974
(A)TRADE BALANCE
(1) Exports
(2) Imports
-1676
1609
-3285
-1604
1998
-3602
-124
3371
-3495
153
8551
-8398
-3318
10161
-13479
(B)INVISIBLE(NET)*
(1)Non Factor Servi
(2)Investment Incom
2.1-Income
2.2-Payments
(of which intrest
(3)Private Transfer 
(of which remitten
-524
-662
-343
176
-519
338
481
0
-885
-752
-438
86
-524
386
305
0
-552
-700
-295
52
-347
243
443
0
-73
-701
-890
178
-1068
900
1518
0
-752
-1525
-713
950
-1663
782
1485
0
(C)BALANCE ON CURRE -2200 -2489 -676 80 -4070
(D)PRIVATE CAPITAL(N) 362 438 328 147 574
(1)Direct Investmen
(2)0ther long term
(3)Short Term
371
0
-10
443
0
-5
333
0
-5
0
136
10
-59
634
0
(E)PUBLIC CAPITAL(N) 
(l)Gross Disbursem
1.1-Project Aid
1.2-Non Food Aid
1.3-Food Aid
1.4-BOP Support
1.5-Relief Ass.
(2)Amortization
2185
2685
1537
752
395
0
0
-500
2432
2913
1737
885
290
0
0
-481
1609
1947
1338
376
233
0
0
-338
2597
3717
1047
1686
984
0
0
-1120
3762
4930
1683
1792
1158
297
0
-1168
(F)ALLOCATION OF SDR 0 0 129 0 0
(G)CHANGES IN RESERV 559 -55 -419 2189 1446
(H )ERRORS/OMMIS SIONS -212 436 1809 634 -1180
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Table 2.1 cont.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
ITEM/YEAR 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
(A)TRADE BALANCE -10639 -9212 --11718 -14835 -19463
(1) Exports 10286 11253 11294 12980 16925
(2) Imports -20925 --20465 -23012 -27815 -36388
(B)INVISIBLE(NET)* -317 109 2317 8554 10474
(l)Non Factor Servi -1614 -1772 -1851 -1792 -2030
(2)Investment Incom -970 -1436 -1673 -1792 -2307
2.1-Income 366 277 327 337 455
2.2-Payments -1337 -1713 --2000 -2129 -2762
(of which intrest 1030 1069 1346 1604 2010
(3)Private Transfer 2267 3317 5841 12137 14810
(of which remitten 0 0 3307 5722 11444
(C)BALANCE ON CURRE - 10956 -9103 -9401 -6281 -8989
(D)PRIVATE CAPITAL(N) 950 1921 1594 1267 1614
(l)Direct Investment 149 228 40 337 327
(2)Other long term 802 1158 1030 733 891
(3)Short Term 0 535 525 198 396
(E)PUBLIC CAPITAL(N) 8237 9138 7772 6841 7069
(l)Gross Disbursem 9662 10534 9504 8474 9385
1.1-Proj ect Aid 2831 3851 4445 5108 5930
1.2-Non Food Aid 1812 1535 2089 1416 2109
1.3-Food Aid 960 1584 1109 941 495
1.4-BOP Support 4059 3564 1861 1010 851
1.5-Relief Ass. 0 0 0 0 0
(2)Amortization -1426 -1396 -1733 -1634 -2317
(F )ALLOCATION OF SDR 0 0 0 376 386
(G)CHANGES IN RESERVS-599 828 1272 -1819 5737
(H )ERRORS/OMMIS SIONS -1170 1127 -1308 4022 -5657
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Table 2.1 cont.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
ITEM/YEAR 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
(A)TRADE BALANCE -23519 -24264 -33211 -33709 -39368
(1) Exports 23410 29280 26270 34442 37339
(2) Imports -46929 -53544 -59481 -68151 -76707
(B)INVISIBLE(NET) 13622 17097 20425 31592 31391
(l)Non Factor Servi -2356 -2515 -1876 -2415 -3710
(2)Investment Incom -2782 -2584 -3411 -5368 -5963
2.1-Income 515 941 1386 1546 2644
2.2-Payments -3297 -3524 -4797 -6914 -8607
(of which intrest 2891 2455 2164 3144 3723
(3)Private Transfer 18761 22196 25712 39375 41064
(of which remitten 13830 17305 22333 28436 38932
(C)BALANCE ON CURRE -9897 -7167 -12786 -2117 -7977
(D)PRIVATE CAPITAL(N) 1723 2584 7430 8601 3575
(l)Direct Investmen 673 703 1301 332 580
(2)0ther long term 703 1356 2185 4741 1605
(3)Short Term 347 525 3944 3527 1389
(E)PUBLIC CAPITAL(N) 11088 6009 8677 11668 9753
(l)Gross Disburs. 14553 9623 11747 16627 15864
1.1-Proj ect Aid 7999 6692 5714 9508 9376
1.2-Non Food Aid 1594 1020 1855 3821 2010
1.3-Food Aid 208 653 949 1022 2388
1.4-BOP Support 4148 158 107 0 0
1.5-Re lief Ass. 604 1099 3123 2275 2091
(2)Amortization -3465 -3614 -3070 -4959 -6111
(F )ALLOCATION OF SDR 366 0 0 0 0
(G)CHANGES IN RESERV--1047 11036 -1520 -995 18475
(H )ERRORS/OMMIS SION S 4327 -9610 4841 19147 -13124
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Table 2.1 cont.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN
1984 1985 1986 1987
ITEM/YEAR 1985 1986 1987 1988
(A )TRADE BALANCE -51799 -41354 -29076 -32937
(1) Exports 37979 49592 63355 78445
(2) Imports -89778 -90946 -92431 -111382
(B)INVISIBLE(NET) 28548 29167 27074 17515
(l)Non Factor Ser. -4712 -6072 -4934 -7968
(2)Investment Inco -7717 - 10336 •-11947 -14040
2.1-Income 2364 1809 1581 2387
2.2-Payments 10080 - 12145 -13529 -16427
(of which interest)4377 4893 6498 7529
(3)Private Transfers 42977 45575 43955 39523
(of which remitten 41739 39503 39159 35767
(C)BALANCE ON CURRE -23251 -12187 -2002 -15422
(D)PRIVATE CAPITAL(N)i 1647 1793 5501 4107
(l)Direct Investmen 1525 2713 2218 2141
(2 )0ther long term 3142 2568 1599 1966
(3)Short Term -3020 -3488 1685 0
(E)PUBLIC CAPITAL(N) 10950 14939 11620 14865
(l)Gross Disbursem 19169 24677 24049 27589
1.1-Proj ect Aid 13771 17038 17293 18147
1.2-Non Food Aid 1906 1502 3541 3001
1.3-Food Aid 1205 3957 980 3106
1.4-BOP Support 0 0 0 0
1.5-Relief Ass. 2288 2180 2235 3335
(2)Amortization -8220 -9738 -12428 -12724
(F )ALLOCATION OF SDR 0 0 0 0
(G)CHANGES IN RESERV -1418 -15528 8564 3454
(H )ERRORS/OMMIS SIONS -9237 20072 6555 95
N o t e :  N = Net
S o u r c e s :  (i) E c o n o m i c  S u r v e y s  of P a k i s t a n  1
1 9 8 3 - 8 4  a n d  1 9 8 7 - 8 8 .
(ii) S e c o n d ,  T h i r d  a nd  F o u r t h  F i v e  Y e a r
of G o v e r n m e n t  of P a k i s t a n .
(iii) S t a t i s t i c a l  Y e a r  B o o k  1 9 6 7 - 6 8 ,
P a k i s t a n
(iv) P a k i s t a n - T h e  E c o n m i c  P r o f i l e  by
H a s m i  et al. ( 1976)
9 7 7 - 7 8 ,
P l a n s
C S O
B a d r
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Notes
(1) Some time government grants are also treated as 
transfers from abroad ( see for example Wilson, 1986, pl56). 
But conventionally in the BOP statistics of Pakistan these 
are recorded as capital transfers from abroad.
(2) Primary commodities normally include products of the 
land such as food, agricultural raw materials, livestock, 
hides and skins, wool and timber or extracted by mining and 
subjected to a limited of processing. For other discussion 
related to the definition of primary production see Rowe 
(1965,pp l-2)and Brown (1965, pp2-3).
(3) There is no easy way to estimate the real worth of 
private transfers from abroad. Here we have estimated by 
deflating with implicit deflator of net income from abroad 
derived from national accounts at current prices and 
constant prices as reported in the Economic Survey of 
Pakistan 1987-88.
(4) For evaluation of impact of different kinds of foreign 
assistance on Pakistan Economy see Brecher and Abbas (1973, 
chapters 7 to 10)
(5) See Economic Survey of Pakistan (1981-82, pl63).
(6 ) See for further discussion Ahmad and Amjad (1984, p 303)
104
(7) A distinction is made between the commodity terms of 
trade and income terms of trade. While the commodity terms 
of trade, as we have mentioned in the main text, means the 
ratio of exports prices to imports prices the income terms 
of trade is the ratio of exports prices to import prices 
times the quantity of exports (i.e Q x ( P x / P m )  where Qx, P x  
and P m  stand for quantity of exports, prices for imports and
prices for exports). In this case the terms of trade, in
fact, measures the total purchasing power of exports over 
imports.
(8) See Learner and Stern (1970, Appendix to Chapter 2) for 
problems associated with building indices of prices for 
exports and imports.
(9) Literature with respect to BOP polices is enormous. Our 
objective here is not to provide any comprehensive review of 
these policies. The idea is to set an agenda for evaluation
of BOP policies adopted by Pakistan. For a synthesis of
different kinds of BOP policies readers are referred to see 
Taylor (1990), Cuthbertson, Taylor (1987) and Cuthbertson 
(1979, chapter 5)
(10) Johnson (1958) first used the term "expenditure 
reducing" for policies that influence the level of spending 
and "expenditure switching" for those which alters its 
composition. Since policies might be used to increasing
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spending as well "expenditure changing" is probably more 
representative.
(11) We have also discussed this concept in the context of 
foreign capital inflow and domestic absorption in Chapter 1.
(12) These are most often considered to be the tools 
discussed under direct control measures though their
ultimate impact is in terms of "expenditure switching"
(13) Under fixed exchange rate system devaluation 
(revaluation) refers to an official lowering (raising) the 
value of the currency fixed in terms of other currencies or 
an international reserves assets such as gold. On the
contrary a free fall (rise) of exchange rate in the foreign 
exchange market without official fixing is called as
depreciation (appreciation) of a currency.
(14) For mathematical proof see Cuthbertsonand Taylor 
(1987,ppl75—179).
(15) For original work with regard to a combined approach 
towards elasticities and absorption see Tsiang (1961).
(16) A distinction is most often made between nominal and 
effective rate of protection which we have not discussed
here. Readers are referred to see Balassa (1965, 1971).
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(17) In the recent years much effort has been expanded by 
the monetarists and others to model the money supply, the 
price level and the exchange rates. These models are still 
relatively new and we are not going to discuss these models. 
For a comprehensive survey of such models readers are 
referred to see Kreinin, and Officer (1978).
(18) For a detail evaluation of different policies see "The 
trade Regimes in Pakistan " World Bank Report No. 7005-Pak, 
November 1987.
(19) For negative impacts, in terms of misallocation of 
resources and development of illegal trade, of such a policy 
see World Bank (1988 Chapter III)
(20) For a detailed analysis of the Export Bonus Scheme see 
Bruton and Bose (1963).
(21) For further details of these rebates see World Bank 
(1988, Chapter III) and Adams and Iqbal(1983, chapter 5).
(22) Government of Pakistan "Fourth Five Year Plan" (1970, 
p. 52) .
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEBT PROBLEM
3.1 The debt crisis
In the 1970s, the external indebtedness of developing 
countries caused increasing concern particularly after the 
first oil price rise of 1973-74, in the aftermath of which 
the debt and debt servicing obligations of developing 
countries rose rapidly. As a result of this rapid rise in 
debt servicing the 1980s saw an important turning point. In 
contrast to the past when the flow of capital from developed 
capital surplus countries to developing countries was 
considered as a vehicle of economic growth, there has been a 
net capital outflow since 1984 from developing countries to 
developed countries. During 1984 the net capital outflow 
from developing countries to developed countries was of the 
order of $ 7.3 billion which reached $ 30.7 billion by the 
end of 1986.(1).
A negative capital inflow and an ever increasing burden of 
debt service for the developing countries created serious 
concern about future prospects of growth of the developing 
countries together with likely negative implications for the 
international monetary system in case the debtor countries 
are forced to default for economic, financial, political 
and/or social reasons. In view of the serious implications
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for the world economy as a whole, the debt problem has 
attracted attention from all sides and within a short period 
enormous studies and literature have emerged which attempt 
to explain the causes and solution to the problem (see for 
example Hope .(1981) Cline (1984), Mehran (1985), Lever and 
Huhne (1987), and full World Development Report (1985). The 
problem of foreign debt is, however, quite complicated. 
According to Currie et al. (1988, pl7) "the ability of the 
south [i.e developing countries] to service the debt 
commitments is the result of complicated interactions 
between northern [i.e, advanced industrialized countries] 
macro economic policies, the movement of commodity terms of 
trade and southern adjustment strategies”. In these few 
sentences Currie et a l . have very intelligently identified the 
important factors associated with the debt problem of 
developing countries.
3.2 Debt problem of Pakistan
The problem of debt in Pakistan received attention just 
after the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) during which 
external capital financed a significant part of domestic 
investment (see Chapter 1). In spite of the fact that a 
large proportion of capital from abroad in the earlier 
years, after independence, was in terms of concessionery 
loans and grants some loans were quite hard which resulted 
in quick debt accumulation. In the 1970s after 1973-74 oil
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price shock, as in case of many other developing countries, 
the external debt and debt servicing obligations of Pakistan 
rose rapidly. The phenomenal exponential increase of foreign 
debt could be seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in absolute and 
log terms. The semi logarithmic growth equations of debt in 
current and constant prices are as following:-
InD = 6.8 + 0.21 Trend [3. 1]
InDc= 6.2 + 0.13 Trend [3.2]
where D and Dc stand for foreign debt at current and 
constant prices.(2)
Foreign debt in the mid seventies, when the economy was 
shattered after 1971 war and other political events, assumed 
large and unmanageable proportions. After the first oil 
price shock, in order to overcome its immediate foreign 
exchange problem, Pakistan obtained for six consecutive 
years moratorium on the annual debt servicing as shown in 
Tab1e 3.1.
The amortisation of past loans and payments of 
interest on debt have substantially reduced the net inflow 
(gross inflow less amortisation) and net transfers (net 
inflow less interest payments) to Pakistan as shown in Table 
3.2. Although Pakistan still has a positive net transfer 
of resources from abroad , the continuous trend of fall in
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Table 3.1 Debt Service Moratorium
[Million Rupees]
Debt Service 
Debt Service Relief as % of 
Year Relief Debt Service Due
1974-75 1584 39.2
1975-76 1742 41.4
1976-77 1653 34.9
1977-78 2416 42.7
1978-79 1495 25.7
1979-80 891 12.4
Source: Econmic Surveys of Pakistan 1979-80 (pl53) and
1980-81 (pl56)
these resource is evident in Table 3.2 (and Figure 3.3). One 
important thing that emerges is that the share of interest 
payments in outflow of capital is increasing rapidly. While 
the net capital inflow is still around fifty percent, net 
transfer is even less than one third of the gross capital 
inflow. If this rising trend of debt is not arrested there 
is a possibility of a net outflow of resources from 
Pakistan in the future.
It is quite obvious that the past, capital inflow, other 
than grants, has to be serviced in terms of repatriation of 
profit against private foreign investment and repayment of 
principle and interest payments against loans and credits. 
In the following sections we will evaluate private foreign 
investment and other capital inflows.
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3.2 Net capital and net transfers as percent 
of gross capital inflow
Net Net
Year Capital Transfers
1959 95 .7 92 . 2
1960 96. 8 95.0
1961 93.4 89.8
1962 93.2 90.6
1963 91 .9 88.6
1964 94. 8 91.2
1965 92.3 86. 1
1966 75.6 68.5
1967 91.5 85 . 2
1968 83.7 72 . 2
1969 81.4 68 . 8
1970 83.5 70. 3
1971 82.6 70. 2
1972 69.9 45.6
1973 76. 3 60.4
1974 85 . 2 74.6
1975 86 . 7 76 . 6
1976 81 . 8 67 . 6
1977 80.7 61 . 8
1978 75 . 3 53 . 9
1979 76 . 2 56 . 3
1980 62.4 36.9
1981 73.9 55.4
1982 70.2 51.3
1983 61.5 38 . 0
1984 57. 1 34. 3
1985 60. 5 40. 7
1986 48.3 21 . 3
1987 53.9 26.6
Source .’Appendix Table 2.1 Chapter 2
3.3 Private investment
Foreign private investment (FPI), particularly by the 
multinational corporations (MNCs) with headquarters 
abroad^involves not only transfers of funds (including the 
reinvestment of profits) but a whole package of physical 
capital, techniques of production, managerial and marketing
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expertise, advertising and other business practices of the 
maximisation of profits at a global level (3). There is
little doubt that such an investment would augment real 
resources in the beginning but it also involves repatriation 
of profits in the future which have implication for BOP and, 
therefore, foreign debt. Direct FPI has, in fact a potential 
disadvantage of a continual outflow of profits lasting much 
longer than outflow of debt service payments on a loan of 
equivalent size. While loans and credits only create
obligations for a definite number of years, FPI may involve 
an unending commitment. As a result, in the long run if 
profits are repatriated the impact of continuous FPI on BOP 
must be negative unless the gross inflow of FPI grows
substantially from year to year (4).
Almost in all planning documents of Government of Pakistan 
FPI has been considered as complementary to overall 
investment programme. As yet no effort has been made to 
publish the data for such investment and repatriation of 
profits. This makes it difficult to have a realistic and 
reliable assessment of the problem. The general assessment 
is, however, not very encouraging. According to Griffin the 
private capital outflows exceeded the inflows in Pakistan 
and according to his estimates in the year 1963-64 the 
outflows were about three times of the direct inflow of 
private capital. (See Griffin 1965, pp616-617). In the
Fourth Five Year Plan (p69) it was first time officially
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documented that the impact of FPI on BOP was negative. The 
data presented in Table 2.1 of Chapter 2 also shows that net 
effect of FPI for most of the years is negative if 
investment payments(less interest payments) are taken as 
profits repatriated each year against net investment as 
shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Effect of Foreign private investment on 
balance of payments
[million Rupees]
Profit impact on
Year___________ FPI__________ Repatriated____________ BOP
1969 371.3 180.9 190.4
1970 442.7 138.0 304.6
1971 333.2 104.7 228.5
1972 0.0 167.5 -167.5
1973 -59.4 881.1 -940.5
1974 148.5 306.9 -158.4
1975 227.7 643.5 -415.8
1976 39.6 653.4 -613.8
1977 336.6 524.7 -188.1
1978 326.7 752.4 -425.7
1979 673.2 405.9 -267.3
1980 702.9 1069.2 -366.3
1981 1300.5 2633.0 -1332.5
1982 332.3 3770.1 -3437.8
1983 580.1 4883.4 -4303.3
1984 1525.0 5703.5 -4178.5
1985 2713.2 7251.3 -4538.2
1986 2217.5 7030.7 -4813.2
1987 2141.1 8897.8 -6756.7
Source: Appendix Table 2.1 Chapter 2
Keeping in view the low level of direct FPI on year to year
basis the outflow of profits appear to be very high.
However, the cumulative foreign capital stock, after
adjusting for a ten percent annual depreciation,
approximated to 8800 million rupees by the year 1987. A
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Table 3.4 Cumulative foreign private investment
[Million Rupees]
Year Cum-Inv
1965 176.00
1966 158.40
1967 140.80
1968 123.20
1969 476.60
1970 864.90
1971 1098.90
1972 966.60
1973 834.30
1974 851.00
1975 931.80
1976 819.40
1977 1000.00
1978 1136.90
1979 1587.10
1980 2037.10
1981 3059.10
1982 3015.30
1983 3186.30
1984 4244.30
1985 6362.70
1986 7726.60
1987 8795.70
Source:Appendix Table 2.1 Chapter 2
yearly details of cumulative investment (with ten percent 
depreciation) are provided in Table 3.4.
In view of continuous rise in the volume of foreign 
physical assets, and corresponding increase in repatriation 
of profits, the long run effect of FPI on BOP in terms of 
direct inflow and outflow of resources appear to be 
negative. However, this would be a hasty conclusion. For a 
realistic estimate of BOP effects of FPI all the secondary 
costs and benefits (such as import substitution, or exports 
of goods, increase in imports of raw material etc.) should
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also be taken into account before a final judgment is made.
3.4 The changing pattern of foreign capital
One of the important developments of 1970s with regard to 
foreign capital inflow to developing countries was the 
significant shift from relatively soft public capital to 
more commercial and commercial like public capital. However, 
Pakistan is one of those countries which has successfully 
avoided borrowing at massive scale from the private 
commercial market. The share of private debt has, therefore, 
never exceeded from ten percent in the total foreign debt. 
Table 3.5 provides share of private and public foreign debt 
and average interest rate.
It is quite evident from Table 3.5 that rate of interest 
against public debt is significantly lower than the private 
commercial debt and to the extent of difference of these two 
interest rates net resources have been transferred from 
abroad to Pakistan.
3.4.1 Grants and grant element
The internal composition of public capital inflow is more 
important for Pakistan. The share of grants and grants like 
assistance was continuously declining over past two decades. 
As a result of Afghan crisis Pakistan has once again
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Table 3.5 Share in total foreign debt
[Percent]
Pub lie Debt_______ Private Debt
Share Interest Share Interest
Year [%] Rate__________ [%]______ Rate
1972 92 2.5 8 3.9
1973 94 3.0 6 6.8
1974 94 2.8 6 9.9
1975 95 3.4 5 7.5
1976 96 3.6 4 8.8
1977 95 3.1 5 8.5
1978 96 1.9 4 8.9
1979 96 2.2 4 11.3
1980 94 2.2 6 11.3
1981 95 3.4 5 15.6
1982 91 4.6 9 13.7
1983 92 4.1 8 10.4
1984 91 3.7 9 9.8
1985 93 5.3 7 8.5
1986 93 6.5 7 8.7
Source: World DEbt Tables 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1987-88
received a substantial amount of grants from abroad. But if 
the relief assistance is excluded from the total inflow of 
resources then the share of grants substantially declines. 
For example just before the Afghan crisis, share of such 
transfers from abroad had declined to only 12 percent 
(during 1970 to 1978) which was about 80 percent during the 
First Five Year Plan (1955-60). Table 3.6 provides the share 
of grants and grants like assistance over past four decades.
Contrary to an outright grant, grant element is the 
difference between face value of a loan and present value of 
all future repayments (amortisation and interest payments) 
discounted at an appropriate rate of discount (5). From such 
a definition one could clearly see the similarity between
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Table 3.6 Share of grants and grants like 
assistance in total resource inflow from abroad
Years Percent
1950-55 70
1955-60 80
1960-65 46
1965-70 31
1970-78 12
1978-83 22
1983-87 24
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1987-88, Table 2.10
grant element and net out flow of resources where a flow of 
lending is offset by a reverse flow of debt service payments 
(6). In other words a capital inflow which has to be repaid 
with interest will be worth its face value only if a 
discount rate at which the repayments are discounted is 
equal to the rate of interest. An appropriate choice of 
discount rate is, therefore, crucial in estimating a grant 
element. There are different opinions with regards to 
selection of a discount rate. It could be recipient 
country's opportunity cost of capital or the interest rate 
on loans in the open market. The discount rate normally 
applied in estimating grant element is ten percent.
Other factors which determine the grant element in a loan 
are grace period and maturity period. The grace period is a 
period between disbursement of loan and the first
installment of repayment. The longer the grace period for a
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loan of a given maturity the less the present value of the 
future discounted repayments. Similarly the longer the 
maturity period, the longer the concessionery interest rate 
is benefited and less the present value of future discounted 
repayments.
All the four elements (i.e. discount rate, interest 
rate,grace period and maturity period) of a loan can be put 
together for calculating grant element as following
where GE (in absolute term)is a grant element, P is face 
value of a loan, Rt is total repayment of principle and 
interest in year t, M is maturity period of the loan and r 
is rate of discount. The GE in percent term will be:
Ohlin (1966, appendix) has worked out grant element for 
different combinations of interest rates, discount rates, 
grace periods and the lengths of maturity. At the one 
extreme, if the capital inflow is a pure grant, with zero Rt 
in equation [3.3], the grant element is 100 percent. At the 
other extreme, where capital inflow is at a rate of interest 
equal to the market rate of interest (assumed to be the
m Rt
t [3.3]
GEP = ( )*100 [3.4]
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appropriate discount rate) and the grace period and maturity 
of the loan are also as in the market, then sum of the 
discounted future value of the capital will be equal to the 
face value and the grant element will be zero. Table 3.7 
give§ some illustrative calculations from Ohlin (1966, 
appendix).
Table 3.7 Grant element in loans
Discount Rate
5 Percent 10 PercentT e4* y-a +  p  £X lit v  X v  D  U X d  v* w  Ot
Maturity Period
oii G=5 G=10 o II o G=5 G=10
2 percent
10 13 12 - 30 42 -
30 29 34 37 55 62 67
40 34 38 41 60 67 73
4 Percent
10 4 7 — 22 31 —
30 10 11 12 41 47 50
40 11 13 14 45 50 55
6 percent
10 NE NE NE 15 21 —
30 NE NE NE 27 31 34
40 NE NE NE 30 33 37
7 percent
10 NE NE NE 11 16 —
30 NE NE NE 20 23 25
40 NE NE NE 23 25 27
G = Grace period NE = Negative
According to calculations of Ohlin, the grant element is 
very sensitive to small changes in the interest rate and the 
discount rate and relatively insensitive to variations in 
the grace and maturity periods.
122
3.4.1.1 Grant element in loans acquired by Pakistan
The terms of various individual loans acquired by Pakistan 
varies from extreme concessionery loans provided by Canada 
(CIDA Loans) which bear no interest and have the maturity 
period of fifty years to pure commercial loans with no 
concessionery element (7). On the average interest payments 
as percent of debt outstanding (with a lag of one year) have 
varied from year to year. For most of the period the rates 
have remained close to four percent. The average terms of 
loans over different years and the corresponding grant 
element as estimated by World Bank for Pakistan are 
tabulated in Table 3.8.
£
Table 3.8 Average terms of loans and grant element
Maturity Grace Grant
Interest Period Period element
Year [*] [Years] [Years] [%]
(i) Private Creditors 
1972 3.9 8.8 2.4 19.4
1973 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1974 9.9 9.1 1.6 0.1
1975 7.5 8.4 1 . 1 8.4
1976 8.8 9.4 2.7 4.3
1977 8.5 8.7 1.9 5.0
1978 8.9 10.0 1.8 4.1
1979 11.2 9.3 1 . 3 -3.4
1980 11.6 9.9 0.7 -4.1
1981 15.6 6.6 2 . 0 -11.5
1982 13.7 3.4 2.0 -6.4
1983 10.4 5.6 2 . 9 -0.7
1984 9.8 7.2 2.7 2 . 1
1985 8.5 10.3 2.4 5.6
1986 8.7 8.6 2 . 8 1.5
Table 3.8 cont.
Maturity Grace Grant
Interest Period Period element
Year [%} [Years] [Years] m
(ii) Official Creditors
1972 2.5 36.6 9.0 62. 3
1973 0.4 40. 3 9.4 81 . 3
1974 2 . 8 24. 5 6.4 51 . 3
1975 3.4 35. 1 8.1 55.8
1976 3.6 27.4 7.2 49. 1
1977 3.1 33.5 8.2 56. 1
1978 1.9 34.8 8.6 65.0
1979 2.2 28 . 3 7.1 56.9
1980 2.2 31 . 3 7.7 59.8
1981 3.4 31.9 7.9 56. 8
1982 4.6 32.9 7.6 46. 2
1983 4.1 30 . 6 7.4 46.8
1984 3.7 30.4 7.5 51 . 5
1985 5.3 28 . 8 6.7 37.0
1986 6.5 26.6 6 . 58 27 . 9
(iii) All Creditors
1972 2.6 35.7 8.8 61.0
1973 0.4 40 . 3 9.4 81 . 3
1974 3.2 23.6 6.1 48 . 1
1975 3.6 34 . 2 8.4 54. 1
1976 4.1 25 .4 6.7 44. 1
1977 3.8 30. 1 7.4 49.0
1978 2.4 32 . 8 8.1 60.2
1979 3 . 3 26 . 1 6.4 49.9
1980 3.8 27. 1 6.4 47.8
1981 7.8 22. 3 5.8 32.2
1982 7.4 23.9 5.9 30. 1
1983 5.5 25.4 6.4 36. 8
1984 4.7 26.5 6.7 43.1
1985 5.6 26.8 6.4 34.8
1986 6.6 25^9 6.4 26. 8
Source:World debt Tables 1982-83, 1983 -84 and 1987-88
9 1  G r a n t  e l e m e n t  h a s  b e e n  w o r k e d  o u t  w i t h  1 0  % d i s c o u n t  rate]
According to Mahmood's (1977)estimates the grant element 
(with 10 percent discount) is about 90 percent for CIDA 
loans followed by IDA and U.K. loans which have the grant 
element of 88 percent and 77 percent respectively. In
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official credits the lowest grant element is in German 
export credits and is about 16 percent. Mahmood has also 
estimated a weighted average grant element, using different
discount rates for different 
findings is provided in Table
A
Table 3.9 Grant element in
Year
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
___________________1974-75______
Source:Mahmood (!977 p6) Table
9 T h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e s  u s e d  to 
w e r e  8, 10, a n d  12 p e r c e n t  fo
a n d  1 9 7 1 - 7 5
periods. A summary of his 
3.9.
public capital from abroad
Percent
41
43
46 
43 
56 
54 
60 
71
47 
62
2
c a l c u l a t e  t he g r a n t  e l e m e n t
r t he y e a r s  1 9 6 5 - 1 9 6 0 ,  1 9 6 8 - 7 1  
• e s p e c t i  v e 1y ._________________________________
The overall picture which emerges from the above 
discussion is that except during 1979 to 1983 when private 
loans have some negative grant element, Pakistan has 
remained a net beneficiary on account of concessionery loans 
and credits received from abroad. However, the old days of 
concessionery loans and credits have clearly gone and the 
resurgence of increase in grants or grant like assistance in 
aftermath of the Afghan crisis is purely a temporary 
phenomenon.
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3.4.2 Tying of loans and credits
The whole discussion with regard to grant element in loans 
and credits has been done under the assumption that prices 
which a recipient country has to pay for the goods and 
services bought with these loans and credits is the minimum 
competitive price. In reality, prices determined by the 
world competitive bidding have most often proved to be
substantially lower than prices paid by recipient country in 
the donor country's market when loans are tied to the 
source. According to Griffin (1965, p615) products purchased 
under tied agreements usually cost 12 to 15 percent more 
than world prices. Even this, according to Griffin is an
underestimate because foreign suppliers frequently raise 
their prices when loans are tied and world competition is 
eliminated. He has particularly observed that German 
industries charge 40 percent more under tied loans
agreements . Similarly Mikesell (1968, p230) has observed
that in case of USA under tied loan the cost of equipment is 
10 to 20 percent higher than lowest international prices.
In order to investigate the element of higher prices under 
tied loans for Pakistan, Haq (1967) examined twenty projects 
where a tied loan facility was utilized and he found that 
the prices from tied sources were about 50 percent higher 
than the lowest bids on international tendering. Most 
alarming higher prices were, probably, charged for iron and
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steel under commodity assistance from USA. The prices were 
higher from the cheapest international sources ranging 
between 41 and 111 percent as shown in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10 Estimates of over valuation for iron and steel
under tied commodity assistance, 1967 
[prices in rupees per long ton]
Increase 
Cheapest in cost due to
Tied international tied credit
Item______________ source___________ source__________ (%)
M.s. billets 633 332 91
M.S. plates 808 469 72
M.S.strips 620 430 44
Structurals 930 555 68
G.P.sheets 1073 746 44
G .C .sheets 1066 754 41
Wire rod 905 429 111
Nail wire 976 495 97
Source:Pakistan Planning Commission, Memorandum for the
Consortium 1968-69 (1968, p71)
The higher prices under tied loans have the obvious 
following implications for a recipient country:-
(a) By definition, raising the cost of imports, tied 
loans augment a deficit on current account of BOP and 
lead to a deterioration of terms of trade. Such a 
situation can persist for quite a long time if 
borrower country permanently becomes dependent upon a 
high cost supplier of spare parts, replacements and 
ancillary equipment.
127
(b) Tied loans lead to higher debt repayment 
obligations and greater foreign debt burden. In other 
words higher prices under tied loans affect the grant 
element negatively and, therefore, should be 
specifically included in any estimation of 
concessionery element in a loan or credit (8).
3.5 Debt servicing models
3.5.1 The debt cycle
The loan part of a foreign capital inflow has to be 
serviced and as a consequence net resource transfers from 
abroad could fall to zero or become negative except where 
gross lending always exceeds debt service payments. In case 
of Pakistan, as we have already noted, the net transfers of 
resources have fallen to a value less than one third of the 
gross inflow.(See Table 3.2).
Projections of capital import requirements based on a 
quantitative two gap model, discussed in Chapter 1, provide 
certain pattern of net resource inflow over a given time 
period. Such models are frequently employed to analyse the 
implications of debt service of foreign loans designed to 
achieve a target rate of self sustaining growth by filling a 
declining gap between domestic savings and investment {see 
for example Avramovic (1964, Chapter IV), Mikesell
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(1968,Chapter 4), Thirlwall (1983, pp298-303), Healy (1971, 
Chapter 5) and World Bank (1985, pp47-48)}. Since resource 
inflows and debt service payments arising from foreign loans 
must always be accompanied by adjustments in the current 
account balance, the savings-investment and imports-exports 
gaps are always identical in such models. In other words the 
capital inflow and debt service payments may be derived from 
either savings-investment gap or imports-exports gap. The 
ultimate conclusion in either way, therefore, will be the 
same.
A typical debt cycle model, which explains the capital 
inflow and debt service payments, assumes a certain growth 
paths for imports and exports as hypothetically illustrated 
in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.11. Our illustration of the debt 
cycle is in terms of exports and imports, but the analysis 
is exactly analogous to that of investment and saving gap. 
The table has been built under following assumptions:-
(1) Exports and imports to grow over the base values 
at a constant rate of 5 percent and 3 percent 
respectively.
(2) Interest is charged at the rate of 5 percent per 
annum on debt of the past year.
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Table 3 .11 Hypothetical foreign debt profile
Trade Net Indb.
Imports exports Bal­ Amort Intr Debt Net [Less Re
Year [gr-3%][gr-5%] ance [7%] [5S] Ser Borr.Payment]
1 1350 1000 350 0 0 0 350 350
2 1391 1050 341 25 18 42 383 733
3 1432 1103 330 51 37 88 418 1126
4 1475 1158 318 79 56 135 453 1527
5 1519 1216 304 107 76 183 487 1935
6 1565 1276 289 135 97 232 521 2349
7 1612 1340 272 164 117 282 554 2768
8 1660 1407 253 194 138 332 585 3189
9 1710 1477 233 223 159 383 615 3610
10 1761 1551 210 253 181 433 643 4030
11 1814 1629 185 282 202 484 669 4447
12 1869 1710 158 311 222 534 692 4857
13 1925 1796 129 340 243 583 712 5257
14 1983 1886 97 368 263 631 728 5645
15 2042 1980 62 395 282 677 739 6016
16 2103 2079 24 421 301 722 746 6367
* 17 2166 2183 -17 446 318 764 748 6694
18 2231 2292 -61 469 335 803 743 6991
19 2298 2407 -108 489 350 839 731 7253
20 2367 2527 -160 508 363 870 711 7474
21 2438 2653 -215 523 374 897 682 7648
22 2511 2786 -275 535 382 918 643 7768
23 2587 2925 -339 544 388 932 594 7826
24 2664 3072 -407 548 391 939 532 7815
25 2744 3225 -481 547 391 938 457 7724
26 2827 3386 -560 541 386 927 367 7544
27 2911 3556 -644 528 377 905 261 7264
28 2999 3733 -735 508 363 872 137 6873
*29 3089 3920 -831 481 344 825 -7 6358
30 3181 4116 -935 445 318 763 -172 5705
31 3277 4322 -1045 399 285 685 -361 4899
32 3375 4538 -1163 343 245 588 -575 3925
33 3476 4765 -1289 275 196 471 -818 2764
34 3581 5003 -1423 193 138 332 -1091 1399
*35 3688 5253 -1565 98 70 168 -1397 -192
* I n d i c a t e s  the v a r i o u s  t u r n i n g p o i n t s
(3) Loans are amortised at the rate of 7 percent per 
annum.
The difference between exports (X) and Imports (M) as 
resource transfers (Rt) from abroad required to bridge the
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exports-imports gap which according to our assumption 
steadily declines and after year 16 exports exceed imports. 
The net borrowing (NB) goes on a little longer (till year 
28) in order to cover interest charges. The excess of 
exports help to clear the accumulated debt and the country 
becomes net creditor after year 34.
According to World Bank assessment (World Development 
Report 1985, p47) United Kingdom and United States over the 
past 150 years have followed the pattern of debt cycle quite 
closely. But, according to the same report, for tyCe 
developing countries the evidence is mixed and because of 
sudden shifts in major economic variables, as have occurred 
during seventies, often lead to a significant departure from 
the predicted path.
Despite the fact that debt cycle model has not proved to 
be precisely relevant for most of the developing countries, 
following are the important points which deserve attention:-
(i) If exports do not grow at a rate higher than the 
rate of growth of imports for a number of years,the 
gross capital inflow and debt service would soon 
reach huge proportions. In our example even if we 
reduce the rate of growth of exports from 5 percent 
to 4 percent per annum, with other assumptions 
remaining the same, the time for exports to exceed
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imports will reach to 32 years from 16 years. 
Accordingly the period of net borrowing and full debt 
liquidation will extend from 28 and 34 years to 75 
and 82 years respectively. It may be noted that in 
the base year the imports are only 35 percent higher 
than exports and no past debt is assumed. If 
difference of exports and imports in the base year is 
increased and the assumption of zero debt in the 
beginning is dropped then the required rate of growth 
of exports to liquidate the debt in the same length 
of time will be much higher.
(2) Long periods of capital inflow financed by loans 
on hard terms quickly buildup a large volume of debt 
service payments which could become unmanageable. 
In our hypothetical example both interest rate and 
amortisation (5 and 7 percent respectively) represent 
relatively soft loans. If the rate of interest is 
raised to 7 percent and amortisation to 10 percent 
the time for net borrowing to continue will extend to 
37 years (from 28 years) and debt liquidation to 42 
years (from 34 years).
If we apply the concept of debt cycle on Pakistan then the 
picture is not very bright. The total outstanding debt is still 
rising (see figure 3.1). If we project the exports and imports 
into the future on the basis of historical trend growth rates
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in current prices, estimated with semi-logarithmic method, the 
imports will continuously exceed the exports till the year 2010 
into the next century (see Figures 3.5 and 3.6). The 
projections are based on following equations
In X = 5.93 + 0.19 Trend [3.5]
In M = 6.94 + 0.17 Trend [3.6]
Keeping in view the fragile nature of exports from Pakistan 
and falling private transfers from abroad (see sections on 
exports and private transfers from abroad in Chapter 2) and 
fall in grants and grants like capital from abroad, the 
problem of foreign debt does not appear to get solved 
without consistent and concrete measures which could ensure a 
simultaneous stable and rapid rise in exports compared to 
imports.
3.5.2 The debt and debt service ratios
Although the external debt of Pakistan has increased 
rapidly during the past two decades and indications are 
that in future it is going to be more expensive to borrow 
from abroad, this dose not mean that Pakistan cannot or 
should not borrow any more to meet its foreign exchange 
requirements. Some indication of the capacity for further
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Table 3.12 Debt and debt service ratios
YEAR DQ% DSQ% INTQ% DSX% INTXSfe
1959 2.7 0.3 0.1 6.9 3.1
1960 3.8 0.4 0.2 15.0 5.4
1961 4 . 3 0 . 8 0 . 3 27 . 2 9.6
1962 5 . 2 1 . 1 0 . 3 22 .4 6.2
1963 8.5 1 . 3 0 . 4 27 . 5 8.0
1964 12.0 1 . 1 0.5 25.9 10.4
1965 16.8 1.2 0.5 29.3 13.0
1966 19.3 2.9 0 . 6 71.9 16. 1
1967 22.7 1.4 0.6 31.3 13.3
1968 26. 3 2.0 0.8 44. 2 18 . 2
1969 27.8 1.9 0.8 52. 1 21.0
1970 30.6 1.9 0.8 43 .4 19 . 3
1971 32.7 1.2 0.5 17.2 7.2
1972 64. 2 3.3 1 . 5 23 .6 10. 5
1973 48.7 2.4 1 . 0 19 . 2 7.7
1974 42 . 3 2.4 1.0 23 .9 10.0
1975 39.7 2.1 0.9 21.9 9.5
1976 41 .9 2.3 1.0 27 . 3 11.9
1977 39 . 3 2.0 1.0 24 .9 12.4
1978 40 . 0 2.4 1 . 1 25 .6 11 .9
1979 36.7 3.0 1.4 27. 1 12.3
1980 34.7 2.5 1.0 20.7 8.4
1981 32 . 2 1.8 0 . 7 19 . 9 8 . 2
1982 34. 3 2.5 1 . 0 23 . 5 9.1
1983 33 .4 2.6 1 . 0 26 . 3 10.0
1984 33 . 2 2.9 1 . 0 33 . 2 11 . 5
1985 32 . 1 3.0 1 . 0 29 . 5 9.9
1986 35 .0 3 . 5 1 . 2 29 . 9 10. 3
1987 34. 1 3.3 1 . 2 25 . 8 9.6
(1) DQ % = T o t a l  d e b t  as p e r c e n t  of GD P .
(2) D S Q  % = D e b t  s e r v i c e  as p e r c e n t  of GD P .
(3) I N T Q  % = I n t e r e s t  p a y m e n t s  as p e r c e n t  of G D P .
(4) D S X  % - D e b t  s e r v i c e  as p e r c e n t  of e x p o r t s .
(5) I N T X  % = I n t e r e s t  p a y m e n t s  as p e r c e n t  of e x p o r t s .
borrowing can be obtained by comparing the situations over 
years, as measured by the changes in ratios of debt and debt 
service payments. Table 3.12 and Figures 3.7 to 3.11 show; 
ratios of total debt outstanding, debt service and 
interest payments to GDP and exports.
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The ratios in Table 3.12 suggest that Pakistan is not in 
a much worse position to day as it was 7-8 years back. 
Interest payments and debt service as percent of exports are 
stable with some decline after 1979. However, the interest 
payments as percent of GDP have risen to 1.2 percent 
compared to 1 percent which were some what stable for a long 
time. Similarly the total debt outstanding as percent of GDP 
have more or less stabilized since 1980. The important point 
is that debt service is now more than 3 percent of GDP and 
is taking slightly above 25 percent of total exports 
earnings.
3.5.3 The critical rate of interest
It is not possible to fix a kind of limit to the ratios 
(discussed above) which could be used as a yardstick in 
order to determine the seriousness of the debt and debt 
service problem. Hayes (1964) has, however, formulated a 
concept of the critical rate of interest which is the 
highest rate of interest which a country can afford to pay 
on external borrowing to cover its investment-savings gap 
without letting the interest charges rise faster than 
its GDP. Assuming no external debt at the beginning, the 
critical rate of interest can be defined as following:-
where i is critical rate of interest, g is rate of growth of 
GDP, So an initial saving rate, Sm the marginal propensity 
to save and k the incremental capital output ratio. If the 
critical rate of interest is exceeded, the debt could well 
be unmanageable, in the sense of unserviceable by further 
borrowing. The critical rate of interest is of particular 
interest in view of the distinction between soft and hard 
loans. If the critical rate of interest is lower than the 
interest rate for hard loans then a growth strategy based on 
external capital could be pursued only on soft loans for 
which the interest rate is lower than critical rate of 
interest.
In case of Pakistan if we ignore the current level of debt 
and take the 10.2 percent level of saving rate of 1987-88 as 
the initial and 19 percent as marginal saving rate (achieved 
in the year 1987-88) then the target growth rate of 6.5 
percent with capital output ratio of 3:1 (9) will have a
critical rate of interest:
. _ 6.5 (10.2-19) [3.6]
1 10.2 - 3 (6.5)
=  6.2 %
The critical rate of interest of 6.2 percent based on very 
optimistic assumption of 19 percent marginal propensity to 
save is not very encouraging. In the past for a number of 
times the marginal propensity to save has been even lower
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than the initial saving rate. Similarly Pakistan is already 
facing the burden of debt which is a missing variable in the 
critical rate of interest estimation. A major upset in the 
terms of loans from abroad could make it difficult to 
continue a high growth rate strategy dependent upon foreign 
borrowing.
3.6 Conclusion
The 1970s witnessed a very rapid buildup of the external 
debt of Pakistan accompanied by some shift from soft loans 
to hard loans and a fall in grants and grant like capital 
from abroad particularly if refugees assistance is excluded. 
Although the average terms for foreign debt are hardening 
and debt is rising quite rapidly there is no major 
deterioration in the debt and debt service ratios. However, 
it is going to be increasingly difficult to pursue a high 
growth strategy on external borrowing withoutadequate policy 
measures to restrict imports and accelerate exports. The 
ultimate conclusion is the same which we arrived in Chapter 
2, that Pakistan can no more afford to rely on only 
structural approach of "two gap hypothesis" for solving the 
problem of imports-exports gap over a period of fifteen to 
twenty years. The attitude has to be changed towards a more 
pragmatic and consistent macroeconomic policy.
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Notes
(1) Lever and Huhne (1987, p41)
(2) It is difficult to construct any deflator which can 
realistically convert the debt from current prices into 
constant real prices. For the sake of comparison we have, 
therefore, applied the domestic GDP deflator.
(3) In this section we will only evaluate the effects of 
foreign private investment on BOP rather than a full 
cost-benefit analysis. For such an analysis of foreign 
investment see Lai(1975).
(4) For a hypothetical numerical example see Thirlwall 
(1983,p306)
(5) See for further details on this point Pincus (1963 
pp360-367).
(6) For further discussion on similarity of these two 
concepts see Ohlin (1966, appendix).
(7) See Economic Surveys of Pakistan, section on Foreign 
Capital Inflow for terms and conditions of different loans.
(8) For a useful discussion of problems and policy
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implications of tied loans see Bhagwati (1970)
(9) The basic data for savings (average and marginal),are 
for the year 1987-88 as reported in the Seventh Five Year 
Plan of Planning Commission Government of Pakistan (p94) and 
is assumed to hold for the subsequent period. It may however 
be mentioned that in reality the marginal propensity to save 
has shown significant fluctuations during the past and may 
so happen in the future. The GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent 
is the target growth rate of GDP for Seventh Five Year Plan 
and capital output ratio of 3:1 is used in estimating the 
capital requirement in order to achieve a target growth 
rate.
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CHAPTER 4
MACRO ECONOMIC MODEL FOR PAKISTAN
4.1 Macro Economic Models and Developing Countries
In capitalist economies before the great depression of 
1930's economic theory was largely devoted to a study of the 
behaviour of individual economic units. The whole economic 
system was to be working automatically by the functioning 
of price system. This is now known as microeconomics. As a 
reaction to the depression and the publication of Keynes 
"General Theory Of Employment, Interest, and Money" in 1936, 
modern macroeconomic developed as an analytical tool for 
understanding behaviour of broad economic aggregates. By 
concentrating on aggregate economic magnitudes, economists 
have derived relationships and used them to control an 
overall economic activity.
The literature related to macroeconomic is is enormous but 
is mostly devoted to developed economies.(1). Macroeconomics 
models based on standard ISLM tools are not quite relevant 
to the third world economies although macroeconomic problems 
have always existed there.{See Taylor (1979, Chapter 1) and 
Vines, (1987)}. Blejer and Khan (1984, pl52) have
listed the following factors which particularly distinguish 
developing economies from the developed economies
(i) A weak and very thin capital market;
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(ii) shortage of credit;
(iii) non market credit allocation;
(iv) managed and non market official interest rate; 
and
(vi) investment in specific sectors in order to 
achieve planned objectives.
These factors are equally true for Pakistan. In 
particular, as we have noted in Chapter 1 investment in 
Pakistan is actively guided by a planning process rather 
than being determined by the market forces. Pakistan cannot, 
therefore, be described a full market economy. Similarly 
following views of Leff and Sato (1975, pl71) are also quite 
relevant for Pakistan
"..interest-rate changes, an adjustment mechanism 
familiar from more developed economies, are not very 
relevant to LDCs. For doctrinal and political 
reasons, the governments in these countries generally 
do not permit interest rates to move sufficiently to 
clear the financial markets. Rather , the monetary 
authorities create new credit more or less 
independently of domestic savings.".
It is for these kind of reasons that we have kept investment
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as exogenous in our model. However, in spite of such
limitations numerous studies have been undertaken on 
analysis of investment in the developing countries (2)
An indiscriminate application of rich-country models to 
third world country (like Pakistan) has not been found to be 
very useful. Klein (1965) had reported that in early sixties 
while Japan was not an advanced economy the models where the 
"parametric structure of the equations and definition of 
variables were made to look almost like those of established
United States models were not successful or lasting
models" (p 665). Such failures som6  times had caused 
temptation to believe that " the economic concepts applied 
to the developed western world were inappropriate [for 
developing countries] and that search should be made for
alternatives" (3). This is of course not a realistic 
conclusion. Instead what Taylor (1979) calls the
"characteristics (or stylized facts)" (p3) of a country 
should be incorporated appropriately in the model.
4.2 Types of Macroeconomic Models
Macroeconomic models are broadly classified as models of 
national economy or international economy. The national 
economy models consist of national income or input output 
models. The national income models are then either in terms 
of the tradition of Keynes's general theory with its short 
run orientation, or models which followed after the
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publication of Harrod-Domar model and placed emphasis on 
long run behaviour of an economy. The models developed in 
the context of third world countries in the macroeconomic 
tradition are significantly different in substance. Park
(1980) has classified the macroeconomic models of developing
countries into following three categories:-
(1) Keynesian models of effective demand both with
and without the financial sector and the supply of
real output.
(2) Chenery's two gap model.
(3) Real models based on either Harrod-Domar or on 
one sector or two sector non classical growth models.
{For a brief list of models under each category see Park 
(page 676)}
4.3 The Mode1
Keating (1985) has defined an economic model as "a 
description of the whole or part of the economy, omitting 
those aspects of the economy that the model-builder believes 
to be relatively unimportant".(p,50). As such in building a 
model there is, in principle, no limit to the level of 
disaggregation and the refinements that one could 
incorporate. The description of a model may take a form of
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words or diagrams or mathematical expressions.
The economy of Pakistan, as a result of political 
instabilities and wars, for most of the time has experienced 
turbulence economic environments*This coupled with the usual 
problems which a developing country faces such as structural 
bottlenecks, imperfection of markets, lack of data and 
comparable work etc. make it difficult to go for an 
ambitious model. In spite of all these limitations, however, 
we have particularly made an effort to avoid most obvious 
drawbacks of the traditional Keynesian type and "two gap" 
models. Our objective is to build a model which is both 
theoretically sound to explain the basic macroeconomic 
behaviour of the economy and in practical terms could also 
be empirically estimated. The basic idea of our model comes 
from Vines (1987) (4)
It is an open economy model. An aggregate demand side 
includes behavioral equations for private consumption, 
imports and exports. Investment (both private and public) 
and government consumption are exogenous. An aggregate 
supply is represented by the productive capacity of 
capital stock. Inflation is explained by the gap between 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply.
As in case of most of the developing countries, the model 
lacks "LM curve". A government budget deficit and current 
account balance of payments which determine a change in
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financial assets in our model become crucially important. 
Influence of financial assets over private consumption is 
direct and strong. It is particularly worth noting that an 
increase in government expenditure directly adds to monetary 
assets and as such fiscal policy also works as an instrument 
of the monetary policy.
The evolution of assets is an important part of our model. 
Besides private sector financial assets and capital stock 
(mentioned above) the model includes accumulation of foreign 
debt. The evolution of these stocks will be described in 
detail in section 4.5.3.
4.4 The Estimation Procedure
Our main focus in this section is the quantitative 
measurement of economic relationships in terms of their 
theoretical relevance and policy importance. The central 
problem at issue would be specification of the relationships 
suitable for statistical fitting rather than going into 
depth of regression methods. This is because the subject is 
very much familiar and a number of standard books on the 
subject are available. We shall also discuss certain special 
problems in choosing variables that may be relevant to 
Pakistan. Use of the error correction mechanism (ECM) with 
cointegration used in an estimation of dynamic structure of 
the model, however, does need some elaboration since it is a 
relatively recent development in the field of econometric
work related to developing countries like Pakistan.
4.4.1 Error Correction Mechanism and Cointegration
Economic theory generally deals with equilibrium 
relationships. Most empirical econometric studies are an 
attempt to evaluate such relationships by summarizing 
economic time series using statistical techniques. Most of 
the econometric studies in developing countries are still 
dominated by partial adjustment specifications "although 
existing evidence clearly indicates that such models are 
potentially misspecified." (5). The models based on ECM, 
first introduced by Sargan (1964) and popularized by Hendry 
{see for example Davidson, Hendry, Srba, Yoo (1978) and
Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan (1983)} has put the ECM into
mainstream of macroeconomic research work. As a result in 
the last few years a voluminous literature has emerged in 
this field (6). The ECM particularly enjoyed revival and 
popularity with the work of Engle and Granger (1987) on
cointegration. This recent work by Granger and Engle has
particularly demonstrated the use of long run equilibrium 
relationships from economic theory in empirical work to 
explain the short run dynamics. They have concluded that 
such error-correction models would not only produce better 
short run forecasts but also produce long run forecasts 
which are economically more meaningful.
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A necessary condition for cointegration is that 
explanatory variables of an equation be of order of 
integration greater than one (7). For this purpose the 
series are tested for their unit root. Dickey and Fuller
(1981) have suggested to test significance of 0 in the 
regression
AXt = 0xt-i + vt [4.1]
To test the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, a test is 
performed on 0. A negative and significant t-ratio of 0 
rejects the null hypothesis. Sargan and Bhargava (1983) 
propose a test of the hypothesis that the errors on the 
regression equation follow a random walk. According to this 
test, whether a series is 1(0), the regression Xt = c + Ut 
is run and null hypothesis of Ut = Ut-i + et is rejected 
against the alternative that the errors follow a stationary 
first order error process. The critical values of 
Cointegration Durbin-Watson statistic (CRDW) are provided by 
Sargan and Bhargava. The Dickey-Fuller (DF) and CRDW, 
however, are not suitable tests if their is a data 
generating process. In order to overcome this problem DF is 
augmented a s :
p
AX = c + 0xt-i + £ d Axt-i + vt [4.2]P j * i  j
The OLS estimator of 0 and its t-statistic (ADF) has the 
same limiting distribution as DF with drift. Engle and Yoo 
(1987) provide the appropriate tables of significance levels 
for Df and ADF. It is important to note that the tests for 
unit roots described here have low power. Hence, in 
accepting a null hypothesis extra care is needed in choice
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of a significance level. It would, therefore, be quite
appropriate to reject the null hypothesis if there is some
statistical evidence and a priori theoretical reason to
accept a relationship. {See for such an argument Mizon 
(1984, pl39)} .
Once the series are tested for their unit roots 
Engle-Granger two stage procedure estimate the long run 
static equation
Yt= a + 0Xt +Ut [4.3]
by OLS method where 0 and Xt are the vectors of long run 
elasticities and explanatory variables. Ut and a stand for 
constant and error term. The residual Ut is subjected to 
test of null hypothesis that Ut is 1(1). We reject the null 
hypothesis if Df/ADF are negative and significantly 
different from zero.Unless the left and right hand sides of 
the equation are of the same order of integration the 
residual Ut will not be stationary. An other view of this 
test is that we are testing the null hypothesis that 
variables of the equation are not cointegrated against the 
alternative hypothesis that variables are cointegrated. The 
residual Ut is entered into the dynamic equation as ECM 
expecting significant negative parameter for it.
There is one problem that the Engle-Granger procedure 
sometimes might give biased long run parameters. Banerjee et 
al. (1986) have provided Monte Carlo evidence that such bias 
is higher with small samples. However, probability of such
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bias is smaller with annual data as compared to 
high-frequency data (see Muscatelli and Hurn (1990)}. Since 
our data frequency is annual we are using the Engl e-Granger 
procedure in estimating consumption and import equations.
4.5 Specification and Estimation of the Model Equations
Our model consists seven behavioural equations and thirty 
one identities and link/ definitional equations which are 
described under following three main sub sections:-
(i) Aggregate Demand;
(ii) Aggregate Supply and
(iii) The Evolution of Assets Stocks.
These sections are, however, not strictly restricted to 
these topics only. In the process of modeling an equation or 
defining an identity if it is deemed suitable various 
explanatory variables of an equation or components of an 
identity are explained under the same section. At end of the 
chapter all equations and identities have been listed and a 
Flow Chart of the model has been added which provide an 
overall summarised picture of the model.
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4.5.1 Aggregate Demand (1975-76 Prices)
Private consumption
Most of the empirical work on the consumption function has 
the following two origins:-
(i) Simple Keynesian 'absolute income hypothesis' 
which implies proportionally lower level of 
consumption at higher level of income.
(ii) A more sophisticated approach towards 
consumption function which began after Kuznet's 
(1955) observation ( for United States) that whereas 
cross section data support 'absolute income 
hypothesis' the annual time series data shows near 
constancy of consumption ratio despite a secular rise 
in income level. The alternate theories commonly 
known as 'permanent income hypothesis' are a kind of 
attempt to reconcile this seemingly contradictory 
behaviour. Most notable of these are Dusenbery's 
(1949) Relative Income Hypothesis, Modigliani and 
Brumberg's (1953) and Modigliani and Ando (1963) Life 
Cycle Hypothesis and Friedman's (1957) Permanent 
Income Hypothesis. Amongst these theories, Modigliani 
model is more useful for building an econometric 
model since it explicitly includes measured current 
income and assets to explain consumption. (See Mayer
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(1972) for a comprehensive review of these theories). 
Molana (1987), besides the review of empirical work 
on these lines provides a good empirical evidence 
about the role of wealth in the aggregate consumption 
(of U.K.).
In addition to above theories, as we discussed in Chapter 
1, in the context of developing countries a negative effect 
of foreign capital on domestic savings (therefore positive 
effect on consumption) has received much attention though a 
significant difference of opinion exists.
Keeping in view the above theoretical considerations, real 
private consumption has been modeled as a function of real 
disposable income and real assets (see section 4.5.3.1 for 
definition of real assets) (8). The equation has been modeled 
in log linear form with real values (1975-76 prices) using 
the Engle-Granger two stage procedure discussed in section 
4.4.1. Although the data is limited to 29 observations the 
frequency is annual which provides enough time-span to 
capture the long-term effects.
Prior to estimating the equation we wish to establish the 
time series properties of the individual series. The natural 
logs of consumption (cone), disposable income (ydc) and real 
assets (a) were tested for 1(1). The CRDW, DF and ADF 
statistics are reported in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Testing for unit root in consumption function variables
Variables CRDW DF ADF
Sconc 2.55 (-)1.50 (-)1.13
6ydc 2.98 (-)1.70 (-)1.18
6a 2.69 (— )2.82 (-)2.10
The ADF and DF tests reported in Table 4.1 are all negative 
and greater 1. The larger values of CRDW particularly 
suggest that the first difference are stationary. We, 
therefore, conclude that 'cone', 'ydc' and 'a' are 
integrated of order one. Having established that our all 
variables are 1(1), we run a static regression. If the 
variables are infact cointegrated then the residuals of the 
equation should be 1(0). The tests for residuals indicate 
that DF, ADF and CRDW are (-)3.78, (->3.86 and 2.1
respectively. This provides further evidence that variables 
are cointegrated. The coefficients of the consumption 
function, therefore,represent the long run elasticities. The 
lagged residual values of the static equation, used as ECM, 
have also significant negative parameter. It may, however, 
be noted that the critical values for DF and ADF are 
available for a minimum sample size of 50 observations. 
Since we have a sample size of 29 observation our tests are 
indicative rather than conclusive.
The static and dynamic equations are as following
Static Consumption Equation [4.4]
cone = 0.1 + 0.85 ydc +0.15 a 
(1.7) (8.9) (1.1)
R SQUR. = 0.995 RSS=0.034 DW = 1.7
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Parameter constancy:(three years forecast period)
Forecast CHI SQUR. 
CHOW Test
0.82
0.55
{cri value = 3.30 }
Dynamic Consumption Equation [4.4a]
6conc = 0.73 Sydc + 0.15 6a - 0.53 ECMt-i
(3.2) (1.1) (-3.7)
R SQUR. = 0.721 RSS = 0.016 DW = 1.98
Parameter constancy:(three years forecast period)
Forecast CHI SQUR. = 1.20 
CHOW Test = 1 . 1 0
{cri value = 3.07 }
Import includes all kinds of goods and services. It has 
been modeled with GNP, effective rate of exchange, and 
levels of foreign exchange reserves of the past year. All 
variables are in real terms. The GNP is considered to be 
more appropriate explanatory variable ( as a compared to 
GDP) because of significant private transfers from abroad 
after 1973. A dummy variable has been used to capture 
effects of the disruption of 1971 war with India.
The real effective exchange rate with expecting negative 
sign has been arrived at as following
Imports
REE = (E x IMD x UVM)/DEF [4.5]
where
E = Nominal exchange rate.
IMD = Average rate of import duty.
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DEF = GDP deflator.
REE = Real effective exchange rate.
UVM = Unit value index of imports.
The nominal exchange rate, import duty and import prices are 
exogenous. (In domestic currency, however, import prices are 
influenced by changing E or IMD).
We have discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.1.2.4 ), that a 
very low level of foreign exchange reserves might force a 
government to put some kinds of restrictions to reduce 
volume of imports. In order to capture effects of such a 
government reaction, we have introduced foreign exchange 
reserves with a lag as one of the explanatory variable in
import equation. However, this effect is kept constant in
our model because we wish to explore the evolution of foreign 
debt without changing reserves. We, therefore, define 
identity for foreign exchange reserves as:
R = Rt-i + CAB -AMT + FA + DISB [4.6]
where CAB, AMT, FA and DISB stand for current account 
balance, amortisation, foreign aid (grants) and disbursement 
on new loans). Substituting identities for foreign debt {Dt 
= Dt-i - AMT + DISB ([4.49])} and disbursements of foreign 
loans, {DISB = AMT - CAB - FA ([4.50]}) in identity for 
reserves gives >R = Rt-i* . Switching-off the change in
foreign exchange reserves, however, will not change the
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basic properties of our model. Effects of an exogenous 
change in reserves for imports (which we have not done in 
our simulation) could still be evaluated.
Import equation has been also estimated using the 
Engle-Granger method with all those steps described for the 
consumption function. The variables of the import equation 
were tested for 1(1). The statistics for set of variables 
are reported in Table 4.2 (9).
Table 4.2
Testing for unit root in import function variables 
Variables CRDW DF ADF
6mtc 3.19 (-) 5.44 (-)2.29
6yc 2.97 (-)1.75 (-)l.OO
SRee 3.00 (-)5.03 (-)3.45
SLRt-i 2.91 (— )4.25 (-)2.70
('mtc',1y c ', 1Ree', and 'LRt-i' stand for log of imports, 
GNP, effective exchange rate and level of foreign exchange 
reserves with a lag of one year in real terms).
The unit root statistics indicate that variables of the 
import equation are 1(1). This evidence is further 
strengthened by unit root statistics of residuals from 
static equation which were tested for 1(0). The DF, ADF and 
CRDW for residuals are (-)5.7, (->-3.2 and 3.2 respectively.
The parameters of the static equation are, therefore, the 
long run elasticities .The equations are as following:-
Static Import Equation [4.7]
mtc = 0.82 yc + 0.12 LRt-i - 0.20 Ree - )0.30 DUMMY 
(7.6) (4.2) (“3.7) (“3.0)
R SQUR. = 0.999 RSS= 0.141 DW = 2.3
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Parameter constancy:(three years forecast period)
Forecast CHI SQUR. 
CHOW Test
1.37
1.28
{cri value = 3.30 }
Dynamic Import Equation [4.7a]
6mtc = 0.95 Syc + 0.05 6LRt-i - 0.29 5 Ree
(3.2) (1.1) (“3.7)
-0.3 5DUMMY - 1 . 0 3  ECMt-i 
(-4.3) (-5.27)
R SQUR. = 0.723 RSS= 0.011 DW = 2.1
Parameter constancy:(three years forecast period)
Forecast CHI SQUR.= 1.11
CHOW Test = 1.08
{cri value = 3.07 >
DF = -5.7 ADF = -3.2 CRDW = 3 . 2
Pakistan being a small country can realistically be 
assumed to be a price taker economy which can only change 
its domestic prices for exports by changing the exchange 
rate. In other words exports are supply constrained and, 
other things being given, an increase in output capacity 
will increase the volume of exports.(10) In addition, as we 
have discussed in Chapter 3, exports from Pakistan are still 
dominated directly or indirectly by the agricultural sector. 
As a result fluctuation in agricultural output have direct 
bearing on volume of exports. Keeping in view these facts, 
exports in real terms have been modeled as following:-
Exports
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(i) Exports are assumed to increase proportionally to 
potential GDP (see section 4.5.2.for definition of 
potential GDP) and any temporary or permanent change 
in this ratio is explained by a real exchange rate 
and index of agricultural marketable surplus (IAMS) 
which are defined as in (ii) and (iii) below 
respectively.
(ii) Real exchange rate as an explanatory variable 
for exports was defined as following
RE = E (UVX/XDEF) [4.8]
where
E = Nominal exchange rate.
UVX = Unit value index of exports.
XDEF = Adjusted GDP deflator for exports.
The XDEF is an adjusted downward GDP deflator for 
rebate of the indirect taxes to exports. These 
indirect taxes add to the cost and therefore pushes 
up the prices of home produced goods. Rebate of the 
indirect taxes neutralize this effect. Such a 
downward adjustment depreciates the real exchange 
rate and encourages exports. After making this 
adjustment for indirect taxes the XDEF is estimated 
by a link equation with GDP deflator.
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xdef = def + 0.005 Trend -0.21 [4.9]
(10.4) (-2.5)
R SQUR. = 0.800 RSS= 0.013
The minus term of 0.21, after taking account of
parameter of 0.005 with trend, is the extent of
indirect tax adjustment to the GDP deflator.
(iii) We have discussed in Chapter 2 that
agricultural sector has significant influence over
exports and fluctuations in agricultural production 
bring parallel fluctuation in exports. In order to 
capture this effect the difference of trend index of
agricultural output and the actual index of output
(abbreviated as IAMS) has been used as explanatory
variable. The estimated IAMS equation is as
following:-
IAMS = iap - (3.94 + 0.07 Trend) [4.10]
R SQUR. = 0.967 RSS= 0.112 DW = 1.00
where 'iap' is the log of actual index of
agricultural production and the second term (3.94 +
0.07 TREND) stand for the trend index of agricultural
production.
The export equation is as following:-
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xtc = kqc + (1.52 - 0.01 
(4.3) (-2.1)
Trend + 0.47 Re
(8 .0)
[4.11]
+ 1 . 0 9  IAMS + 
(2 .1)
0.87 IAMSt-l) 
(2 .6)
R SQUR. = 0.910 RSS= 0.183 DW = 1.40
Parameter constancy:(three years forecast period)
Forecast CHI SQUR. = 3 . 0 6  
CHOW Test = 1 . 8 9
{cri value = 3.10 >
The terms 'xtc' and 'kqc' stand for the log of total exports 
and capacity output respectively. Other variables have 
already been explained. Except with the IAMS there is no lag 
with any other explanatory variable.
Investment
Gross investment, both private and government, are treated 
as exogenous as we have explained in section 4.1. A net 
investment is estimated after adjusting for depreciation.
where NIC, IC and DEPC stand for net investment, gross 
investment and depreciation of capital stock. The capital
stock and depreciation have been discussed in detail in
section 4.5.3.
Gross domestic product ,gross national 
product and disposable income
Gross domestic product at market prices (QCM) is based on
NIC = IC - DEPC [4.12]
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standard national income accounting identity.
QCM = CONC + PIC + GIC + GCC + XTC - MTC + CSTC [4.13]
CONC, PIC, GIC, GCC, XTC, MTC and CSTC stand respectively 
for private consumption, private investment government 
investment, government consumption, exports of goods and
services, imports of goods and services and change in
stocks.
Gross domestic product at factor (QC) has been arrived 
at after adjustment of net indirect taxes as following
QC = QCM (1—INTAXR) [4.14]
The rate of net indirect taxes (INTAXR) is based on actual
indirect taxes, after adjusting for subsidies, as a percent
of gross domestic product at market prices.
Gross national product (YC), in accordance with the national 
income accounting system is defined as following
YC = QCM + NIAC [4.15]
The term NIAC stands for net income from abroad which is 
defined as :
NIAC = PTAX - PTAM - INTR [4.16]
where PTAX is for private transfers from abroad and are
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exogenous. The term PTAM is for transfers to abroad (other 
than interest payments) and is exogenous. Interest paid 
against foreign debt is endogenous which is defined as 
following:-
INTR = Dt- l*INTRR [4.17]
where INTR is for total amount of interest paid, Dt-i is the 
level of foreign debt at end of the past year and INTRR is 
average rate of interest. For the purpose of our model we 
have estimated the average rate of interest based on the 
relationship as defined in [4.17] i.e. the actual interest 
payments divided the level of debt of the past year.
Disposable income (YDC) is estimated by adjusting the 'YC' 
for direct tax which has been assumed to be a fixed 
percentage of 'YC' based on actual direct tax collected.
YDC = YC (1 - DTAXR) [4.18]
4.5.2 Aggregate Supply 
Modeling inflation
Inflation is one of the most controversial issues between 
Keynesian, Monetarists and New Classical Economists. While 
from Keynesian point of view an increase in aggregate demand 
leads to an increase in prices, for Monetarists it is purely 
a monetary phenomenon (11). The famous Phillips Curve (12)
for the first time established the relationship between 
growth rate of money wages and unemployment. Samuelson and 
Solow (1960) estimated a direct relationship between the 
rate of unemployment and the rate of price inflation. 
However, Friedman (1968) has criticized the whole concept of 
long run trade off between inflation and unemployment. 
According to Friedman it is the real wage and not the money 
wage which matters. Workers offer their labour and accept a 
money wage after giving full consideration to the 
anticipated inflation. New Classical Model, somewhere in 
between these two concepts is "a development of introduction 
of endogenous expectations in to the Phillips curve" 
{Hillier (1988, P151)}.
The concept of expectation also faces criticism. The 
adaptive expectation which allows some learning from 
previous experience and past mistakes is relatively simple 
to model but is only dependent on the past. Rational 
expectations on the other hand "is highly controversial" 
{Hillier (1988, pl40). It may be noted that controversy 
which is referred to here is in the context of developed 
economies. Problems of applying this concept on developing 
countries are more difficult to resolve (13). Inspite of 
these difficulties and complications we have modelled the 
home product inflation equation for Pakistan as following:-
HP I - HPIt-i = (ne-HPIt-i) + 0 CU [4.19]
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where HPI, HPIt-i I1G, and CU stand for home product 
inflation, home product inflation with a lag, expected 
inflation and index of capacity utilization. If ne is 
assumed to be equal HPIt-i then the change in inflation SHPI 
(which is by definition equal to 'HPI-HPIt-i') is explained 
by the index of capacity utilization as following:- (14)
SHPI = CONSTANT + 0CU [4.20]
Capacity output, capacity utilisation 
and home product inflation
Capacity utilisation is defined as a ratio of actual GDP 
to potential GDP. i.e.
CU = QC/KQC [4.21]
The terms 'QC* and 'KQC' stand for actual and potential GDP.
The capacity output (KQC) depends on an explicit 
production function. In its most simple form, (particularly 
with reference to developing countries where capital is 
considered to be a limiting factor) the capacity output is 
most often estimated in the following form:-
KQC = «K [4.22]
The term 'K' is for the capital stock and 'a' is the 
familiar capital out put ratio. The drawback of this form
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is that it ignores the change in capacity output that takes 
place with variations in total labour and change in 
productivity. In order to estimate the capacity output for 
Pakistan we selected the following functional form (15):-
KQC = A [e“ Trend i ] [4.23]
or in natural log form
kqc = a + aTrend + /3k [4.24]
in which 'a' and 'Trend' were expected to capture the 
contribution of other factors and technological progress. 
However, because of strong col linearity between Trend and 
capital stock series the result was not quite 
satisfactory.(See section 4.5.3.2 for estimating the capital 
series)* Alternatively following equation was estimated:-
KQC = A[K^] [4.25]
with the underlying assumption that 'A' will capture all 
effects other than the capital. The resulting equation is as 
following:-
kqc = 7.81 + 0.33 k [4.26]
(10.00) (4.9)
R SQUR. = 0.984 RSS= 0.069
The parameter of 0.33 of log of capital stock is close to a 
generally accepted share of 25 percent for capital and the
rest for the other factors of production in total output.
The final equation for change in home product inflation 
which also includes a DUMMY variable to capture the effect 
of 1971 war is as following:-
SHPI = -0.01 + 0.66 CUt-i + 0 . 0 6  DUMMY [4.27]
(1.2) (2.03) (3.5)
R SQUR. = 0.372 RSS= 0.028 DW = 2.2
Parameter constancy:(three years forecast period)
Forecast CHI SQUR. = 0 . 2 1  
CHOW Test = 0 . 2 0
{cri value = 3.07 }
Consumer price equation
Consumer prices areinfluenced by prices of imports (in 
domestic currency) and home product inflation as following:-
Scdef = a Sdef + 0 Suvmd [4.28]
where cdef, def and uvmd stand for the log of indexes for 
consumer prices, home product and import price (in domestic 
currency). The term '6' is for first deference and 'a' and 
'01 are the parameters. Since by definition 'a + 0' are
equal to 1:
Scdef = a Sdef + (1-a) Suvm [4.29]
(i.e. 0= 1-a) and therefore
Scdef = a Sdef - a Suvm + Suvm [4.30]
which is equal to
(Scdef- Suvm) = a (Sdef - Suvm) [4.31]
The final estimated equation is as following:-
Scdef = 0.96 Sdef + 0.04Suvm [4.32]
R SQUR. = 0.976 RSS= 0.010 DW = 2.15
The resulting equation is not entirely satisfactory 
because of relative dominance of the home product inflation 
in the consumer price index though the share of imports in 
GDP is higher. However, it will have little effect on 
overall behaviour of the model though it indicates 
relatively smaller direct influence of import prices on the 
consumer price index which is something not entirely 
realistic.
Other price indices
The implicit price deflators for government consumption, 
government and private investment have ben derived from the 
current and constant estimates of their values given in 
national income accounts. These are assumed to be proxied by 
GDP deflator as following:-
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gcde = def [4.33]
gide = def [4.34]
pide = def [4.35]
The terms 'gcde1, 'pide' 'gide' and 'def' stand for log of 
deflators in respect of government consumption, government 
investment, private investment and GDP.
The unit value index of imports and exports, as already 
mentioned, are exogenous in foreign currency though in local 
currency are changed by the exchange rate which is also 
exogenous. As we have described in Chapter 2 the implicit 
price deflator for net income from abroad has been derived 
from the national income accounts at current and constant 
prices. There are, however, no further details available as 
to how net income from abroad has been estimated at constant
prices in the national income accounts.
4.5.3 The evolution of assets stocks
Our model has the following three kinds of assets
(a) Private sector financial assets.
(b) Capital stock.
(c) Foreign debt.
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4.5.3.1 Private sector financial assets
The total private sector assets consist of physical and 
financial assets. However, for lack of data it was not 
possible to take into account physical assets. Financial 
assets which are claims on goods and services consist of 
money, bonds, loan stocks etc. As Taylor (1979,p3) pointed 
out that " bonds which enter as an alternative interest 
bearing1 assets in advanced country models simply are not 
there [in developing countries models] ".is equally true for 
Pakistan. The term financial assets referred in our study 
include currency in circulation, demand deposits and time 
deposits (including deposits with State Bank of Pakistan).
The change in financial asset is brought by government 
budget and current account balance of payments. An increase 
in government deficit and surplus in the current account 
increase financial assets of private sector and vice versa. 
This is a significant departure from the traditional 
Keynesian type approach where assets are assumed to be 
constant (see Chapter 2 section 2.3.1.5)
For the current account balance of payment as an agent of 
affecting financial assets, it is important to note that 
neither a surplus nor a deficit can continue indefinitely. A 
persistent current account surplus will lead to ever 
increasing assets of the private sector and vice versa. 
However, in either case, the model has correcting mechanism,
172
through change in consumption, which changes the aggregate 
demand and therefore balance of payments directly as well as 
through change in prices. It is some times argued that in 
case of a deficit in balance of payments governments use 
deficit financing to maintain an economic activity (and vice 
versa) and in that process sterilize the financial assets. 
But certainly such a policy cannot be pursued indefinitely.
Since an asset is a stock variable, it is measured at a point 
in time as following:-(16)
A = At-1 + AA [4.36]
where
At = the private sector nominal financial assets at 
the end of time.
At-i= the private sector assets at the end of period 
't-l^or beginning of 't')
AA = the change in the financial assets
The change in financial assets is brought as following:-
AA = (GE-REV) + CAB [4.37]
where
GE = Autonomousus government expenditure (consists 
of government consumption and investment);
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CAB = current account balance and 
REV = government revenue and
Current account balance is driven by the following 
identity (see for details Chapter 2):-
CAB = XT + NIA- MT [4.3B]
XT, NIA, MT are for total exports, net income from abroad 
and total imports (all in current prices). The exports and 
imports are brought to current prices by using appropriate 
indexes (see for definition of these indexes Chapter 2 
section 2.1.3)
Government revenue has been linked with GNP. The estimated 
equation is as following:-
rev = y + 0.02 Trend -2.3 [4.39]
(6.9) (-5.7)
R SQUR. = 0 . 9 8  RSS = 0.010 DW = 1.70
where 'rev' 1 y' stand for log of revenue and GNP 
respectively.
In consumption equation (described above) these are the real 
financial assets which positively influence the private 
consumption. The real assets are defined as following:-
AC = (A/P) [4.40]
where
AC = real private sector financial assets and 
P = consumer price index.
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The equation for 'AC1 represents the real balance or Pigou 
effect and could be be assumed as simplified 'wealth effect' 
in which only money is considered as wealth and it effects 
the aggregate demand by influencing private sector 
consumption {see for such definition Cuthbertson and Taylor 
(1987, p21).
4.5.3.2 Capital stock series
Capital stock series for Pakistan are not readily 
available. The only information available was the data for 
depreciation of capital stock reported in National Accounts 
Statistics of United Nations from 1968 through 1985 with 
additional details about rate of depreciation for different 
sectors. There were following two possible ways for 
developing a capital stock series for Pakistan:-
(1) Estimating production function and capital stock 
series simultaneously as recommended by Dadkhah and 
Zahedi (1986).
(2) Using the data for depreciation of capital stock 
reported in the United Nations National Accounts 
Statistics for the years 1968 to 1985 which also 
include details of rate of depreciation of different 
sectors.
According to method (1) the capital stock series is
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estimated on the basis of following relationships: -
Qi = odCt +et [4.41]
Kt = (l-X)Kt-i [4.42]
and therefore
Qt = a (l-X)Kt-i + al + v [4.43]
(l-X)Qt-i + al + v [4.44]
where
Qt = output (potential GDP)1 
Kt = capital stock,
X = rate of depreciation of capital stock, 
It = fixed investment, 
a = capital out put ratio, 
c = error term, 
v = £ - (1-X)£t-1
Assuming '£' to be zero and 'a' to remain constant over 
the sample period the capital stock series could be 
developed as following
where 'a' is derived from relationship at (iv) above as
In order to use this method equation [4.44] was estimated. 
However, the result was not satisfactory because the 
parameter (1-X) was greater than '1• which implies as if 
there is no depreciation of capital stock. In view of this 
inconsistency the data available for depreciation in UN
Kt = (Qt/a) [4.45]
a = [Qt- (l-X)Qt-i] /It [4.46]
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National Accounts Statistics was used to develop the 
capital stock series as following:-
(a) In absence of sectoral share of capital stock, a 
weighted average rate of depreciation was estimated, 
assuming that capital stock of different sectors is in 
proportion to the value added of these sectors. An 
implicit assumption is that capital output ratio of 
different sectors is the same. The weighted average 
depreciation so estimated is 5.7 percent and 5.6 
percent for the years 1969 and 1985 respectively. A 
rate of overall depreciation of about 6 percent is 
quite realistic for an economy like Pakistan. Details 
of exercise are provided in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Estimate of Weighted Average Rate of
Depreciation for Pakistan
s .NO Sector
% Share 
value
in total 
added
Rate
of
dep.
Weighted 
Rate of dep.
1969-70 1984-85 1969-70 1984-
1 Agriculture 0.368 0.246 0.050 0.018 0.012
2 Mining 0.005 0.022 0.050 0.000 0.001
3 Industry(L) 0.125 0.124 0.100 0.013 0.012
4 Industry(S) 0.035 0.043 0.050 0.002 0.002
5 E & Gas 0.015 0.023 0.070 0.001 0.002
6 Construction 0.042 0.060 0.025 0.001 0.002
7 T & C 0.068 0.080 0.100 0.007 0.008
8 Banks 0.018 0.030 0.050 0.001 0.002
9 Owner dwe1. 0.037 0.039 0.240 0.009 0.009
10 Ser.& oth. 0.287 0.333 0.020 0.006 0.007
0.057 0.056
Notes:
1 ) T h e  d a t a  for r a l e  of d e p r e c i a t i o n  has b e e n  t a k e n  f r o m
N a t i o n a l  A c c o u n t s  S t a t i s t i c s  of U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  for the
y e a r  1985 a n d  the s h a r e  of v a l u e  a d d e d  h a s  b e e n  d e r i v e d
f r o m  the n a t i o n a l  a c c o u n t s  a v a i l a b l e  in E c o n o m i c  S u r v e y  of
P a k i s t a n  ( 1 9 8 7 - 8 8 )
2) L  a nd S in p a r e n t h e s i s  s t a n d  for l a r g e  s c a l e  a n d  s m all 
sea 1e .
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(b) The rate of depreciation of 5.7 percent was used 
to estimate the capital stock (K) for the year 1969 as 
bench mark i.e.
K(1969)=[(Depl969)/0.057] [4.47]
(c) For the years 1969 onwards the capital stock has 
been developed according to identity given below. For 
the years 1985-87 the depreciation has been assumed 
to be 5.7% of the past year capital stock.
Kt = Kt-i + ( It-Depreciation) [4.48]
It may be mentioned that in absence of data for 
depreciation capital stock with a lag for the period 
prior to 1969 the depreciation rate has been assumed 
to be 5 percent of capital stock of the current 
year (17) Table-4.4 provides full details of 
capital stock series.
4.5.3.3 Foreign debt evolution
As in the case with financial assets, foreign debt is also 
a stock variable and is driven by new disbursements after 
making adjustment for amortisation.
Di = Dt-i- AMT + DISB [4.49]
Table 4.4
Table 4.4 Estimated Capital Stock at Constant
1975-76 Prices 
(Mi 11 ion R s .)
YEAR Inve- Depre- Capital
stment ciation Stock
1959 5504 992 19845
1960 7223 1289 25779
1961 8486 1632 32633
1962 10903 2073 41463
1963 14168 2649 52981
1964 15829 3277 65533
1965 13984 3787 75731
1966 13691 4258 85164
1967 13124 4680 93607
1968 12771 5066 101313
3.969 14946 62§9 109990
1970 14695 M Z 3 118667
1971 13406 6128 127234
1972 12987 5727 134512
1973 14544 7494 141773
1974 18178 7184 148823
1975 24057 7497 159816
1976 25173 7571 176376
1977 25292 8147 193977
1978 26030 8533 211123
1979 29385 9297 228620
1980 27579 _97&1 248707*/
1981 28931 10465 266505
1982 31504 11247 284971
1983 32185 12029 305228
1984 34374 12807 325383
1985 36803 13640 346950
1986 40504 21096 370113
1987 41027 22203 389521
The terms Dt, Dt-i, AMT, and DISB respectively stand for 
current outstanding debt, debt outstanding at the end of 
last year (in case of Pakistan the date is 30th June) and 
new disbursement of foreign loans/credits respectively. The 
term DISB is defined as following.
DISB = AMT - CAB - FA [4.50]
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CAB is for current account balance which we have already 
explained. FA stands for non repayable foreign aid. 
Amortisation (AMT) \s driven by a fixed average rate of 
amortisation (AMTR) times Dt-i. The average rate of 
amortisation has been derived according to the same 
relationship, where the actual amount of amortisation is 
divided by the level of debt of the past year. The algebraic 
definition for amortisation is as following:-
AMT = Dt-l * AMTR [4.51]
4.6 Summary and Flow Chart of the Model
The aim of this section is to summarise the model we have 
estimated and to describe briefly some of its important 
features.
Despite the aggregate nature of the model, it differs 
from the traditional Keynesian type models because:
(i) It permits the change in financial assets brought 
by government budget and current account balance of 
payments and
(ii) Besides the aggregate demand of the economy 
there is also an aggregate supply side which is 
represented by the productive capacity of capital
stock and accordingly the domestic prices respond to 
changes in aggregate demand and supply.
As a whole, inspite of the problems associated with model 
building for a developing country like Pakistan, we have 
successfully combined the important features of a 
macroeconomic system.
4.6.1 Summary Listing of the Equations
In Table 4.5 we have listed all the equations and 
identities. The equations estimated with two stage 
cointegration have been combined rather than presenting the 
long run and short run equations separately.
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Table 4.5 Summary listing of the model
Private consumption
cone = conct-i +0.73 Sydc + 0.15 5a-0.53{( conct-i
- (0.1 + 0.85 ydct-i + 0.15 at-i)} [1]
Imports of goods and services
mtc = mtct-i + 0.95 Syc + 0.05 6LRt-i - 0.29 6 Ree
-0.3 SDUMMY - 1.03 { mtct-i- (0.82 yct-i + 0.12 LRt-2 
- 0 . 20Reet-1 - 0.30 DUMMYt-i)} [2]
Exports of goods and services
xtc = kqc + (1.52 - 0.01 Trend + 0.47 Re [3]
+ 1.09 IAMS + 0.87 IAMSt-l)
Gross domestic product at market prices and factor cost, 
Gross national product and disposable income
QCM = CONC + PIC + GIC + GCC + XTC - MTC + CSTC [4]
QC = QCM (1-INTAXR) [5]
YC = QCM + NIAC [6]
YDC = YC (1 - DTAXR) [7]
Depreciation, investment, and capital stock
DEPC = KCt-i * LEMDA [8]
NIC = IC - DEP [9]
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KCt = KCt-i + NIC [10]
Capacity out put and capacity utilization
kqc = 7.81 + 0.33 kc [11]
CU = (QC/KQC) [12]
Price and price indices
SHPI = -0.01 + 0.66 CUt-l + 0.06 DUMMY [13]
HPI = 5 HPI + HPIt-i [14]
def = HPI + deft-1 [15]
Scdef = 0.96 Sdef + 0.04Suvm [16]
cdef = Scdef + cdeft-1 [17]
xdef = def + 0.005 Trend -0.21 [18]
gcde = def [19]
gide = def [20]
pide = def [21]
Real and real effective exchange rate
RE = E (UVX/XDEF) [22]
REE = (E x IMD x UVM)/DEF [23]
Evolution of real assets
A = At-1 + AA [24]
AA = (GE-REV) + CAB [25]
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AC = (A/P) [26]
Net income from abroad, Current account balance, 
Foreign exchange reserves, Foreign debt, 
Amortisation, Interest payments and Disbursements of loans
NIA = PTAX - PTAM - INTR 
CAB = XT + NIA- MT
[27]
[28]
INTR = Dt-i * INTRR [29]
AMT = Dt-i * AMTR [30]
DISB = AMT - CAB - FA [31]
Dt = Dt -1- AMT + DISB [32]
R = Rt-i + CAB - AMT + FA + DISB [33]
Government revenue and government expenditure
rev = y + 0.02 Trend -2.3 [34]
IG = IGC * GIDE * 0.01 [35]
GC = GCC * GCDE * 0.01 [36]
GE = IG + GC [37]
Ratio of actual and trend agricultural production
IAMS = iap - (3.94 + 0.07 Trend) [38]
Note: All variables written in small cases or started with 
letter ' L' are in natural logs
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Figure 4.1 Flow Chart of the Model
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MT
4.6.2 Flow chart of the model
In figure 4.1 the flow-chart summarises in a very general 
and simple terms the main elements and interrelationships of 
our model. In this chart endogenous variables are determined 
by the variables to which they are linked by the inward 
pointing arrows. Definitionsof the variables used in the
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chart y& as follows.
Definition of variables
A = nominal financial assets
AC = real financial assets
AMT = amortisation
CAB = current account balance of payments
CONC = private consumption
CDEF = consumer price deflator
CU = index of capacity utilization
D = foreign out standing debt
DEF = GDP deflator
DEP = depreciation
DHPI = change in home product inflation
DISB = disbursement of loans
DTAX = direct tax rate
E = nominal exchange rate
FA = foreign aid (grants)
GE = government expenditure
HPI = home product inflation
I = total investment
IAMS = index of agricultural surplus
IG = government investment
IMD = rate of import duty
INTR = interest paid on foreign debt
INTRR = average interest rate on foreign loans
K = capital stock
KQ = capacity output
L = lag of same variable
LEMDA = rate of depreciation
MT = gross imports
NI = net investment
NIA = net transfers from abroad
PTAX = private transfers from abroad
PTA/n = private transfers to abroad
Q = gross domestic product
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R = foreign exchange reserves
RE = real exchange rate
REE - real effective rate of exchange
REV = government revenue
UVM = unit value index of imports
UVMD = unit value index of imports (domestic prices)
UVX = unit value index of exports
XT = total exports
Y = gross national product
YD = disposable income
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Notes
(1) For a brief history and developments in macroeconomics 
see Mankiw (1990).
(2) A good sample of such literature is Scott (1981),
Leff and Sato (1975) and Behrman (1972).
(3) Coats et al. (Page 3)
(4) The same model has been applied more rigorously by Vines 
and Srinvison in a World Bank financed project 
"Macroeconomics in the South-Adjustment with Growth." The 
draft version of this paper was prepared in 1988. The final 
version is yet to come.
(5) Gemech (1990,pi)
(6) See for example the entire issue of Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics (1986) vol 48, No 3. Dolado et a l . 
(1990) provide a good review of the recent literature on 
cointegration and unit roots.
(7) Most often the economic series are assumed to be 
stationary of order 1 and a cointegration equation is run 
directly. The residuals from that equation are then tested 
to ensure whether the series used in the regression are 
integrated.
(8) In order to investigate the impact of foreign capital on
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domestic consumption gross and net foreign capital inflow 
were also used as explanatory variables expecting a positive 
relationship with the hypothesis that foreign capital 
reduces domestic savings. However, foreign capital has not 
shown a significant relationship both in terms of size of 
parameter and statistical significance. In fact this 
requires further empirical work where different kinds of 
foreign capital are separated for their impact on 
consumption.
(9) A dummy variable cannot be put to the test of 
integration .However, such dummy variable is used in 
regression with cointegration .See for example Drobny and 
Hall (1988).
(10) See for such specification Aghevi and Khan (1980,p691)
(11) There is relatively little difference of opinion on 
cost push inflation . See for example for further discussion 
on this point (i) John Hudson (1982) (ii) Ball and Doyle 
(1969) and (iii) Hillier (1988,Chapter 6)
(12) First published by Phillips (1958) in article "The 
relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of change of 
Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom ,1861-1957. "
(13) See also Hillier (1988, Chapter 6 and 7) and entire book 
by Stein (1982) which provide a good synthesis and
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comparative analysis of Keynesian, Monetarists and Classical 
(including New Classical) approach to inflation and other 
related issues.
(14) See for such specification IMF (Research Department) 
Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook (1988, pp61-63) 
where inflation has been modeled as following:-
Aq-(Aq-1) =Constant+ (Ile - Aq-i) +.169 MCU
S E R =  0 . 0 2 2
R 2= 0.398
Aq = inflation ;
0
n = Expected inflation and
MCU = Two years of moving average of capacity utilisation.
(15) See for a relatively more complicated production 
function for the developing countries by Singh (1975, 
Chapter 6). However, most often in the empirical analysis 
of growth in developing countries the simpler form (in which 
'a' is set to zero) is used {see Khan and Montiel (1988, 
p7)}.
(16) See for further discussion on this point Hillier 
(1988,pp140—141).
(17) ) In order to be more realistic the overall rate of 
depreciation should increase with increasing share of rapid 
depreciating capital stock of industrial sector. However, 
the share of capital formation of industrial sector in the 
total capital formation from 1959 to 1988 has been slightly
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higher and is unlikely to cause a significant shift in the 
overall rate of depreciation.
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CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATION OF THE MODEL
5.1 The meaning of simulation
In economics " simulation refers to the operation of a 
numerical model that represents the structure of a dynamic 
process(1)". It has evolved as one of the most powerful 
tools available for analyzing economic problems. Building 
and running a simulation model permits observation of the 
dynamic behaviour of a system under controlled conditions. 
For a given values of the initial conditions, parameters and 
exogenous variables a simulation represents behaviour of the 
process over time. In contrast to mathematical approaches, 
simulation enables to determine not only the long run state 
of the system but also time path through which the system 
passes to reach its final state.
The exogenous variable simulation is done by altering the 
relevant variables for a certain magnitude (permanently or 
temporarily) and then difference for this change is noticed 
for endogenous variables. In order to have clear 
identification of this impact it is now customary to keep 
the residual terms of equations constant at their base run 
values so that they do not influence the differential effect 
on endogenous variables(2). In order to make such residual 
adjustments we have used in our simulation exercise the 
software Semafore (Pc Version of the LBS Model of Centre for 
Economic Forecasting).
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Once such a solution is established then the dynamic 
behaviour i.e . the response over time, can be determined by 
so-called "dynamic multiplier" as follows : First a basic
run solution for the endogenous variables is established 
without any exogenous change. Then a new solution 
corresponding to "disturbed values" of the exogenous 
variables is made in order to see how much influence they 
have on endogenous variables which is measured by taking a 
difference of the base run values and new "disturbed 
solution". The ratios of the difference between the base run 
and "disturbed solution" and the difference between the 
actual and "disturbed" exogenous variables over time are the 
familiar dynamic multipliers. Algebraically for each period 
of time the multiplier will be as following
DM = (E+- EB)/(Z*- Zt) [5.1]
+ Bwhere (E - E ) represent a change in the endogenous variable 
resulting from the exogenous change (Z*-Z^). {See for a 
detailed exposition of the concept of dynamic multipliers 
Klein (1974, Chapter 6 PP226-280)}. If the exogenous shock 
is a policy instrument then these multipliers are in fact 
the policy multipliers or ready-reckoners describing the 
response of endogenous variables (target) to a unit shock in 
policy instrument,(See David et a l . (1989,pl06).
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5.2 Tuning of the model
As described, above a simulation involves examining the
sensitivity of some important endogenous variables with 
respect to changes in key exogenous variables allowing for 
all feedbacks and lag effects. In this process it is 
possible that dynamic behaviour of the model is unstable 
and as a result any change in exogenous variables will not 
give a meaningful change in endogenous variables. A minor 
adjustment in the structure of the model or coefficient of 
an individual equation might stabilize it. Such adjustments 
are quite common in the simulation of macroeconomic model 
and is known as tuning and adjustments (3).
A full simulation of the model was done with the original
estimated equations described in Chapter 4. A permanent
increase of rupees 100 million in government consumption
indicated that model is oscillatory and unstable (see
Figure-5.1). Since full dynamic multipliers cannot be
determined from the inspection of the model this problem was
not visualized at the beginning. A diagnostic exercise with
respect to different equations was conducted and it was
found that the capacity utilization (CU) as the explanatory
variable (with a lag )of the price equation has made the
model unstable and oscillatory. Alternatively we also
estimated price equation with a two years moving average of
the CU as explanatory variable but the full model simulation
outcome was still oscillatory (see Figure 5.1)
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Note:
CUMA and CUt-i stand for two years moving average of 
capacity utilization (CU) and CU with a lag used as 
explanatory variables in home product inflation equation. In 
all other graphs in this chapter, unless other wise 
explained, following abbreviations have been used:-
(1) AP-EXO = Nominal financial assets and prices 
Exogenous;
(2) P-EXO = Prices Exogenous;
(3) A-EXO = Nominal financial assets Exogenous;
(4) Full = Full Model
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The actual estimated equation for change in home product 
inflation (6HPI) is following:-
SHPI = (-)O.Ol + 0.66 CUt-i + 0.06DUM [5.2]
When this equation was replaced by the following for the 
purpose of simulation, the result was quite satisfactory.
SHPI = (— )0.01 + 0.5CU +0.56CU +0.06DUM [5.3]
The basic difference between the two equations is the 
absence of lag and an additional term of change in CU in 
equation [5.3].
5.3 The simulation exercise and the results
The dynamic chain of effects in the model to an external 
shock are quite complicated. (See flow diagram of the model 
given at the end of Chapter 4). In order to understand 
properly the mechanism of the model some parts of the model 
were kept fixed to reduce this complexity. Keeping certain 
variables exogenous is not intended to change the properties 
of the model or to represent reality. It is only for 
investigation (4). We have simulated our model under 
following different conditions
(I) Prices and Nominal Assets exogenous.
(II) Prices exogenous.
(III) Nominal Assets exogenous.
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(IV) Full Model.
It may be noted that once we keep the prices and assets 
exogenous we are more or less in the tradition of Keynesian 
framework.
In addition to four options some special partial 
simulations have also been run to estimate Keynesian 
Multipliers and effect of exchange rate depreciation if 
Marshal1-Lerner conditions hold.
The simulation exercise under each of the option has been 
done with following internal and external shocks
(a) Internal Shocks
(1) A rupees 100 million increase in real government 
consumption.
(2) A rupees 100 million increase in private 
investment.
(3) A depreciation of nominal exchange rate by 20 
percent
(4) A ten percent increase in direct tax rate.
(b) External shocks
(1) A rupees 100 million permanent fall in foreign 
grants.
(2) A ten percent fall in private transfers from
(3) A ten percent increase in interest rate on foreign 
loans.
(4) A ten percent increase in unit value index 
of imports.
(5) A ten percent fall in unit value index of exports.
The nine shocks, besides special simulations, under four 
options involves 36 simulations. All the simulation results 
could not be included in this study for brevity. However, 
for the purpose of illustration we have prepared the 
comparative graphs for selected key variables which include 
all the options. In addition simulation results for selected 
variables under option IV (i.e. full model) are also 
appended at the end of the chapter.
In describing our simulation results we have emphasized 
the results for full model simulation though for the purpose 
of comparison all the other options have also been referred 
and compared in graphs.
5.3.1 Keynesian Multipliers
Keynesian multipliers have been estimated for closed
economy as well open economy with a temporary rupees 1000
million increase in government consumption beside for rupees
100 million permanent increase mentioned above. For the
closed economy all the variables are kept exogenous except
private sector consumption, GDP (GNP and disposable income
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as well) and in open economy imports are also endogenous. 
The closed economy long run Keynesian multiplier is about 5 
and open economy, which allows for imports leakage, is 
around 3. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the dynamic Keynesian 
multipliers in terms of change in GDP for a temporary and 
permanent fiscal expansion of 1000 million and rupees 100 
million rupees respectively.
5.3.2. Simulation of internal shocks
All the internal shocks are policy variables and could be 
used as instruments to influence the economic activities. 
Among the four internal shocks government consumption, 
exchange rate and tax rate are directly controlled by the 
government. Although investment is not a policy variable yet 
as we have discussed in Chaptersl and 4 investment both in 
its volume and composition is controlled under the planned 
growth strategies. So a simulation exercise with a change in 
investment is quite sensible.
5.3.2.1 Increase in Government Consumption
A government spending carries with it either creation of
money or new bonds floating. In our model, however, a change
in government spending is not a "pure fiscal shock" because
it is not associated with a tax increase (5). The increase
in government consumption, of 100 million rupees, therefore,
add?directly to nominal financial assets (if assets are not
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exogenous) besides aggregate demand.
When prices are exogenous the dynamic chain of effects are 
relatively simple and increase in GDP is somewhere near to 
Keynesian Multiplier of open economy. Endogenous prices 
make the government expenditure shock less effective with 
respect to GDP which converges over base run values in the 
long-run after some fluctuation on both sides of the base 
run value at a diminishing rate. Figure-5.4 compares the 
change in GDP under different options. The reasons for this 
convergence could be traced, among other things, 
particularly, in changes which took place in home prices and 
assets (discussed in detail below). It is for this reason 
that when these two variables are kept exogenous the result 
is like traditional Keynesian model where such fiscal 
expansion is always expansionary.
The change in the rate of inflation is mixed, but there is
a permanent upward shift in the GDP deflator. The rise is
higher when assets are endogenous. When assets are exogenous
it inhibits the additional increase in aggregate demand
because of private consumption rise as a result of new
assets creation. After a sharp increase in the initial years
there is a continuous decline but it is not completely
leveled back as it nearly happens when assets are exogenous
(Figure-5.5). The highest increase in GDP deflator is
around 1.4 percent which occurs in the fifth year with
subsequent continuous downward trend stabilizing at about
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0.2 percent above the base run values. In view of quite 
dominant role of price in the model, the permanent increase 
of even less than one point percent has significant effects 
on other dependent variables. The rise in price level 
appreciates the real exchange rate which reduces exports and 
increases imports. In addition it reduces the real worth of 
the assets (i .e .creating a negative real balance effect) and 
therefore have a depressing effect on private consumption 
and so on.
The increase in imports is on account of increase in 
aggregate demand and rise in domestic prices which 
appreciates the real exchange rate. It is interesting to 
note that highest increase in imports is under option II 
(when prices are exogenous) because there is no,fall in real 
assets and, therefore, there is no downward pressure on 
aggregate demand as it happens in full model simulation.(see 
Figure-5.6). In the long run imports under the full model 
simulation increase by about 30 million rupees as compared 
to 100 million rupees increase in real government 
consumption.
The exports are affected only when prices are endogenous.
A rise in home prices appreciates the real exchange rate 
which reduces the exports. The change in exports over base 
run is a kind of mirror reflection of the price rise 
discussed above.(See Figure-5.7).
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In view of increase in imports and fall in exports the 
effect on current account balance of payments is obvious. 
The deficit is further accelerated by increase in interest 
payments because of foreign debt accumulation. Figure-5.8 
compares the changes in current account balance (1975-76 
prices) under different options. In accordance with the 
change in exports and imports, increase in deficit is highest 
in the full model. The deficit increases continuously and 
approaches the level of shock. The government consumption is 
fully transformed into an external deficit. This points 
towards the effectiveness of restraint on government 
consumption (particularly when it is money financed) for the 
balance of payments.
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 are for changes in foreign debt and 
interest payments (in real terms) over base run values under 
different options. The changes are in accordance with the 
change in current account deficit. The accumulation of debt 
and interest payments are quite significant in absolute 
terms. As in the long-run the change in current account 
balance stabilizes, the foreign debt also stabilizes at 
about six times of the size of shock.
Impact of real assets with its positive influence on
aggregate demand (through private consumption) is very
significant in the model. As a result of increase in
government consumption it remains unchanged when prices and
nominal assets both are exogenous. Real assets remain above
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the base run values for a quite long period when prices are 
exogenous and nominal assets endogenous. It converges on the 
base run values particularly because of increase in current 
account deficit. Conversely when prices are endogenous and 
assets exogenous there is an immediate sharp fall in real 
assets which remains negative over simulation period. Under 
the full model simulation, when both prices and nominal 
assets are endogenous, there is still fall in the real
assets and stabilize at about 50 percent below the increase
of government consumption. Figure 5.11 compares the changes 
in real assets under different options. It may be noted that 
although the increase in government consumption is not 
financed by raising direct taxes, it still reduces the
private financial assets by a significant margin.
5.3.2.2 Increase in Investment(6 )
We now turn to investment increase whose effects differs 
from increase in government consumption in following 
respects:-
(a) While government consumption increase adds to
the nominal assets investment adds to capital stock 
assets. The increase in capital stock then increases 
the supply of output which relieves the pressure on 
prices.
(b) The increase in capital stock by increasing the
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potential GDP also increases the exports directly.
The 100 million rupees permanent increase in private
investment keeps the change in real GDP above the base run 
values under all the options. It may be particularly noted 
that the highest increase in GDP, which is about three times 
of the size of the shock, is in the full model 
simulation.(Figure-5.12) which is a clear reflection of 
supply side effects on GDP as could well be seen in the rise 
of potential GDP. (Figure-5.13). The permanent rise in 
private consumption is quite obvious.(Figure-5.14).
In view of a relatively higher increase in aggregate 
demand in the initial years, as compared to potential GDP, 
the prices tend to rise during that period. As capital
stock accumulates over the years the supply starts
equating/exceeding the demand and pressure on prices
decreases. In full model simulation the downwards pressure 
on demand, in the initial years, also takes place because of 
the current account deficit and fall in real assets. When 
nominal assets are exogenous, the initial negative effect on 
real assets (because of current account deficit) is missing 
and the price, therefore, falls relatively at a smaller 
pace. It remains slightly above the base run values as 
against full model where the fall in price is permanent 
(Figure-5.15).
The exports in our model are influenced by rise in
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investment directly (with increase in capacity output) and 
through change in price level. The highest rise in exports, 
as expected, is in full model simulation.(Figure-5.16)(7)
The actual change in imports over base run is the net 
outcome of the two forces working in the opposite direction
i.e. (i) the aggregate demand and (ii) the price change. 
While rise in aggregate demand increases the demand for 
imports, falling prices reduce the demand for imports. This 
is in quite contrast to government consumption increase 
where aggregate demand and price move in the same direction 
and the out come is clear. There is, however, a permanent 
increase in imports and as expected lower when prices are 
endogenous. (Figure-5.17).
The impact on current account balance is quite obvious. 
While there is a permanent increase in deficit when prices 
are exogenous ( because of more rise in imports compared to 
exports in absolute terms) there is a significant 
improvement (except for some earlier years losses) when 
prices are endogenous. The surplus is highest in full model 
simulation.(Figure-5.18)
The impact on foreign debt is the cumulative effect of 
change in the current account balance (Figure-5.19) and 
interest payments on foreign debt changes in accordance with 
the change in foreign debt (Figure-5.20)
212
F— 5.16 C H A N G E  IN REAL E X P O R T S
[PRIVATE INVESTMENT SHOCK]
SO
50
30
20
10
— 1 O
F — 5.17 C H A N G E  IN REAL IMPORTS
[PRIVATE INVESTMENT SHOCK]
52
50
AS
1955
YEARS
F— 5.1S C H A N G E  IN CAB [1975 —  76 PRICES]
[PRIVATE INVESTMENT SHOCK]
50
AO
20
1 O
10
■20
■30
■AO
■50
1 975
213
F— 5.19 C H A N G E  IN F-DEBT[1 9 7 5 - 7 6  PRICES]
[PRIVATE INVESTMENT SHOCK]
4-00
300 -
200
1 OO
■100
—200
— 300
1 ess 1970 1 970 1 982
YEARS
AP— EXO -t- P — EXO O A— EXO A. FULL
F-5.20 C H A N G E  IN JNTER.[ 1 9 7 5 - 7 6  PRICES]
[PRIVATE INVESTMENT SHOCK]
3 -
— 3
YEARS
AP— EXO +  P — EXO O A— EXO A  FULL
214
5.3.2.3 Depreciation of nominal exchange rate
The nominal exchange rate has no direct influence over 
exports and imports. It is the real exchange rate which 
matters. Real exchange rate, in addition to nominal exchange 
rate, also depends on domestic and international prices (see 
for definition of real exchange rate Chapter 4, equations 
[4.5] and [4.8]). Since the depreciation of nominal exchange 
rate pushes up the domestic prices because of its immediate 
upward pressure on aggregate demand, the initial real 
exchange rate depreciation is not going to sustain unless 
prices are controlled by some other measures.
Under Marshal1-Lerner conditions^ described in Chapter 3, 
when output and domestic prices are constant, 20 percent 
depreciation in nominal exchange rate causes around 9 
percent points increase in real exports and about 5 percent 
fall in real imports. (Figure-5.21). The current account 
balance improvement as percent of base run exports is about 
20 percent (with some fluctuation over different years.) 
(Figure-5.22). So the overall elasticity of trade balance 
with respect to devaluation is around unity.
When prices are exogenous there is a permanent
depreciation of real exchange rate and the rise in exports
is as under Marshal1-Lerner conditions . With endogenous
prices, as the prices start rising the exports start
falling. When assets are exogenous the ultimate rise in
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domestic prices is half the nominal exchange rate 
depreciation and therefore, there is a permanent increase in 
exports. In the full model the ultimate price rise is equal 
to nominal exchange rate depreciation and the real exchange 
rate depreciation is, therefore, completely neutralized. The 
exports also converge back on the base run values (see 
Figures 5.23, and 5.24 for change in exports and GDP 
deflator over base run values under different options).
The effect on imports of nominal exchange rate is twofold. 
On the one hand imports are influenced by the changes in 
real exchange rate and on the other hand by the changes in 
the aggregate demand. The aggregate demand converges back to 
the base run values over long run when prices are endogenous 
and is about 3-4% above of base run values when prices alone 
and both prices and assets are exogenous.(Figure-5.25). When 
prices and aggregate demand do not move together and 
influence imports in the opposite direction, the net impact 
on imports is always ambiguous as discussed in section
5.3.2.2 above. The impact on imports could be, however, 
summarized as following:-
(i) When aggregate demand is decreasing and there is 
a permanent depreciation of real exchange rate, change 
in imports remain below the base run values.
(ii) In full model where aggregate demand and real
exchange rate fall back over base run values, imports
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also follow the same pattern.
(iii) With prices (alone) exogenous real exchange 
rate depreciation remains intact but the increase in 
aggregate demand pushes the imports up and neutralize 
the real exchange rate effect.
(See Figure 5.26 for change in imports under different 
options)
The net effect on current account balance depends upon the 
absolute changes in imports and exports together with any 
change in interest payments. When prices and assets are 
exogenous there is significant permanent improvement in the 
current account balance. In the full model simulation, 
initially there is an improvement in real terms, but as 
exports ceases to rise and demand for imports picks up, the 
ultimate current account deficit is more then the initial 
gain (Figure-5.27). The rise in current account deficit 
causes the accumulation of foreign debt in full model 
simulation and interest payments also go up (see Figures 
5.28 and 5.29). The extra interest payments make the current 
account deficit permanent though there is little difference 
in imports and exports in the long run. In spite of . some 
quick improvement in current account balance the long run 
implications make the use of nominal exchange rate 
depreciation in isolation an unsuitable instrument for 
achieving external balance.
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5.3 2.4 Increase in Direct Tax Rate
We now turn to increase in direct tax rate which reduces 
the disposable income. With slightly varying rate, on the 
average the direct taxes have remained about 3 percent of 
GNP. Thus a 10% increase in direct tax rate reduces the 
disposable income by about 0.3%. The fall in disposable 
income, after taking into account the other chain of 
effects, remains close to this level (with some fluctuations) 
with endogenous prices. When prices and assets are 
exogenous, there is a continuous fall in the GDP and GNP 
caused by the fall in private consumption. Figures 5.30 and 
5.31 show the percent change in GDP and disposable income 
over base run values under different options.
As expected there is a fall in prices particularly when 
assets are exogenous (Figure-3.32) In percentage terms 
though it is small but still powerful enough to increase 
exports and reduce imports (because of depreciation of real 
exchange rate) creating a visible positive effect on current 
account balance of payments which ultimately reduce the 
foreign debt and interest payments by a big margin. Figures 
5.33 to 5.37 provide the comparison of change under 
different options for exports, imports, current account 
balance, foreign debt and interest payments on outstanding 
foreign debt respectively.
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5.3.3 Simulation of External Shocks
The external shocks consist of change in foreign aid 
(grants), interest rate on foreign loans/credits, private 
transfers from abroad and prices for imports and exports. 
The first two have been selected in order to relate our 
simulation exercise with present day reality of a continuous 
fall in the share of grants and gradual shift from soft 
loans (with large grant element), towards hard loans (with 
small or no grant element)(8). Similarly as we have noted in 
Chapter 2 that the private transfers from abroad are now 
declining after a continuous rise over past two decades. The 
simulation of a fall in private transfers from abroad also 
represents the reality. The increase in unit value index of 
imports and a fall in unit value index of exports is, 
however, only to see the effect of any such change rather 
than representing reality.
5;3.3.1 Rupees 100 million permanent fall in foreign grants
The permanent fall in grants of 100 million rupees is
assumed to be in real terms (9). A fall in grants from
abroad lead to an equal amount (in current prices) (10) of
increase in foreign debt which over time cumulates and hence
also increases the interest payments. The higher interest
payments reduce the level of GNP and,therefore, disposable
income and private consumption. Thus the important ultimate
effect, other than rising debt, is in terms of fall in
226
aggregate demand which put^downward pressure on prices. A 
fall in domestic prices depreciatejthe real exchange rate 
pushing up exports and reducing demand for imports and
as a result the GDP converges back on the base run values as 
time passes. Quite obviously when prices are exogenous then 
there is a permanent fall in GDP. Figure 5.38 shows change 
in GDP over base run values under different options.
The increase in exports (Figure-39) and fall in imports 
(Figure 5.40), because of depressed prices (Figure-5.41), is 
more or less equal to the additional interest payments in 
full model simulation. However, because of direct impact of 
foreign grants there, is sustained rise in the foreign debt 
under all the options. The ultimate increase in foreign debt 
in full model simulation (the lowest increase among four 
options) is roughly eight times of the size of the 
shock.(see Figure-5.42). The additional interest payments 
move according to change in debt level. Figure-5.43 compares 
the change in interest payments over base run values under 
different options.
5. 3.3.2 Increase in interest rate
The chain of effects of increase in interest rate (by
10 percent) is more or less the same as that of fall in
grants from abroad (except the direct implication of grants
for debt). It reduces the GDP permanently if prices are
exogenous. When prices are endogenous GDP changes in a
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cyclical fashion and converges back to base run values 
(Figure-5.44). Such a behaviour of GDP is because of the 
following reasons
(i) As a result of higher interest payments the GNP 
falls which reduces the disposable income and thereby 
private consumption and GDP.
(ii) The fall in GDP puts downward pressure on prices 
which depreciates the real exchange rate and 
therefore increases exports and reduces imports. The 
fall in prices also increases the real worth of the 
financial assets and so starts boosting private 
consumption. As a result of these changes the GDP and 
home prices gradually rise and reverse the kinds of 
changes we have just described. In the long run the 
movements of GDP on either side of the base run 
values die away and the system moves towards 
stability.
The GNP, as compared to GDP, because of rise in interest 
payments experiences a permanent fall under all the 
options and clearly points towards a transfer of resources 
to abroad (see Figure 5.45).
The ultimate effect on price level is depressing (Figure
5.46) with a parallel movement to changes in GDP. The
depressing prices cause the exports to rise and imports to
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fall which in the full model offset most of the current 
account deficit. However, under all the options there is an 
increase in the external deficit (see Figure 5.47).
In accordance with changes in current account balance 
foreign debt rise is slightly above the base run values in 
full model simulation and about 1 percent above base run 
values when prices and assets are exogenous (Figure 5.48).
5.3.3.3 Ten percent fall in private transfers from abroad
The private transfers have played a very vital role in the 
aftermath of two oil price shocks.and helped to cushion the 
deteriorating balance of payment situation. In our 
simulation exercise we have applied the shock in percentage 
term so its immediate effect from year to year varies in 
absolute terms according to the size of transfers from 
abroad in that year. The ultimate effects of fall in private 
transfers from abroad are similar to rise in the interest 
rate discussed in section 5.3.3.2 because both of these
reduce the net income from abroad.
The immediate result of fall in private transfers is in
terms of fall in GNP and increase in current account
deficit. The fall in GNP is lower when prices are
endogenous (see Figure 5.49).As a result of fall in
disposable income and fall in assets the private consumption
also falls. The effect of fall in private consumption on
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prices, as part of aggregate demand, is substantial and is 
around 7 percent in the long run in full model simulation.
In the full model simulation fall in price level 
depreciates the real exchange rate leading to an increase in 
exports and fall in imports. (In addition imports also fall 
because of fall in GNP). Thus the immediate negative effect 
on current account deficit is partly offset. Figure 5.50 
compares the changes in current account under different
options.
The fall in imports, increase in exports and some recovery 
of private consumption keep the GDP in the long run more or 
less to its base run level though there are some
fluctuations for the years when fall in private transfer is 
quite significant. The relative sharp fall (over 29s) when 
prices are exogenous is because of the absence of the
positive effects on aggregate demand of falling prices. (See 
Figures 5.51 and 5.52 for changes in GDP and GDP deflator 
over base run values).
The increase in current account deficit increases the 
foreign debt significantly and even with full price effects 
the rise is about 3 percent above the base run values in the 
long run. Interest payments increase accordingly. (See 
Figures 5.53 and 5.54 for changes over base run values in
foreign debt and interest payments).
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5.3.3.4 Increase in import prices
We now turn to the rise in import prices. As an exogenous 
variable import prices affect the real exchange rate (11) 
for imports. An increase in import prices reduces imports 
and puts upward pressure on prices because of higher
aggregate demand relative to supply. In a full model
simulation the ultimate price rise is equal to the shock. 
The domestic price rise is about half the level of import 
price rise when assets are exogenous because the improvement
in current account balance is blocked to increase the assets
which would have pushed up the private consumption (and 
therefore aggregate demand) and prices further.(See Figure 
5.55 for change in GDP deflator over base run ). In the full 
model simulation the change in GDP subsides gradually and 
converges back to base run values. However, when the prices 
are exogenous there is a permanent increase in aggregate 
demand (see Figure 5.56) because of a permanent fall in 
imports (Figure 5.57).
The change in current account balance moves around base
run values in full model simulation. The domestic price rise
more or less neutralizes the initial depreciation of real
exchange rate. Particularly, when assets and prices are
exogenous there is an increase in current account deficit
because now there is no increase in exports though there is
some fall in imports. A slight improvement in current
account balance in full model simulation, because of it%
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cumulative effect on debt has produced little improvement in 
the foreign debt and reduction in interest payments. The 
situation under all other options is worse than before. 
(Figures 5.58, 5.59, 5.60 are for changes in current account 
balance, foreign debt and interest payments over base run 
under different options).
5. 3.3.5 Fall in exports prices
A fall in export prices appreciate the real exchange rate 
for exports and causes exports to fall. The immediate impact 
of export price fall is, therefore, in terms of fall in 
exports. Figure 5.61 is for change in exports under 
different options. (It may be noted that when prices are 
exogenous under option I and II the change in exports is the 
same).
The effect on home prices is depressing because of fall in 
aggregate demand and is slightly less then the fall in 
export prices in full model simulation (see Figure 5.62). 
As expected when nominal assets are exogenous the price fall 
is relatively smaller because of appreciation of assets 
with the initial price fall which pushes up the aggregate 
demand and restrict further fall in prices.
The change in GDP is brought about by falling exports and
appreciation of assets in the opposite direction (when
prices are endogenous). As a result the GDP converges back
239
(T
ho
us
an
ds
)
F—5 .5 8  CHANGE IN CAB [ 1 9 7 5  — 7 6  PRICES]
[i m p o r t s  p r i c e  s h o c k ]
—2
TEARS
AP— EXO ■+■ P — EXO O A— EXO A. FULL
F — 5.59 C H A N G E  IN F-DEBT[1 9 7 5 - 7 6  PRICES]
[IMPORTS PRICE SHOCK]
—  1 O
—  1 1 
—  1 2
—  13
—  1 4.
— 1 3
YEARS
AP— EXO +  P — EXO O A— EXO A. FULL
F-5.60 C H A N G E  IN INTR. [1975—  76 PRICES]
[IMPORTS PRICE SHOCK]
SO
—50
—100
—  1 SO
—200
— 250
— 300
— 3SO
YEARS
AP— EXO +  P —  EXO O A— EXO A FULL
240
PE
RC
EN
T
F - 5 . 6 1  CHANGE IN REAL EXPORTS
[EXPORTS PRICE SHOCK]
o
1
■2
■z
■B
0
•7
■s
■9
10
1070
TEARS
10 02
F— 5.62 C H A N G E  IN G D P  DEFLATOR
[EXPORT PRICE SHOCK]
1000 1070 1074 1070 1002
FULL
1000
241
on the base run values as the time passes. When prices are 
exogenous there is, however, a permanent fall in GDP of 
about 2 percent. (See Figure 5.63 for comparison under 
different options).
The fall in prices on the one hand pushes up exports again 
and on the other hand depressxsdemand for imports. Imports 
are initially also depressed by falling aggregate demand 
(see Figure 5.64 for change in imports under different 
options). The net outcome for current account balance 
appears in terms of long cycles with tendency towards 
improvement in full model simulation. This happens because 
of relatively more fall in imports than exports in absolute 
terms. In absence of price and assets effects the net outcome 
is simple and there is permanent increase in external 
deficit (see Figure 5.65). The long cycle of current 
account balance, in cumulative form is more visible in the 
foreign debt rise over base run in full model simulation. 
Under other options the result is quite obvious (Figure 
5.66). Change in interest payments are the direct reflection 
of extra debt accumulated (Figure 5.67). The outcome in the 
full model for current account balance appears paradoxical 
and not very much convincing but it has happened because of 
significant fall in price level which has pushed up the 
exports and reduced imports. Thus it is more a reflection of 
a deflated economy rather than any kind of efficiency of the 
economic system. However, it does show the effect of a
deflationary policy on imports and exports.
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5.4.Summary and Conclusions
The simulation exercise which we have done under different 
options is of special significance. The four different 
options are like four different kinds of models. The 
comparison of full model with these options further 
highlights the properties of our basic model.
The simulation exercise has the expected results 
identifying clearly the policy options available for 
price stability, balance of payments problem and foreign 
debt problem. The government consumption has shown 
significant influence over prices and balance of 
payments. An appropriate exchange rate policy/in order to 
maintain the competitiveness in the international market for 
exports and reduce imports^ is undoubtedly desirable but it 
has to be accompanied by suitable policy measures to keep 
the domestic price level stable. The simulation exercise has 
clearly demonstrated that the rising share of hard loans, 
fall in grants and private transfers from abroad are clear 
signals for the deteriorating situation in the future and, 
therefore, warrant some adjustment policy measures to 
tackle the problem. The long lasting durable solution lies 
in sustain rise in productive investment - the issue further 
examined in Chapter 6.
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
FULL MODEL SIMULATION RESULTS
(1)RUPEES 100 MILLION PERMANENT INCREASE 
IN REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
CURRENT
YEARS
EXPORTS
[M-RS]
IMPORTS
[M-RS]
GDP
[M-RS]
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
[M-RS]
FOREIGN 
. DEBT 
[M-RS]
GD]
d e f l a :
[<
1962 -6 . 64 38 . 27 126.55 -34.06 34.06 0.21
1963 -16.49 35 . 19 114.19 -40.84 69. 12 0.50
1964 -28.81 31 . 33 72 . 25 -44.61 102.05 0.81
1965 -39.64 26.43 19.69 -48.69 142.41 1 .08
1966 -52.53 17.58 -40.23 -47.35 172.47 1 . 30
1967 -65.15 6 . 17 -105.05 -48.74 196.88 1 .40
1968 -78.26 -1.57 -150.53 -51.62 241.08 1 .40
1969 -90.45 -2.9 -173.99 -53.21 276.86 1 .29
1970 -81.38 7.95 -137.45 -55 . 12 308.25 1 . 14
1971 -62.48 23. 13 -57.6 -57.88 338.75 1 .00
1972 -63. 14 6 . 89 19. 84 -74.38 360.7 0.91
1973 -52.18 32.96 -20.91 -98 . 3 381.05 0.79
1974 -42 . 57 31.71 8 . 87 -91.19 393.75 0.68
1975 -38.93 34.77 30 . 66 -81.96 421.84 0.60
1976 -35.11 36 46.9 -80.81 450. 8 0.54
1977 -32 .43. 35 . 85 43.95 -77.89 478.93 0.50
1978 -29 .46' 32 . 24 30. 55 -78 . 1 520. 2 0.47
1979 -30.39 21 .68 12 . 77 -75 .4 530.95 0 .43
1980 -30.01 22.77 -14.2 -78 .4 535.98 0.37
1981 -29.33 19.09 -3 .48 -66.54 537.16 0.33
1982 -29.07 17.57 6 . 14 -63.07 553.31 0 . 28
1983 -22.69 23. 14 20. 8 -64.82 547.45 0.24
1984 -21.96 22.45 38 . 52 -64.29 556.48 0.22
1985 -23.43 24 . 57 33 . 23 -72.65 571.38 0 . 20
1986 -23.89 21 . 95 40 . 95 -72 . 55 580.91 0 . 20
1987 -23.63 22 . 35 33 . 69 -78 . 27 585.45 0.20
Note:
(1) M-RS= Million R s .
(2) All absolute figures ar in 1975-76 prices.
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(2)RUPEES 100 MILLION PERMANENT INCREASE 
IN REAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
CURRENT
EXPORTS IMPORTS GDP ACCOUNT FOREIGN GDP
BALANCE DEBT DEFLATOR 
YEARS [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [%]
1962 2.67 33 .93 119.13 -24.07 24.07 0.12
1963 3 . 13 29.6 115.91 -22.17 42 .15 0 . 22
1964 2.47 28 .64 106.16 -20.36 55.39 0.31
1965 2.71 28.23 99.74 -19.12 70 .01 0.35
1966 3 . 93 27. 19 96 . 02 -16.99 78 . 50 0 .35
1967 7. 86 26 . 92 106.58 -14.14 81 . 55 0.30
1968 14. 19 28 . 72 120 -10.97 89.46 0.23
1969 23 . 73 30.27 138.72 -8.11 91 .12 0. 14
1970 29.08 32.91 159.13 -6.01 89. 32 0.05
1971 31 .79 28 . 24 193.45 -0 . 33 81 .72 -0 .04
1972 40.96 32.5 233.13 6.23 62.84 -0.11
1973 41 .01 33.69 269.63 5 .96 43 . 30 -0.15
1974 38 . 38 35 . 17 271.86 0.63 33.75 -0.18
1975 39.84 32.7 252.67 6.43 22 .71 -0.20
1976 40. 09 27.38 236.48 15 . 38 4. 54 -0.23
1977 41 .43 22.34 231.19 20.64 -16.60 -0.26
1978 40. 11 23 . 16 244.25 26.70 -42.02 -0.29
1979 44. 34 24.65 254.36 23.76 -60.55 -0.30
1980 47.97 23.16 265.39 29 . 27 -81.46 -0.30
1981 51 .75 23 . 25 258 . 8 27 . 39 -98.92 -0.29
1982 55. 11 27.66 268.47 26 . 08 -116.36 -0.27
1983 45 . 54 19.78 249.16 28 .46 -129.96 -0. 25
1984 45.54 19.26 232.97 29.09 -145.93 -0.24
1985 47.71 18 . 89 234.22 45 .68 -176.46 -0.21
1986 45 . 62 21 . 29 225.69 45 .08 -202.08 -0 . 19
1987 40 . 95 17.33 218.22 45 .40 -221.83 -0.17
Note:
(1) M-RS= Million R s .
(2) All absolute figures ar in 1975-76 prices.
(3)TWENTY PERCENT DEPRECIATION 
OF NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
CURRENT
EXPORTS IMPORTS GDP ACCOUNT FOREIGN GDP
BALANCE DEBT DEFLATOR 
YEARS [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [%]
1962 -297.71 -117.24 -388 . 11 441.32 -441.32 2.12
1963 -288.93 -122.08 -383.77 348.71 -715.13 4.86
1964 -276.58 -133.04 -322.72 290.39 -884.65 8.11
1965 -242.96 -132.78 -199.09 239.82 -1052.23 11 . 52
1966 -225 . 7 -129.35 -62.34 180 . 38 -1104.85 14.76
1967 -217.62 -115.74 97 . 16 169.69 -1118.69 17.41
1968 -223.07 -111.94 234.77 158.10 -1234.63 19. 24
1969 -242.69 -138.79 311.05 136.91 -1282 . 28 20 . 37
1970 -223.04 -197.27 327.82 71 . 26 -1243.66 21 . 08
1971 -180.87 -218.87 270.62 3 .72 -1136.89 21 . 58
1972 -170.95 -61.73 -63.73 -27.31 -933.65 21 .85
1973 -170.7 -287.68 589.57 -3 . 08 -728.81 21 . 55
1974 -177.1 -283 . 3 479.75 -37.89 -540.77 21 . 22
1975 -194.45 -388.03 113.15 -233.94 -232.86 21 . 50
1976 -189.57 -465.67 -212.67 -459.49 255.24 22.56
1977 -178.78 -525.26 -243.45 -624.81 851.87 24.05
1978 -168.64 -516.61 -57.69 -700.41 1486.77 25.41
1979 -186.62 -413.48 81 . 5 -676.86 1978.83 26.20
1980 -230.82 -491.98 507.77 -651.93 2357.31 26. 11
1981 -284.24 -456.98 302.41 -600 . 18 2670.04 25 .66
1982 -362.13 -422.58 273.03 -423 . 30 2860.11 24.64
1983 -364.18 -518.65 346.06 -423.06 2917.83 23.48
1984 -423.74 -509.38 7.67 -402.61 3025.92 22.47
1985 -523.66 -640.64 -123.77 -419.77 3131.59 21 .60
1986 -564.88 -611.98 -541.77 -401.39 3187.61 21 .04
1987 -562.01 -669.02 -553.81 -414.05 3197.08 20.74
Note .
(1) M-RS= Million R s .
(2) All absolute figures ar in 1975-76 prices.
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(4)TEN PERCENT PERMANENT INCREASE 
IN DIRECT TAX RATE 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
YEARS
EXPORTS
[M-RS]
IMPORTS
[M-RS]
GDP
[M-RS]
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
[M-RS]
FOREIGN
DEBT
[M-RS]
GDI
d e f l a :
[*:
1962 2.76 -15.91 -52.65 14. 15 -14.15 -0.09
1963 6 . 82 -14.26 -46.23 16.68 -28.42 -0.21
1964 11 .69 -11.74 -25.69 17.44 -41.06 -0. 32
1965 15.99 -10.4 -6 . 54 19.48 -57.16 -0.43
1966 21 . 38 -8 . 53 11 .03 20 . 13 -70.34 -0. 52
1967 26. 16 -0.25 50. 56 18. 25 -78.69 -0.55
1968 31 . 16 0.76 61 .71 20.48 -96.19 -0.55
1969 37. 33 -4.6 48 . 01 25 . 28 -114.52 -0 . 53
1970 32 . 53 3 . 28 77 . 78 18 .40 -123.11 -0.45
1971 30.63 -30.58 -69.03 38 . 92 -151.10 -0.48
1972 37.06 -8 .42 -45.64 47.55 -175.27 -0.53
1973 35.42 -20.88 21 . 06 63 . 83 -201.22 -0 . 53
1974 32 .13 -17.66 33 . 73 60 . 03 -219.80 -0 .51
1975 34 . 6 -34.64 -26.91 73 . 86 -263.59 -0.53
1976 37.54 -41.74 -49.8 85 . 75 -316.94 -0.58
1977 40. 11 -39.87 -15.36 86.78 -368.73 -0.62
1978 42.03 -45.22 -13.08 103.08 -443.46 -0.66
1979 52.56 -50.01 -52.58 133.88 -522.21 -0.73
1980 64. 27 -64.35 -12.88 165.25 -615.30 -0.80
1981 76.72 -54.55 20. 52 158.87 -699.14 -0.84
1982 88.13 -36.87 100.73 151 . 14 -789.20 -0.84
1983 72.79 -34.56 175.02 137.08 -825.48 -0.78
1984 67. 92 -23.59 164.08 121.53 -863.69 -0.68
1985 64. 2 -26.63 146 136.44 -910.48 -0.56
1986 53.05 -20.28 71 . 13 120.60 -930.67 -0.44
1987 42.07 -37.36 -43.41 133.26 -945.80 -0.35
Note
(1)
(2)
M-RS= Million R s .
All absolute figures ar in 1975-76 prices.
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(5)RUPEES 100 MILLION PERMANENT 
FALL IN FOREIGN GRANTS 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN] .
YEARS
EXPORTS
[M-RS]
IMPORTS
[M-RS]
GDP
[M-RS]
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
BALANCE
[M-RS]
FOREIGN
DEBT
[M-RS]
GDP
DEFLATOR
[%]
1962 0.00 0 .00 0 . 00 0.00 76.56 0.00
1963 0.17 -2 . 35 -3 . 34 -2 . 38 143.67 -0.01
1964 0.60 -3.92 -6.12 -2.71 193.01 -0.02
1965 1 .21 -4. 27 -6.57 -3.40 247.82 -0.03
1966 2 .11 -4. 83 -5 . 55 -2 . 97 284.35 -0.05
1967 3 . 40 -5 .62 -4. 55 -3 . 68 308.73 -0.07
1968 5.04 -4.21 1 .21 -2.77 360.24 -0.09
1969 7.02 -3.51 6.63 -5 .06 398.49 -0 .10
1970 7 .71 -5 . 93 5 . 90 -3 . 14 425.16 -0.11
1971 7 .21 -5 .57 3 . 52 -3 . 53 449.48 -0.11
1972 8.11 0.36 8 .49 1 . 93 481.15 -0.12
1973 7.04 -3 .67 16. 38 2 . 67 483.46 -0.11
1974 5 . 78 -3.12 12 . 50 2.41 499.70 -0 . 09
1975 5 . 34 -5 .75 2 . 84 0 .61 530.72 -0.08
1976 4. 98 -7.12 -4 . 73 1 .41 561.39 -0.08
1977 4. 93 -8 .49 -8 . 38 1 . 16 595.58 -0.08
1978 4. 98 -9 .47 -8.97 0 .71 644.93 -0.08
1979 5 . 87 -8 .07 -6.48 0.22 685.30 -0.08
1980 6.75 -9 . 89 -1 .02 -4.04 711 . 14 -0.08
1981 7.68 -7 . 87 1 .72 -1 . 50 744.23 -0.08
1982 8 . 57 -6.22 6.97 0.08 799.46 -0.08
1983 7. 37 -9.11 5.09 -2 . 13 814.59 -0.08
1984 7.65 -9.41 0.36 -3 . 89 851.86 -0.08
1985 8 . 56 -11.30 1 .09 -1 . 36 871.92 -0.07
1986 8.92 -10.77 -3 . 09 -2 . 22 883.15 -0 .07
1987 8 . 91 -11.96 -4.41 -1 .41 887.88 -0.07
Note:
(1) M-RS= MILLION R S .
(2) All absolute values are in 1975-76 prices
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(6)TEN PERCENT PERMANENT INCREASE IN INTEREST RATE 
ON FOREIGN LOANS/CREDITS 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
CURRENT
EXPORTS IMPORTS GDP ACCOUNT FOREIGN GDP
BALANCE DEBT DEFLATOR
YEARS [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [%]
1962 0.64 -8.35 -12.25 -8 . 14 8 . 14 -0.02
1963 1 .77 - 9.66 -16.65 -9.11 15.86 -0.06
1964 4.11 -14.63 -18.24 -9 . 92 23. 10 -0.11
1965 6 . 53 -18.06 -21.41 -14.53 35 . 73 -0.17
1966 10.86 -23 . 6 -20.13 -16.02 47.42 -0.25
1967 16.4 -29.32 -24.51 -21 . 15 61 . 89 -0.35
1968 24.69 -27.32 -8 . 34 -19.73 79 . 27 -0 .43
1969 35 . 26 -24.87 12 . 38 -37.04 110.58 -0.51
1970 41 .87 -42.69 7 . 02 -26.83 127.95 -0.58
1971 41 .64 -40.26 -8 -31.76 148.35 -0.66
1972 49.32 -0.71 35 . 88 6 . 52 118.85 -0.70
1973 48.37 -45.59 53 . 98 -24.23 117.40 -0.72
1974 44. 31 -33.01 61 .96 -0 . 99 94. 20 -0.70
1975 45.72 -55.48 11 . 57 -3 . 97 85 . 29 -0.70
1976 46.64 -61 . 8 -19.91 11.12 63.69 -0.72
1977 49.53 -74 . 12 -25.11 9 . 90 46.76 -0.76
1978 50.47 -80.29 -21.64 10.95 32 .21 -0.79
1979 59.55 -68.27 2 . 5 9.22 18 . 98 -0.82
1980 66.01 -78.55 55. 19 -20.27 36.63 -0.82
1981 72.17 -60.51 69. 33 -0. 14 32 . 30 -0.79
1982 76. 13 -44.89 97.31 11 . 89 17.59 -0 .73
1983 62 . 8 -74.58 54.56 -7.61 22 . 96 -0.67
1984 61 .73 -77.06 -15.22 -24.97 45.61 -0.63
1985 68 . 26 -95.56 -20.58 -9 . 83 50.71 -0.59
1986 70.46 -92.34 -61.67 -19.29 64.41 -0.58
1987 71.5 -112.79 -99.75 -30.74 86.97 -0.59
Note .
(1) M-RS= Million R s .
(2) All absolute figures ar in 1975-76 prices.
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(7)TEN PERCENT PERMANENT FALL IN 
PRIVATE TRANSFERS FROM ABROAD 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
CURRENT
EXPORTS IMPORTS GDP ACCOUNT FOREIGN GDP
BALANCE DEBT DEFLATOR
YEARS [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [%]
1962 0 . 16 -2 .07 -3 . 04 -2 . 03 2 . 03 -0.01
1963 0 . 86 -7.91 -11.84 -7 . 65 9.33 -0.03
1964 2. 29 -11.49 -17.60 -7.39 15 . 14 -0.06
1965 4.45 -16.59 -23.84 -13.53 27.43 -0 .12
1966 8.26 -24.85 -30.70 -17.39 41 .49 -0 .20
1967 14. 18 -28.35 -30.99 -19.71 55.37 -0.30
1968 23. 51 -36.31 -27.91 -28.25 81 . 53 -0.41
1969 38 . 20 -46.34 -27.44 -69.01 144.65 -0.54
1970 48.48 -57.60 -19.38 -37.15 169.40 -0.67
1971 50.63 -46.93 -7 . 74 -35 .18 189.53 -0.80
1972 72.11 -57.68 -102.62 -131 . 10 291.30 -1 .02
1973 82.68 -106.72 -37.34 -113.15 341.49 -1 . 22
1974 88 . 86 -100.97 15 . 77 -65.19 . 336.35 -1 .40
1975 111.56 -210.09 -131.30 -155.90 446.23 -1 .69
1976 145.06 -336.01 -347.27 -231.46 622.86 -2 .20
1977 201.24 -560.02 -628.97 -445.17 999.26 -3 .04
1978 266.61 -667.12 -639.80 -421.34 1343.76 -4.08
1979 378.55 -599.62 -342.53 -397.36 1574.10 -5.10
1980 484.47 -623.68 392.75 -461.73 1818.31 -5.78
1981 595.45 -613.09 514.92 -489.01 2085.60 -6.28
1982 738.09 -785.17 351 . 14 -906.09 2809.52 -6.75
1983 700.82 -954.41 333.30 -672.53 3123.18 -7.14
1984 784.90 -913.99 306.39 -525.21 3333.14 -7 .47
1985 920.56 -1075 . 52 709.84 -187.07 3174.23 -7 .57
1986 969.71 -891.12 700.14 8 .60 2815.56 -7.55
1987 934.13 -866.41 949.69 340.73 2117.46 -7.31
Note :
(1) M-Rs= Million Rupees
(2) All absolute values are in 1975-76 prices
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(8 )TEN PERCENT PERMANENT INCREASE IN 
UNIT VALUE INDEX OF IMPORTS 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
CURRENT
EXPORTS IMPORTS GDP ACCOUNT FOREIGN GDP
BALANCE DEBT DEFLATOR
YEARS [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [%]
1962 -14.47 -156.45 273.21 109.40 -109.40 0.46
1963 -38.36 -178 300.42 117.63 -208.49 1.17
1964 -85.33 -330.81 524.68 185.28 -358.50 2.42
1965 -139.83 -354.53 442.63 155.41 -484.64 3.91
1966 -213.3 -378.57 238.98 125.52 -551.30 5 .44
1967 -300.63 -423.37 -71.86 93 .21 -566.73 6.73
1968 -408.13 -497.42 -373.54 69.34 -614.74 7.61
1969 -538.3 -565.81 -583.25 70 . 00 -640.25 8 .07
1970 -563.42 -556.11 -500.31 39.22 -624.61 8 . 30
1971 -494.55 -412.47 -443.88 -30.17 -538.96 8 . 32
1972 -528.21 -350.82 -605.34 -157.49 -298.06 7.95
1973 -486.31 -533.08 -234.98 66 . 72 -300.36 7.67
1974 -466.78 -636.82 379.85 235.92 -474.41 7.86
1975 -497.48 -359.05 210.51 -128.48 -281.03 8 .06
1976 -520.13 -304.85 396.45 -248.80 2 . 30 8.52
1977 -555.69 -314.2 424.28 -263.87 265.92 9.15
1978 -576.17 -361.52 132.97 -356.65 602.12 9.71
1979 -663.7 -442.34 -351 . 5 -266.21 793.49 9.97
1980 -743.14 -573.52 -609.94 -198.37 882.21 9.93
1981 -821.69 -608.86 -568.64 -140.44 915.08 9.74
1982 -902.9 -694.21 -750.55 -121.89 957.03 9.27
1983 -777.18 -709.63 -241.84 -30.91 865.69 8.90
1984 -806.17 -721.55 52 . 86 -34.95 813.27 8 .62
1985 -904.29 -814.13 56. 52 -321.02 1049.88 8 . 36
1986 -927.76 -818.29 30. 27 -436.73 1370.81 8.10
1987 -898.57 -817.93 66 . 28 -393.77 1590.59 7.86
Note:
(1) M-RS= Million R s .
(2) All absolute figures ar in 1975-76 prices.
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(9)TEN PERCENT PERMANENT FALL IN
UNIT VALUE INDEX OF EXPORTS 
[CHANGE OVER BASE RUN]
CURRENT
EXPORTS IMPORTS GDP ACCOUNT FOREIGN GDP
BALANCE DEBT DEFLATOR
YEARS [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [M-RS] [%:
1962 -297.71 -117.24 -388.11 -123.67 123.67 -0.66
1963 -288.93 -122.08 -383.77 -114.63 217.32 -1 .58
1964 -276.58 -133.04 -322.72 -102.27 282.85 -2.66
1965 -242.96 -132.78 -199.09 -87.86 347.61 -3 .76
1966 -225 . 7 -129.35 -62.34 -65.25 370.66 -4.80
1967 -217.62 -115.74 97. 16 -73.30 391.68 -5 .68
1968 -223.07 -111.94 234.77 -77.65 454.56 -6.34
1969 -242.69 -138.79 311.05 -59.37 481.06 -6 . 83
1970 -223.04 -197.27 327.82 -17.29 457.13 -7 . 15
1971 -180.87 -218.87 270.62 11 . 08 405.45 -7.37
1972 -170.95 -61.73 -63.73 -111.89 454.59 -7.77
1973 -170.7 -287.68 589.57 122.69 233.65 -7.66
1974 -177.1 -283.3 479.75 133.23 52 . 29 -7.41
1975 -194.45 -388.03 113.15 192.49 -147.36 -7.26
1976 -189.57 -465.67 -212.67 255.25 -384.49 -7.32
1977 -178.78 -525.26 -243.45 336.26 -678.31 -7 .46
1978 -168.64 -516.61 -57.69 307.65 -933.79 -7.56
1979 -186.62 -413.48 81 . 5 302.42 -1120.14 -7 .60
1980 -230.82 -491.98 507.77 350.26 -1315.61 -7.36
1981 -284.24 -456.98 302.41 285 .36 -1440.56 -7.10
1982 -362.13 -422.58 273.03 164.13 -1478.85 -6.78
1983 -364.18 -518.65 346.06 249.04 -1538.99 -6.37
1984 -423.74 -509.38 7.67 187.81 -1571.46 -6.03
1985 -523.66 -640.64 -123.77 54. 16 -1462.50 -5.75
1986 -564.88 -611.98 -541.77 -84.28 -1216.93 -5.66
1987 -562.01 -669.02 -553 .81 1 . 29 -1063.76 -5 .67
Note
(1)
(2)
M-RS= Million R s .
All absolute figures ar in 1975-76 prices.
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Notes:
(1) Meir et al.(1969,pi)
(2) See on this point Wallis et a l . (1984 and 1985chapter 1)
and Cuthbertson and Taylor (1987,pp241-244).
(3) See for further discussion Pindyck and Rubinfield 
(1983,pp384-388)
(4) See Wallis et ell. (1985, pp5-7) and David et a l . (1987, 
ppl07-110) for algebraic treatment of exogenising an 
endogenous variable in a macroeconomic model .
(5) For distinction between fiscal and monetary implication 
of government expenditure see Blinder and Solow (1974,p57)
(6 ) Simulation here has been confined to private investment 
only. Government investment, in addition to capital stock 
also adds to financial assets. The ultimate result of such a 
simulation will be like a combined and equal increase in 
private investment and government consumption. In Chapter-7 
the impact of private investment versus government 
investment on economy has been dealt with (though it is 
slightly in different context).
(7) It may be noted that when prices are exogenous the rise
in exports is only because of change in potential output. So
the change in exports under option I and II (where prices
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are exogenous) is the same.
(8) The grant element, in addition to interest rate (viz a 
viz domestic opportunity cost of capital) also depends on 
the repayment schedule and grace period (see on this point 
for detailed discussion Chapter 3 section 3.4.1). Since 
grant element has not been explicitly modeled, reduction in 
maturity period of loans has not been simulated.
(9) In order to arrive at real values of foreign aid and 
foreign debt, as explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, unit 
value index of imports and GDP deflators have been used.
(10) Some time grants are treated as simple transfers from 
abroad making positive contributions in current account 
balance and therefore, do not appear to affect the foreign 
debt directly. In our case, as we described in Chapter 2 
grants are a part of overall inflow of capital from abroad 
which are non repayable and bear no interest.
(11) For the sake of simplicity and developing a meaningful 
argument, at one time we have assumed only a rise in import 
prices. Such a price rise depreciates the real exchange rate 
only for imports. The price change with respect to exports 
has been simulated separately.
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CHAPTER 6
EXTERNAL SHOCK AND POLICY SIMULATION
6.1 Introduction
The exercise of this chapter is a logical extension of 
Chapter 5 where effects of different kinds of shocks have 
been evaluated in very broad and general terms. Here in this 
chapter we wish to be relatively more specific.
We have noted in Chapter 1 that the objective of 
elimination of dependence on foreign capital could not be 
achieved during 1965-85. Instead, the past capital inflow 
has resulted in an accumulation of foreign debt. (See 
Chapters 1 and 3). The simulation exercise of this chapter 
is designed for a possible policy response to overcome the 
balance of payments problem and control the foreign debt 
accumulation. This has been done by introducing an external 
shock leading to an increase in foreign debt together with a 
possible cut in domestic investment.
6.2 Shock and Impact of Shock
The likely consequences of different internal and external 
shocks have been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. In the 
present exercise a shock has been defined as net loss of 
transfers of those kinds of foreign resources which are non 
repayable and bear no interest. Foreign aid fully coincides
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with this definition of resources from abroad. The effects 
of a rising interest rate on foreign loans/credits, of a 
fall in export prices, of a fall in private transfers from 
abroad etc. all ultimately cause a loss of transfers of 
resources from abroad, though their direct impacts are some 
what different which have been explained in Chapter 5. Such 
details do not change the ultimate effects of the analysis. 
In fact our direct approach here also helps to examine the 
problem of already accumulated debt since such a shock acts 
through debt identity (see identities [4.49] and [4.50] in 
Chapter 4).
A simulation exercise has been done with a shock of 1000 
million rupees loss of foreign resources in real 1975-76 
prices which is close to one percent of GDP in the earlier 
years. As an immediate impact it would increase the debt 
burden by an equal amount (in nominal terms). In real 
terms, because of different price deflators used to bring 
the foreign aid and foreign debt in current prices, the 
immediate impact is some what different as shown in Table 
6.1. (In Chapters 2-4 we have explained using different 
deflators to arrive at constant prices).
The simulation exercise has been done under following 
three different scenarios:-
(I) An equal fall in private investment.
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Table 6.1 Loss of Foreign Grants and Its 
Equivalent Direct Impact on foreign Debt Position
Current prices Constant prices
Year Grants Debt Grants Debt
1962 -267.20
1963 -277.30
1964 -271.70
1965 -264.50
1966 -273.80
1967 -269.60
1968 -268.00
1969 -270.90
1970 -276.50
1971 -297.60
1972 -607.40
1973 -795.20
1974 -1054.80
1975 -1000.00
1976 -1076.80
1977 -1173.80
1978 -1219.80
1979 -1697.90
1980 -1815.30
1981 -2010.80
1982 -2167.00
1983 -2272.40
1984 -2414.30
1985 -2354.80
1986 -2437.20
1987 -2863.70
267.20 -1000 
277.30 -1000 
271.70 -1000
264.50 -1000 
273.80 -1000
269.60 -1000
268.00 -1000 
270.90 -1000
276.50 -1000
297.60 -1000 
607.40 -1000
795.20 -1000
1054.80 -1000 
1000.00 -1000
1076.80 -1000
1173.80 -1000
1219.80 -1000 
1697.90 -1000
1815.30 -1000
2010.80 -1000 
2167.00 -1000 
2272.40 -1000
2414.30 -1000 
2354.80 -1000 
2437.20 -1000 
2863.70 -1000
00 765.62
00 777.19
00 709.22
00 671.66
00 636.45
00 608.03
00 603.74
00 592.39
00 576.76
00 585.60
00 1031.59
00 1089.61
00 1182.25
00 1000.00
00 973.07
00 973.22
00 958.51
00 1207.61
00 1165.00
00 1183.03
00 1203.15
00 1151.28
00 1155.89
00 1071.34
00 1051.74
00 1154.07
(II) An equal fall in government investment.
(III) No fall in private or public investment.
The rationale and logic of the these three scenarios are 
in line with the recent difference of opinion with regard to 
impact of foreign capital inflow on domestic investment. 
Scenarios (I) and (II) imply that foreign capital inflow 
increases the domestic investment to the full extent and
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does not add to domestic consumption ( or alternatively 
reduces savings) . A fall in transfer of resources from abroad 
is, therefore, matched by an equal fall in investment. In 
addition it also shows the consequences of squeezing of 
economy by curtailing investment to solve the problem.
Apparently it appears that there is little difference 
between scenario (I) and (II) because private and public 
sector investment are not treated separately with regard to 
their productivity. However, where private investment only 
adds to capital assets, government investment equally adds 
to private financial assets which positively influence the 
private consumption. In other words a fall in government 
investment will have more depressing effect on aggregate 
demand compared to a fall in private investment alone. 
However, it may be recalled from Chapter 1 that empirically 
we have found no relationship between foreign capital and 
government investment. It is the private investment which 
has shown positive association with the foreign capital.
The scenario (III) is the one where immediate impact on 
foreign debt is the same but since there is no fall in 
capacity output there is no immediate fall in exports. This 
could happen when either foreign capital inflow is assumed 
to have no influence on domestic investment or government 
adopt such a policy which helps to maintain the level of 
investment intact.
260
6.3 The policy response
The traditional theory of economic policy dating back to 
Meade (1951) and Tinbergen (1952) requires specific targets, 
instruments, and an empirical macroeconomic model. In the 
simulation approach, which we have described in Chapter 5, 
the values of endogenous variables, within the framework of 
empirical model,are determined under alternative assumptions 
about policy variables. The simulation exercise thus shows 
to policy-makers the implications of alternative policies, 
out of which they can select their preferred alternative. 
Such an approach has the advantage of not demanding any 
objective function from the policy makers (1).
The objective of improvement of current account deficit 
(in order to reduce the external debt), as we have discussed 
in Chapter 3 under balance of payment policies, could be 
accomplished in either of two ways (or some combination of 
two) :
(a)"expenditure changing " policies are designed to 
affect the level of aggregate demand by depressing 
economic activities which inturn reduce demand for 
imports and
(b) "expenditure switching" policies that would 
affect the composition of demand by curtailing 
imports and inducing an extra flow of goods to the
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external market.
Nominal exchange rate and real government consumption are 
the two instruments applied in each of the three scenarios 
Changing growth rate policy is implicit in the fall of 
investment in two scenarios.
6.4 Simulation Exercise
A full account of impact of different shocks with
implication of loss of foreign resource has already been
provided in Chapter 5. The detailed evaluation in this 
chapter is therefore confined primarily to change in current 
account balance and foreign debt over the base run values.
The evaluation of three scenarios starts from the most 
difficult one (where there is also a fall in private
investment) followed by scenarios related to fall in the 
government investment and no impact on investment. In each 
case we consider "expenditure changing" and "expenditure
switching" policies.
6.4.1 Fall in Private Investment
While loss of foreign transfers add to the foreign debt 
directly, as a result of shock the fall in private 
investment reinforces the accumulation of foreign debt 
because of:
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(i) the fall in exports as the capacity output 
shrinks (see Chapter 4; Equation [4.11]) and
(ii) an upward pressure on prices (also because of 
fall in capacity output) which appreciates the real 
exchange rate reducing the competitiveness for 
exports and creating additional demand for imports.
The full simulation results for change in current account 
balance, foreign debt, GDP, capacity output,and GDP deflator 
over base run values are provided in Table 6.2.
The fall in aggregate demand (as a result of fall in 
private investment and additional interest payments on 
foreign debt) has significant dampening effect on prices 
though the fall in capacity output puts upward pressure on 
price level. Initially there is relatively a higher fall in 
imports than fall in exports which produces an improvement 
in current account balance. However, this improvement is 
very small compared to shock and as a result debt 
accumulates rapidly.
Different levels of cut in real government consumption were 
simulated. The exercise revealed that it would require a cut 
of 900 million rupees to improve the current account balance 
enough to stabilise the debt accumulation. Table 6.3 
provides the yearly details of change for selected 
variables.
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Table 6.2
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of foreign transfers 
with an equal fall in private investment
Change Over Base Run
Year CAB Foreign
Debt
GDP Capac ity 
output
GDP
Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 242.29 523.33 -1199.06 -561.14 -1 . 20
1963 200.30 1088.77 -1203.10 -947.16 -2.32
1964 177.39 1545.85 -1139.33 -1216.34 -3 . 23
1965 155.47 2020.04 -1084.92 -1446.51 -3 .78
1966 137.85 2347.72 -1043.38 -1638.89 -3.97
1967 100.80 2785.05 -1150.88 -1807.92 -3.78
1968 75.82 3309.83 -1240.41 -1956.29 -3.26
1969 20.34 3784.89 -1378.16 -2059.92 -2.46
1970 21.68 4165.50 -1594.73 -2156.40 -1 .64
1971 -40.47 4555.50 -1967.01 -2259.49 -0.92
1972 -41.13 5004.63 -2301.81 -2360.27 -0 . 26
1973 -26.66 5153.99 -2563.94 -2426.23 0. 30
1974 26.96 5371.12 -2617.05 -2446.83 0.72
1975 -51.17 5843.29 -2529.64 -2407.37 1.09
1976 -131.85 6385.32 -2453.13 -2371.96 1 .42
1977 -187.98 7019.75 -2441.75 -2346.05 1 .79
1978 -255.86 7867.30 -2577.94 -2322.98 2.01
1979 -233.18 8561.65 -2651.84 -2283.31 2.11
1980 -341.07 9231.45 -2701.50 -2264.56 2 .09
1981 -297.05 9943.01 -2610.86 -2242.58 2.04
1982 -268.80 10855.19 -2652.92 -2211.75 1 . 87
1983 -322.50 11379.18 -2485.89 -2183.50 1 .69
1984 -353.96 12263.05 -2381.13 -2150.83 1.54
1985 -499.75 13224.34 -2390.50 -2114.06 1 .35
1986 -510.43 14105.69 -2355.56 -2057.55 1 . 12
1987 -512.13 14839.05 -2300.88 -2007.03 0.85
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Table 6.3
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of foreign transfers 
with an equal fall in private investment and 
900 million Rs cut in government consumption
Change Over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees] (Percent)
1962 560.90 204.72 -2378.38 -561.14 -3.23
1963 599.19 378.24 -2313.27 -947.16 -6.98
1964 646.44 415.04 -1956.82 -1216.34 -10.71
1965 701.30 374.12 -1479.50 -1446.51 -13.92
1966 709.75 269.17 -926.02 -1638.89 -16.33
1967 722.55 146.63 -368.68 -1807.92 -17.62
1968 772.92 -22.72 74.30 -1956.29 -17.75
1969 787.36 -217.02 224.54 -2059.92 -16.86
1970 857.30 -487.55 -317.03 -2156.40 -15.55
1971 850.53 -724.86 -1446.48 -2259.49 -14.41
1972 1138.95 -732.98 -2395.91 -2360.27 -13.64
1973 1519.28 -1021.03 -1617.74 -2426.23 -12.15
1974 1488.85 -1141.79 -2039.50 -2446.83 -10.69
1975 1348.57 -1367.27 -2510.11 -2407.37 -9.48
1976 1344.47 -1606.96 -2940.42 -2371.96 -8.66
1977 1323.52 -1824.70 -3033.73 -2346.05 -8.03
1978 1313.54 -2084.37 -2893.69 -2322.98 -7.54
1979 1339.90 -2018.89 -2620.14 -2283.31 -7.03
1980 1320.69 -1977.39 -2031.92 -2264.56 -6.23
1981 1150.16 -1779.90 -2160.19 -2242.58 -5.41
1982 1073.74 -1550.29 -2262.06 -2211.75 -4.60
1983 1030.12 -1293.48 -2379.30 -2183.50 -3.86
1984 948.22 -1014.65 -2698.59 -2150.83 -3.25
1985 938.63 -831.49 -2730.16 -2114.06 -2.76
1986 869.79 -606.73 -2972.50 -2057.55 -2.49
1987 918.72 -331.26 -2946.59 -2007.03 -2.37
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A permanent stability in foreign debt after the loss of 
foreign transfers require an equal improvement in current 
account balance. This happens from year 10 onwards and 
ultimately debt stabilises slightly above the base run 
values. The important points to be noted are:
(i) The significant fall in GDP which also causes 
prices to fall. At one stage prices are about 18% 
below the base run values.
(ii) The cut in government consumption is 90% of loss 
of foreign transfers if it is accompanied by an equal 
fall in the private investment and takes six years to 
fully offset the increasing debt problem.
As we have already observed in Chapter 5 exchange rate 
depreciation alone is not a solution to improve the balance 
of payments on permanent basis because of its upward 
pressure on prices which ultimately offsets the depreciation 
in real terms. A 10% depreciation of nominal exchange rate 
was simulated. In the short run it slightly improves the 
balance of payments .As prices start moving up the situation 
again deteriorates and the initial improvements are fully 
wiped out. The ultimate rise in price is more than the 
nominal exchange rate depreciation since the fall in 
capacity output is higher than the fall in aggregate 
demand. It is this difference which is causing an extra 
price rise. Table 6.4 provides results of simulation for 
selected variables.
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Table 6.4
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of foreign transfers 
with an equal fall in private investment and 
10 % depreciation of nominal exchange rate
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 464.93 300.69 -562.75 -561.14 l o H* o
1963 377.44 693.86 -669.97 -947.16 0.15
1964 326.74 1028.70 -712.05 -1216.34 0.82
1965 281.16 1391.25 -842.14 -1446.51 1.89
1966 234.08 1675.91 -1017.00 -1638.89 3 . 22
1967 192.89 2041.16 -1389.01 -1807.92 4.64
1968 163.73 2478.87 -1691.08 -1956.29 6.04
1969 99.11 2899.51 -1923.86 -2059.92 7.42
1970 65.83 3276.78 -2035.71 -2156.40 8.63
1971 -31.11 3707.78 -2263.11 -2259.49 9.68
1972 -50.14 4281.96 -2557.46 -2360.27 10.54
1973 -20.90 4565.19 -2961.66 -2426.23 11 .02
1974 13.00 4903.47 -2836.07 -2446.83 11 .35
1975 -168.39 5543.27 -2329.34 -2407.37 11 .91
1976 -368.71 6351.06 -1941.48 -2371.96 12.81
1977 -512.94 7313.27 -1926.78 -2346.05 13.97
1978 -622.21 8511.84 -2396.69 -2322.98 14.90
1979 -588.33 9500.19 -2919.67 -2283.31 15.41
1980 -685.58 10422.82 -3426.52 -2264.56 15.35
1981 -617.25 11355.39 -3259.88 -2242.58 15.08
1982 -498.34 12417.59 -3437.78 -2211.75 14.41
1983 -555.70 13038.08 -3026.80 -2183.50 13.64
1984 -580.16 14056.89 -2547.14 -2150.83 12.98
1985 -742.94 15172.16 -2343.55 -2114.06 12.35
1986 -749.11 16191.92 -2026.55 -2057.55 11.82
1987 -764.41 17039.59 -1836.28 -2007.03 11 .39
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It is evident from the simulation results that government 
consumption is crucial to neutralize the effects of loss of 
foreign transfers and fall in private investment. On the 
other hand exchange rate though not very effective in 
solving the problem has a little advantage with producing 
the effect relatively quickly. Different combinations of 
these two instruments were simulated. Combining two has not 
much changed the earlier results. It is still the government 
consumption which is dominant. Rupees 750 million cut in 
government consumption with 10% depreciation of nominal 
exchange rate stabilise the accumulation of debt though at 
slightly higher level compared to the cut in government 
consumption of R s . 900 million in isolation. Full results 
for selected variables are reported in Table 6.5. As 
expected the results are in between the two simulations 
already discussed.
Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 compare the results graphically 
of four simulations discussed in this section for change in 
current account balance, accumulation of foreign debt and 
GDP deflator over base run. The abbreviations used in the 
graphs are explained below.
(1) SHOCK (shock without any response).
(2) GC = Cut in real government consumption by.
(3) E = Nominal exchange rate depreciation.
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Table 6.5
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of foreign transfers 
with an equal fall in private investment,
750 million R s . cut in government consumption and 
10 % depreciation of nominal exchange rate
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 764.52 1.10 -1677.55 -561.14 -2.02
1963 755.96 22.30 -1717.05 -947.16 -4. 33
1964 773.71 -43.73 -1486.91 -1216.34 -6.49
1965 802.09 -172.97 -1228.45 -1446.51 -8.21
1966 780.63 -302.52 -934.77 -1638.89 -9.34
1967 789.01 -474.49 -700.77 -1807.92 -9.65
1968 834.91 -705.13 -510.59 -1956.29 -9.13
1969 839.97 -932.05 -460.34 -2059.92 -7.84
1970 873.81 -1186.13 -843.35 -2156.40 -6 . 24
1971 831.30 -1364.62 -1757.23 -2259.49 -4.88
1972 1100.65 -1246.88 -2652.65 -2360.27 -4.00
1973 1508.46 -1424.81 -2063.66 -2426.23 -2.61
1974 1472.67 -1455.89 -2272.19 -2446.83 -1 .26
1975 1230.50 -1529.44 -2266.70 -2407.37 0.13
1976 1109.36 -1518.39 -2356.85 -2371.96 1 .46
1977 1008.50 -1428.41 -2462.83 -2346.05 2.80
1978 970.73 -1365.99 -2697.81 -2322.98 3.91
1979 1026.99 -1055.77 -2923.66 -2283.31 4.77
1980 1045.64 -833.29 -2789.72 -2264.56 5.55
1981 906.94 -487.82 -2820.61 -2242.58 6.19
1982 932.14 -189.34 -3018.75 -2211.75 6.57
1983 895.69 82.82 -2847.56 -2183.50 6.84
1984 821.30 412.85 -2772.06 -2150.83 7.04
1985 820.17 643.48 -2563.67 -2114.06 7.22
1986 750.84 911.27 -2539.83 -2057.55 7.30
1987 791.61 1213.45 -2395.56 -2007.03 7.36
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(4) EGC= Cut in government consumption/depreciation
of exchange rate.
(These abbreviations have the same meaning everywhere unless 
otherwise explained)
6.4.2 Fall in Government Investment
The implications of a fall in government investment as a 
result of foreign transfers loss are significantly different 
from loss in private investment. Government investment 
directly adds to financial assets which is an important 
explanatory variable for private consumption. Thus a 
reduction of R s . 1000 million in real government investment 
simultaneously reduces the private financial assets by the 
same magnitude. This additional dampening effect over 
aggregate demand makes it more or less self correcting as 
for as current account balance and debt problem are 
concerned. The simulation results with cut in government 
investment (without any other response) are in Table-6 .6 .
It is quite obvious that under this option there is a 
relatively less pressure to use any of the two instruments 
for adjustment. The reduction of R s . 1000 million in
government investment has in itself brought enough 
improvement in the current account balance which has more or 
less stabilised the accumulation of debt. A permanent fall 
in aggregate demand which is higher than the fall in 
potential GDP has kept price level below the base run values.
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Table 6.6 Simulation of 1000 million R s .
loss of foreign transfers 
with an equal fall in government investment
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 321.43 444.19 -1492.34 -561.14 -1.70
1963 363.41 848.25 -1717.84 -947.16 -3.86
1964 412.12 1087.11 -1751.91 -1216.34 -6.25
1965 462.87 1266.36 -1653.41 -1446.51 -8.55
1966 491.76 1303.90 -1422.34 -1638.89 -10.56
1967 507.29 1365.83 -1162.94 -1807.92 -11.98
1968 563.33 1404.69 -869.80 -1956.29 - 12.68
1969 587.90 1368.02 -694.55 -2059.92 -12.68
1970 672.98 1208.74 -916.83 -2156.40 -12.38
1971 675.59 1050.24 -1602.86 -2259.49 -12.13
1972 940.57 997.49 -2176.86 -2360.27 -12.01
1973 1271.57 622.82 -1268.79 -2426.23 -11.00
1974 1243.38 448.31 -1541.31 -2446.83 -9.77
1975 1132.55 267.44 -2044.63 -2407.37 -8.63
1976 1140.95 73 . 80 -2567.22 -2371.96 -7.80
1977 1139.40 -98.47 -2817.53 -2346.05 -7.14
1978 1117.17 -251.98 -2755.86 -2322.98 -6.61
1979 1144.92 -165.38 -2589.34 -2283.31 -6.08
1980 1118.93 -103.15 -2130.61 -2264.56 -5.33
1981 987.65 100.81 -2282.56 -2242.58 -4.60
1982 919.05 379.25 -2350.91 -2211.75 -3.90
1983 884.34 613.00 -2453.50 -2183.50 -3.27
1984 819.23 915.93 -2736.95 -2150.83 -2.79
1985 809.30 1132.41 -2751.23 -2114.06 -2.42
1986 747.57 1378.29 -2911.97 -2057.55 -2.24
1987 798.91 1642.30 -2847.52 -2007.03 -2.20
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even in the long run which has helped to bring down imports 
and increase exports. How the impact on current account 
balance/foreign debt differs from the fall in private 
investment are compared in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. (FA-GI and 
FA-PI are for government investment and private investment 
respectively).
The improvement in current account balance has not only 
gradually neutralized the initial impact of loss of foreign 
transfers but has reduced the debt burden even below the 
base run debt. As the improvement in current account balance 
adds to the financial assets, fall in price level 
appreciates the financial assets in real terms, imports fall 
and exports rise, the initial dampening effect on aggregate 
demand is gradually reduced and the state of current account 
balance is reversed. It appears as if the fall in government 
investment creates a kind of cycle. However, it would be 
observed that prices in the long run stabilise around 2% 
below the base run values which is an indication of overall 
stability in the long run.
The cut in real government consumption of 100 million 
rupees further deepen the kinds of effects discussed above. 
It takes relatively less time to neutralise fully the 
initial foreign debt impact and there is very little 
increase in debt over base run values towards the end of 
simulation period. Table 6.7 provides full details of the 
simulation.
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Table 6.7 Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of foreign 
transfers with an equal fall in government investment and 
100 million Rs. cut in government consumption
Change over Base Run
Year CAB Foreign
Debt
GDP Capacity
output
[millions Rupees]
GDP
Deflator
(Percent)
1962 356.69 408.92 -1622.84 -561.14 -1 .93
1963 407.63 769.54 -1841.28 -947.16 -4.38
1964 464.27 961.66 -1843.88 -1216.34 -7.09
1965 523.87 1083.31 -1699.29 -1446.51 -9.68
1966 555.96 1072.14 -1411.11 -1638.89 -11.93
1967 577.18 1071.07 -1075.37 -1807.92 -13.49
1968 641.74 1031.86 -720.02 -1956.29 -14.24
1969 673.96 920.06 -510. 16 -2059.92 -14.22
1970 766.37 688.04 -769.35 -2156.40 -13.84
1971 774.57 460.07 -1541.21 -2259.49 -13.53
1972 1071.04 357.65 -2176.66 -2360.27 -13.37
1973 1437.48 -59.31 -1156.34 -2426.23 -12.25
1974 1397.43 -263.71 -1474.11 -2446.83 -10.90
1975 1279.05 -514.32 -2046.47 -2407.37 -9.67
1976 1294.43 -786.14 -2628.31 -2371.96 -8 .77
1977 1295.07 -1043.14 -2890.34 -2346.05 -8.08
1978 1277.56 -1307.68 -2798.89 -2322.98 -7 . 52
1979 1304.77 -1280.77 -2593.78 -2283.31 -6.94
1980 1286.08 -1276.75 -2070.55 -2264.56 -6.12
1981 1132.75 -1120.18 -2244.34 -2242.58 -5.30
1982 1053.41 -907.36 -2319.83 -2211.75 -4.51
1983 1019.41 -696.11 -2451.89 -2183.50 -3.80
1984 949.88 -451.81 -2776.72 -2150.83 -3.24
1985 953.56 -311.56 -2792.05 -2114.06 -2.81
1986 887.04 -130.83 -2978.41 -2057.55 -2.59
1987 944.29 87 .60 -2914.70 -2007.03 -2.51
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A 10 percent depreciation of nominal exchange rate has an 
immediate positive impact but as we noted earlier this 
impact on current account balance of payments is ultimately 
eroded by price rise and produces no improvement in the 
long run. The price fall is now relatively small and 
flattens quickly rather than deepening. The change in 
current account balance over base run is still positive over 
the whole simulation period under the influence of fall in 
government investment but long run price effect of exchange 
rate depreciation brings the resurgence of debt problem 
relatively quickly and sharply. Table 6.8 has the full 
simulation results for the selected variables.
A combination of Rs 100 million cut in government 
consumption with 10% depreciation has a quick neutralizing 
effect on rising debt but foreign debt again starts rising 
towards the end of the simulation period. In the long run 
prices stabilise at about 2 .5% above the base run values as 
compared to permanent fall when there is only a cut in 
government consumption or there is no response. Full 
simulations results are in Table 6.9.
Figures 6 .6 , 6.7, and 6.8 compare the changes for current 
account balance, accumulation of foreign debt and GDP 
deflator over base run values.
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Table 6.8
Simulation or 1000 million R s . loss of foreign transfers 
with an equal fall in government investment and 
10 % depreciation of nominal exchange rate
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees^ (Percent)
1962 5 4 4 . 4 5 2 2 1 . 1 7  - 8 5 8 . 9 5 - 5 6 1 . 1 4 - 0 . 6 1
1963 5 4 2 . 0 5 4 5 1 . 4 8  - 1 1 8 7 . 1 1 - 9 4 7 . 1 6 - 1 . 4 3
1964 5 6 3 . 7 6 5 6 5 . 9 4  - 1 3 2 5 . 7 2 - 1 2 1 6 . 3 4 - 2 . 3 2
1965 5 9 0 . 8 5 6 3 1 . 3 7  - 1 4 1 0 . 0 0 - 1 4 4 6 . 5 1 - 3 .  15
1966 5 9 0 . 1 3 6 2 4 . 2 6  - 1 3 9 8 . 0 5 - 1 6 3 8 . 8 9 - 3 . 8 5
1967 6 0 2 . 4 7 6 1 1 . 2 4  - 1 4 1 5 . 0 5 - 1 8 0 7 . 9 2 1 A to -0
1968 6 5 6 . 2 5 5 5 8 . 0 4  - 1 3 4 6 . 8 0 - 1 9 5 6 . 2 9 - 4 . 3 1
1969 6 7 3 . 5 0 4 6 0 . 5 8  - 1 2 7 0 . 0 8 - 2 0 5 9 . 9 2 - 3 . 9 1
1970 7 2 4 . 2 7 2 9 1 . 8 4  - 1 3 7 1 . 7 3 - 2 1 5 6 . 4 0 - 3 . 3 3
1971 6 9 2 . 4 8 1 6 8 . 4 2  - 1 8 9 7 . 2 1 - 2 2 5 9 . 4 9 - 2 . 8 9
1972 9 4 9 . 4 1 2 2 7 . 5 5  - 2 4 5 5 . 8 9 - 2 3 6 0 . 2 7 - 2 . 6 9
1973 1 3 2 0 . 0 5 - 4 6 . 8 5  - 1 7 1 2 . 0 3 - 2 4 2 6 . 2 3 - 1  . 7 7
1974 1 2 8 3 . 0 9 - 1 3 9 . 1 7  - 1 7 8 5 . 4 4 - 2 4 4 6 . 8 3 - 0 . 6 3
1975 1 0 6 5 . 7 0 - 1 8 9 . 8 6  - 1 8 2 2 . 9 8 - 2 4 0 7 . 3 7 0 . 6 9
1976 9 5 7 . 3 5 - 1 5 5 . 8 5  - 2 0 1 1 . 0 2 - 2 3 7 1 . 9 6 2 . 0 7
1977 8 7 5 . 7 5 - 4 5 . 5 3  - 2 2 7 1 . 3 1 - 2 3 4 6 . 0 5 3 . 4 5
1978 8 2 8 . 0 7 8 7 . 2 9  - 2 5 7 5 . 4 2 - 2 3 2 2 . 9 8 4 . 6 3
1979 8 8 6 . 7 3 3 9 9 . 8 9  - 2 8 9 6 . 6 9 - 2 2 8 3 . 3 1 5 . 5 2
1980 9 0 1 . 7 6 6 2 4 . 0 8  - 2 8 7 0 . 6 7 - 2 2 6 4 . 5 6 6 . 2 6
1981 7 9 4 . 9 9 9 6 0 . 1 7  - 2 9 3 0 . 8 0 - 2 2 4 2 . 5 8 6 . 8 3
1982 8 2 6 . 6 2 1 2 8 2 . 6 5  - 3 1 0 2 . 0 2 - 2 2 1 1 . 7 5 7 . 1 2
1983 8 0 0 . 4 3 1 5 2 1 . 2 8  - 2 9 2 5 . 9 8 - 2 1 8 3 . 5 0 7 . 2 8
1984 7 4 2 . 7 7 1 8 5 0 . 7 0  - 2 8 2 7 . 4 7 - 2 1 5 0 . 8 3 7 . 3 6
1985 7 4 8 . 8 1 2 0 8 1 . 2 0  - 2 5 9 9 . 4 4 - 2 1 1 4 . 0 6 7 . 4 1
1986 6 8 6 . 5 8 2 3 3 9 . 2 3  - 2 5 0 0 . 7 0 - 2 0 5 7 . 5 5 7 . 4 0
1987 7 3 4 . 0 0 2 6 0 4 . 5 9  - 2 3 1 4 . 6 3 - 2 0 0 7 . 0 3 7 . 3 9
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Table 6.9
Simulation or 1000 million R s . loss of foreign transfers 
with an equal fall in government investment,
100 million R s . cut in government consumption and 
10 depreciation of nominal exchange rate
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 579.58 186.04 -989.75 -561.14 I o CO »f^
1963 586.46 372.70 -1310.40 -947.16 -1.95
1964 616.41 439.92 -1417.79 -1216.34 -3.18
1965 652.49 447.13 -1457.05 -1446.51 -4.33
1966 655.08 390.67 -1389.59 -1638.89 -5.31
1967 673.51 313.56 -1332.96 -1807.92 -5.91
1968 736.18 180.77 -1203.95 -1956.29 -6.04
1969 761.49 6.37 -1091.58 -2059.92 -5.62
1970 819.86 -237.02 -1226.27 -2156.40 -4.98
1971 793.89 -431.88 -1834.55 -2259.49
00I
1972 1084.28 -425.45 -2456.78 -2360.27 -4.25
1973 1493.79 -747.42 -1598.86 -2426.23 -3.21
1974 1446.00 -875.13 -1715.93 -2446.83 -1 .95
1975 1220.74 -1001.53 -1818.70 -2407.37 -0.52
1976 1119.84 -1051.81 -2065.96 -2371.96 0.92
1977 1041.52 -1033.34 -2341.61 -2346.05 2.33
1978 1000.35 -1021.19 -2619.14 -2322.98 3.53
1979 1060.45 -777.14 -2904.70 -2283.31 4.46
1980 1085.93 -622.16 -2810.08 -2264.56 5.29
1981 956.45 -343.78 -2890.83 -2242.58 5.95
1982 977.68 -98.95 -3065.06 -2211.75 6.35
1983 953.09 107.90 -2915.97 -2183.50 6.60
1984 890.61 367.23 -2859.52 -2150.83 6.77
1985 913.32 506.99 -2630.22 -2114.06 6.90
1986 845.38 687.25 -2560.52 -2057.55 6.94
1987 899.36 896.52 -2377.56 -2007.03 6.97
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6.2.3 No Fall in Investment
A loss of foreign transfers with no implication for 
domestic investment is the easiest scenario. The rationale 
of such a possibility has already been explained. The 
immediate impact of loss of foreign transfers is only in 
terms of increase in foreign debt. Table 6.10 provides the 
yearly details of impact of shock with no response.
A little fall in aggregate demand pushes the prices down. 
Depreciation of the real exchange rate then positively 
affect the current account balance. However, over the whole 
simulation period there is no significant change in current 
account balance. The foreign debt accumulation is therefore 
continuously on the rise.
The simulation exercise suggests that it will require 750 
million rupees cut in real government consumption to hold 
the rising trend of debt. The cut in government consumption 
is 17 % less compared to the scenario when there is a fall 
in private investment. Full simulation results for selected 
variables are in Table 6.11.
The impact of exchange rate depreciation is in conformity 
with other results. A ten percent depreciation shows some 
improvements only initially. There is a permanent rise in 
current account deficit over base run values as a result of
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1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Table 6.10
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of 
foreign transfers 
with no fall in investment 
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity
Debt output
[mi 11 ions Rupees;
GDP
Deflator
(Percent)
0.00 765.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
-23.79 1549.86 -33.38 0.00 -0.05
-29.43 2182 .11 -65.44 0.00 -0.17
-39.06 2833.54 -74.67 0.00 -0.35
-34.68 3264.91 -66.03 0.00 -0.56
-42.97 3818.71 -57 .11 0.00 -0.80
-36.71 4454.86 0.78 0.00 -1 .00
-65.00 4981.71 63 . 38 0.00 -1.13
-41.95 5370.78 55 .61 0.00 -1.24
-47.75 5699.76 30.27 0.00 -1 .35
20.47 5930.65 98 . 98 0 . 00 -1 .38
31.53 5842.91 203.59 0.00 -1 .28
29.96 5931.66 162.21 0 . 00 -1 . 13
9.66 6282.57 47.81 0.00 -1 .01
19.56 6630.88 -44.72 0.00 -0.94
16.59 7040.48 -90.80 0.00 -0.93
11 .09 7619.99 -100.88 0.00 -0.95
4.98 8099.65 -74.45 0.00 -0.99
-45.19 8518.69 -11.72 0.00 -1.00
-17.78 9010.32 16.02 0.00 -1.01
-0 . 10 9706.31 76.20 0.00 -0.98
-27.34 10035.66 52.05 0.00 -0.94
-51.05 10690.54 -6.75 0.00 -0.92
-24.03 11254.30 0.97 0.00 -0.89
-38.91 11765.55 -52.69 0.00 -0. 89
-34.39 12175.92 -73.44 0.00 -0.91
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Table 6.11
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of of foreign transfers,
with no fall in investment 
and 750 million cut in government consumption 
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 264.60 501.02 -981.77 0.00 -1 .67
1963 309.25 958.00 -971.36 0 . 00 -3.97
1964 365.01 1236.44 -779.46 0.00 -6.58
1965 423.59 1450.92 -456.53 0.00 -9. 16
1966 454.23 1510.37 -29.63 0.00 -11.42
1967 492.90 1580.53 543.26 0.00 -13.03
1968 569.43 1613.07 1077.91 0.00 -13 .83
1969 606.00 1552.19 1429.01 0.00 -13.87
1970 693.03 1364.37 1183.65 0.00 -13.50
1971 737.70 1134.95 539.54 0.00 -13.18
1972 1057.08 954.10 108.70 0.00 -13.01
1973 1381.93 477.45 1154.20 0 . 00 -11.99
1974 1291.97 280.82 765.55 0.00 -10.82
1975 1211.26 39. 29 114.96 0.00 -9. 86
1976 1279.30 -270.72 -456.16 0.00 -9.26
1977 1296.46 -571.63 -616.72 0.00 -8.91
197B 1329.00 -912.25 -399.72 0.00 -8.61
1979 1316.38 -934.46 -81.52 0.00 -8.23
1980 1326.81 -1005.01 500.23 0.00 -7.53
1981 1168.52 -906.82 340.28 0.00 -6.79
1982 1092.12 -744.74 342.03 0.00 -5.96
1983 1064.77 -593.07 74. 16 0.00 -5.17
1984 997.65 -402.22 -327.22 0.00 -4. 55
1985 1124.73 -435.61 -338.73 0.00 -3.99
1986 1062.16 -423.59 -604.48 0.00 -3.60
1987 1104.30 -345.81 -639.53 0.00 -3.34
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extra interest payments for accumulated debt. This however 
tends to get stabilised when prices stabilise at a level 
close to the exchange rate depreciation. Table 6.12 provides 
full details of simulation for the selected variables.
A combination of 750 million rupees cut in government 
consumption and 10 percent depreciation of exchange rate 
has the outcome in the middle when these two instruments 
were applied in isolation. There is a significant improvement 
in current account balance for a number of years exceeding 
the level of shock. The foreign debt changes in terms of 
long cycles because of cyclical change in price level. Full 
results for selected variables are given in Table 6.13.
Figures 6.9, 6.10, 6,11 compare the results of different 
simulation for change in current account balance, foreign 
debt and GDP deflator over base run.
6.5 Conclusion
The external imbalance is primarily caused by excess of 
demand over aggregate supply and ,therefore, any attempt to 
restore the external balance by squeezing investment, 
further reduces the aggregate supply (though aggregate 
demand is also reduced) because of its direct implication 
for capacity output which influence exports (positively) and 
prices (negatively).
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Table 6.12
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of of foreign transfers,
with no fall in investment 
and exchange rate depreciation of 10 %
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 226.49 539.12 639.84 0.00 1 .09
1963 155.77 1148.75 504.57 0.00 2.44
1964 121.34 1657.76 370.84 0.00 3 .96
1965 86.62 2197.75 183.70 0.00 5.48
1966 60. 12 2588.13 -20.36 0.00 6.86
1967 46.61 3072.49 -276.37 0.00 7.90
1968 47.28 3625.50 -439.13 0.00 8.58
1969 8.44 4103.21 -483.80 0.00 8 .99
1970 -5.23 4496.05 -395.32 0 .00 9.22
1971 -47.56 4874.40 -280.36 0.00 9.37
1972 0.00 5238.75 -180.77 0 . 00 9.48
1973 23.63 5292.59 -248.05 0.00 9.45
1974 4.15 5507.32 -95.50 0.00 9.45
1975 -122.73 6036.36 239.36 0.00 9.71
1976 -236.42 6664.36 482.23 0.00 10.30
1977 -328.19 7415.98 439.94 0.00 11 .04
1978 -371.92 8358.89 73 .61 0.00 11 .65
1979 -360.63 9134.05 -374.69 0.00 11 .96
1980 -391.74 9798.61 -781.09 0.00 11 .86
1981 -334.44 10500.34 -662.41 0.00 11 .60
1982 -216.67 11329.02 -731.70 0.00 11.11
1983 -241.51 11730.57 -485.50 0.00 10.56
1984 -254.38 12495.53 -148.14 0 . 00 10.07
1985 -231.28 13176.78 84. 84 0.00 9.67
1986 -237.58 13787.73 314.83 0.00 9 .40
1987 -239.28 14269.27 432.00 0.00 9.24
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Table 6.13
Simulation of 1000 million R s . loss of of foreign transfers,
with no fall in investment, 
and 750 million cut in government consumption and 
10 % depreciation of exchange rate 
Change over Base Run
CAB Foreign GDP Capacity GDP
Debt output Deflator
[mi 11 ions Rupees; (Percent)
1962 489.92 275.69 -342.60 0.00
QOIf)01
1963 490.36 556.49 -431.91 0.00 -1.54
1964 519.11 708.39 -343.98 0 . 00 -2.65
1965 553.74 807.07 -206.39 0.00 -3.78
1966 554.17 821.06 -3.98 0.00 -4.76
1967 589.59 815.05 284.37 0.00 -5.40
1968 663.52 754.36 586.70 0.00 -5.55
1969 692.54 632.10 835.81 0.00 -5.20
1970 744.45 435.28 714.71 0.00 -4.56
1971 754.25 241.96 234.90 0 . 00 -4.04
1972 1066.45 173.98 -183 .19 0.00 -3.80
1973 1433.04 -203.06 694.61 0.00 -2.88
1974 1334.95 -318.81 514.45 0.00 -1.81
1975 1146.31 -430.75 343.52 0.00 -0.68
1976 1096.72 -512.90 112.82 0 .00 0.42
1977 1034.51 -531.88 -62.81 0.00 1.44
1978 1044.22 -589.79 -224.56 0.00 2.33
1979 1066.18 -392.40 -405.64 0.00 3.03
1980 1123.15 -312.22 -257.05 0.00 3.70
1981 990.41 -93.61 -316.70 0.00 4.27
1982 1017.61 97. 21 -411.06 0.00 4.71
1983 1001.11 238.88 -387.30 0.00 5.05
1984 941.57 440.05 -399.98 0.00 5.29
1985 1091.82 397.68 -165.56 0 . 00 5.56
1986 1029.52 399.44 -176.55 0.00 5.79
1987 1070.55 456.53 -93.53 0.00 6.02
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In Chapter 1 we have discussed that government investment 
is little influenced by the foreign capital inflow and a cut 
in foreign capital primarily affects the private sector 
investment. Our analysis, however, suggests that a smaller 
volume of other adjustment measures are needed where there 
is a cut in government investment (because that also 
depresses private wealth and, therefore, private 
consumption) rather than private investment.
Though it is neither advisable nor possible for Pakistan 
to discontinue meeting its foreign exchange requirements 
from abroad, a policy of heavy reliance on foreign capital 
to finance domestic investment is a risky proposition. In 
view of difficulties in getting soft loans and credits in 
future, it is imperative to mobilize domestic resources in 
order to achieve the target levels of investment. If it 
could not be done for any reason then there is no quick-fix 
solution to the problem and a cut in domestic expenditure 
becomes necessary. Keeping in view the difficulties in 
cutting government spending and further squeezing the 
private consumption from the existing low level, the private 
investment is likely to be most vulnerable.
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Notes
(1) Lack of knowledge of policy makers objective functions 
poses serious difficulties when applying to theory of 
economic policy .{See for example (i)Ben.(1990) and (ii) 
Arestis and Hadjimatheou (1982, pp200-210)}.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Foreign capital as an important agent for economic growth 
has been widely relied upon in Pakistan over the past four 
decades. This policy was designed with a clear target to 
eliminate the dependence on foreign capital by the end of
1985. The overview of past growth strategies (Chapter 1)
suggests that foreign capital has been relied upon as an
easy option for a very long period in order to achieve the 
planned growth targets. The strategies of economic growth in 
Pakistan have been influenced mostly by the fashionable 
ideas of the time.
The economic performance during the past four decades has 
been remarkable and Pakistan has been amongst the leading 
developing countries in terms of economic growth. But this
record has been built on an increasingly unstable
foundation. The economy is now experiencing the problem of a 
continuous rising external debt and as a result the debt
service liabilities are utilising about two third of the 
gross inflow of new capital from abroad. Lack of sufficient 
balance of payments margin to cushion the economy from the 
unexpected shocks has rendered the economy at risk of an
economic crisis and any further acceleration in the
build-up of foreign debt might increase the debt service to 
an unmanageable proportion.
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After a detailed evaluation, we have arrived at the 
conclusion that the balance of payments problem of Pakistan 
is not of a temporary nature and it can be corrected only 
with an appropriate policy measures. Such a policy 
formulation requires an implicit macroeconomic model which 
could link the policy instruments with the balance of 
payments. Having arrived at this conclusion, we proceeded 
with our study further in following three broad stages
(a) We built an empirical macroeconomic model for 
Pakistan in which we combined the aggregate demand, 
inflation balance of payments, financial and capital 
assets accumulation and foreign debt. This is a 
significant improvement over the "two gap model" 
which see the balance of payments in the context of a 
developing country like Pakistan only as a structural 
problem. Similarly our model goes well beyond the 
traditional Keynesian type demand determined models 
because it not only includes supply side of the 
economy but also allows the financial assets to 
change with a change in government spending and 
current account balance.
(b) We simulated our model under various exogenous 
and policy induced shocks in order to analyse their 
impact on key economic variables such as GDP, prices, 
imports, exports, current account balance and
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foreign debt.
(c) Our final simulation of Chapter 6 is of 
particular importance where we have explicitly 
examined different possible implications for the 
domestic investment when the economy is subjected to 
an external shock which reduces the net availability 
of foreign resources. In the light of our findings of 
Chapter 1 that fall in foreign resources which 
reduces private investment, we have simulated a shock 
of cut in the net foreign resource availability with 
an equal cut in the private investment or government 
investment. Working through these two scenarios has 
helped us in understanding different kinds of 
implications of a cut in private versus government 
investment. The simulation exercise has been further 
extended using policy instruments of cut in 
government consumption or exchange rate depreciation 
(and a suitable combination of the two) so as to 
regain the pre-shock stability in foreign debt and 
current account balance.
The results, we obtained, from the simulation exercise 
were found to be broadly consistent with widely held priori 
views. We have arrived at following important conclusions.
(i) Typically, a current account deficit of the balance of
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payments that creates a need for adjustment results from 
expansion of aggregate demand while aggregate supply remains 
unchanged. Such an expansion is mostly associated with 
excessive public sector expenditure. The same is true for 
Pakistan where excess of government expenditure over revenue 
is considered to be one of the principle reasons for balance 
of payments and foreign debt problem, {see World Bank Report 
(1988, p9)>. The corrective action should, therefore,
include measures to reduce government spending in real 
terms. Our simulation results also, very strongly, support 
this view. In fact, in order to achieve a visible and quick 
improvement in the balance of payments (and therefore 
foreign debt) a significant restraint on government spending 
has to be exercised. The reason is that a cut in government 
consumption reduces aggregate demand directly (being a part 
of aggregate demand) and also through fall in private 
consumption (because of its assets creation affect). Thus a 
cut in government consumption in our model improves the 
balance of payments deficit in two ways:
(a) reduction in aggregate demand reduces the demand 
for imports to the extent of strength of marginal 
propensity to import; and
(b) fall in aggregate demand depresses the domestic 
price level which depreciates the real exchange rate 
and thus further reduces imports and promotes
292
exports. However, it may be noted that in a dynamic 
system where we allow all the chain of effects, a 
gradual fall in imports and rise in exports will 
again push up the aggregate demand. Similarly 
improved current account balance of payment adds to 
financial assets boosting private consumption and, 
therefore, aggregate demand. In this way the initial 
improvement in current account balance of payments 
gradually declines (1).
(ii) Competitive exchange rates are equally important and 
crucial for any successful future balance of payments 
policy. Overvalued currency (in real terms) discourages 
exports and increases demand for imports and ultimately 
generates pressure for import protection. This appears to be 
what has happened in Pakistan. While the protection of 
import substitute industry in Pakistan is very high compared 
to many developing countries the exports for the most of 
period have been promoted by various ad hoc administrative 
measures. Such a policy has been perhaps adopted under the 
influence of the "two gap" model which assigns no role to the 
relative price change in promoting exports and reducing 
imports. However, we have found that both exports and 
imports do respond to relative price changes brought in by 
exchange rate depreciation. But in order to maintain the 
real competitive exchange rate a regular adjustment in 
nominal exchange rate has to be made according to relative
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rates of inflation at home and abroad. Any nominal exchange 
rate depreciation in isolation ultimately causes the prices 
to rise by the same margin and the initial real exchange 
rate depreciation is neutralized. Thus, unless the nominal 
exchange rate depreciation is supported with appropriate 
other policy measures, so that domestic prices do not rise 
faster than prices abroad, maintaining a competitive 
exchange rate will need a regular depreciation. Such a 
policy, however, might be difficult to manage for too long a 
period unless supported with measures like cut in government 
budget deficit and expanding the capacity of the economy for 
a short run and medium/long run management of the external 
balance respectively.
(iii) We have noted in (i) above that the external 
imbalance is primarily caused by excess of demand over 
aggregate supply. Any attempt to restore the external 
balance by squeezing investment would further reduce the 
aggregate supply (though aggregate demand is also reduced) 
and in view of its direct implication for capacity output 
{which influence exports (positively) and prices 
(negatively)} ultimately outweigh any initial improvement in 
the balance of payments. The difficulty is that in case of 
Pakistan, as we have observed in chapter 1, the government 
investment is little influenced by the change in foreign 
capital inflow. A short fall of foreign capital reduces the 
private sector investment. The simulation results clearly
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demonstrate that adjustment is stronger with reduction in 
government investment because that also depresses private 
wealth and therefore private consumption. Thus the same 
level of adjustment can be achieved with a smaller cut in 
government investment than in private investment.
(iv) The economic structure of Pakistan has been supported 
and sustained for a very long time with the help of 
concessionary capital from abroad. Inspite of the fact that 
Pakistan has successfully avoided expensive borrowing at a 
very large scale from abroad, yet it is quite obvious that 
the continuous shift from grants and grants like soft 
loans/credits to hard commercial kind of loans is exposing 
the economy of Pakistan under increasing danger of debt 
rise. The simulations done in terms of raising interest and 
cut in grants have powerfully supported this view. Under 
these circumstances, though it is not advisable to 
discontinue borrowing from abroad yet a policy of heavy 
reliance on foreign capital as an integral part of high 
growth strategy has to be adopted with greater care. A 
policy to mobilize domestic resources and earn foreign 
exchange in order to support domestic investment activity at 
a target level has to be pursued rigorously. If such 
measures are not taken then it seems increasingly difficult 
to sustain a high growth strategy for such a long period as 
has been done in the past.
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NOTES
(1) In order to see the impact of government consumption on 
other economic variables we have simulated a permanent 
increase in real government consumption in Chapter 5. We 
have explained in the beginning of Chapter 4 that these 
simulations provide us a kind of "policy multipliers" or 
"ready-reckoners" .and hence the results can be safely 
interpreted for a cut in government consumption.
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